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PREFACE 
A literature that does not contain an informing structure 
built upon coherent thought is likely to represent a random collection 
of ideas without any real cohesion. Much·of contemporary literary 
criticism blithely assumes that the whole of the significance inherent 
in a text rests in a simple unfolding of the arrangement of its images 
and motifs, as if a story or poem exists independent of its author's 
world-view. This is not to deny that much valuable work has been 
accomplished by the formalist approach; rather, the hegemony of that 
school of thought has :precluded other possibilities from gaining a wide 
understanding. 
The need far fresh approaches was made clear to me in. Aprilt1978 
at the home of Dr. Timothy Austin, who had invited his graduate class 
in lingUistics to meet the eminent British linguist, Dr. Roger Fowler. 
Dr. Fowler gave a presentation of current techniques he had been 
developing to show the underlying meaning, or deep-structure (to use 
the terminology of that branch of English studies), of poems by W. H. 
Auden. After the ensuing discussion, Dr. Fowler was kind enough to 
speak to me privately on this topic for well over an hour, reviewing 
various possible alternatives to the critical approaches that have held 
the field in recent decades. 
Though many details of that conversation have disappeared with 
the good fellowship of that evening, an extremely interesting 
iii 
point that remains. As we continued to talk over new methodologies, 
Dr. Fowler left this student with a feeling that he believed he had found 
a rock upon which to ground his method of preserving the extra-literary 
meaning o:f a text without reducing it to nothing more than a philosoph!-
cal treatise. Only at the end of that evening, when Dr. Fowler's Ma.:r:xism 
was revealed, was the student forced to defend his orthodox Christianity. 
Fowler and the student finally agreed that his method could easily be 
used to preserve either ideology (or any other philosophy) for examina-
tion in serious literature without wrenching the thought from its 
literary context. 
The speaker and the student agreed at that evening's talk that 
one school of thought, the pragmatic {which T. S. Eliot once derided as 
1 the "lemon-squeezer school" of criticism), has virtually monopolized 
literary analysis for well over a generation; and that any one school 
of philosophical inquiry is virtually incompetent to judge the pre-
suppositions and doctrines of any other school without falling into a 
hopeless muddle. 
Each philosophical system contains an aesthetics appropriate to 
its own biases which flows inevitably from its metaphysical and ethical 
beliefs. For idealists, aesthetics is the queen of the sciences. Mater-
ialists, say, by their own standards, are thus incapable of determining 
the artistic quality of a poem by Keats or an essay by Santayana. Such 
1Russell Kirk, Eliot and His Ages T. S. Eliot's Moral 
Imagination in the Twentieth Century. (New York= Random House, 1971), 
p. 398. 
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attempts have produced a great deal of horrendous communis~ and psycholo-
gical criticism over which it is best to draw a curtain of charity. But 
a Marxist or Freudian ~ tell us whether or not a work is good Marxism 
or Freudianism and whether or not it follows the canons of the aesthetics 
that flow from those persuasions. 
The assumption to be made from this data is that all literature 
worthy of the name is to some extent a literature of ideas. ·As Vernon 
Parrington observed over half a century ago: " ••• poetasters have 
shouldered aside vigorous creative thinkers. "2 The object of these pages 
is to show the possibility of reengaging literary work with the history 
of ideas rather than to cater to "those whose disedged appetites find 
no savor in old-fashioned beef and puddings ... 3 
2vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: 
An Inter etation of American Literature From the Be innin to 1 20 
New York1 Harcourt, Brace, 1930 , p. vi. Parrington argued for main-
taining a critical tradition of discussing literature in terms of its 
manifest ideas rather than limiting discussion to formal elements. 
3Ibid, pp. vi-vii. 
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CHAPI'ER I 
THE NATURE OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOO<mrY 
To comprehend the relationship of philosophy to literature as 
it affects the novels of Charles Williams, it is first necessary to es-
tablish the ~alidity of some analytical tool that will allow the inves-
tigator to recognize a generic philosophy, and then to be able to dis-
tinguish the specific differences among the individual philosophical 
systems. In this paper, the writer will identify eight distinct schools 
of thought and place the thought of Williams in one of these traditions. 
It will further be argued why this tradition, better than any of the 
others, elucidates the achievement of Williams. 
From one point of view, that of Richard McKeon of the University 
of Chicago, philosophies may be analyzed into principles, methods and 
conclusions. 1 Professor McKeon, perhaps the dean of American philosophy 
teachers, has influenced a whole literature that has come to be known as 
historical semantics. McKeon himself was influenced by A. 0. Lovejoy's 
The Great Chain of Being~ The best known of the many extrapolations of 
1Richard McKeon, Thoughts, Actions and Passions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 1-29. 
2Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1936). 
1 
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McKeon's approach has been the Great Ideas and Great Books programs in the 
Syntopicon of Mortimer Adler.J Less familiar but more rigorously systema-
4 tic have been the works of Stallknecht and Brumbaugh, who attempted a 
synthesis of the oeuvre of McKeon and Steven Pepper, the author of World 
Hypotheses.5 The strong influence of Alfred North Whitehead on Stallknecht 
and Brumbaugh, however, led to the lasing of their synthesis on numerous 
idealistic concepts to be found in The Function of Reason. 6 In this paper, 
I have generally followed the descriptions of philosophical systems in a 
more contemporary thesis,? one using an approach that neither proliferates 
categories like McKeon, nor overly conflates them like Pepper. 
The discipline starts with the idea that confronted with any 
quandary, the human person discovers that he lacks certain knowledge in 
order to be able to solve a given problem. There are two possible methods 
~ortimer J. Adler, ed. The Great Ideal A Srntopicon of 
Great Books of the Western World (Chicago• Encyclopedia Britannica, 
1952), 2v. (Vols. 2-3 of Gr~t Books of the Western World in 54v.) 
4 N. P. Stallknecht and R. S. Brumbaugh ~ompa.ss of Philosophy 
(New York: Longmans, Green, 1954). 
5steven Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966). 
6Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Bostons 
Beacon Press, 1966). 
7William Lloyd Smith, "System Construction in Science, Theo-
logy and Philosophy& The Myths Men Live By." Thesis. DePaul University, 
Chicago, 1971, passim. 
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of filling in the lacunae, both of which begin with experience. In the 
first, the person takes from experience some class of events, gives this 
class the dignity of calling it a principle, and then follows the impli-
cations of this principle, and treats the conclusions there drawn as 
valid, possessing the comparable dignity and certitude of the original 
events. This way of dealing with events is called synthesis. 
Alternatively, the second method--that of analysis--takes some 
assemblage of events, and reduces the whole to some basic element, type, 
form,or purpose in an attempt to discover the original nature of reality. 
At this point, it should be noted that the very method or logical approach 
selected by the observer results from the class of events chosen to ini-
tiate the process, which is an elaborate way of saying that metaphysics 
(or first principles) is also a meta-logic, itself determined by the 
events selected to begin the rational process. 
The term metaphysics has four possible meanings; the first three 
derive from Aristotle directly, while the fourth comes from him oy a 
barbarism. Three of the meanings are accidental in the Aristotelean sense 
that distingu~shes substance from accident. Because Aristotle's first 
principles were taken from logical categories, those thinkers who use 
epistemological, anthropologica1,or linguistic principles b~ve often 
been considered anti-metaphysical; because metaphysics comes to theologi-
cal conclusions, some shallow thinkers have confused the two, to the dis-
service of both disciplines. Finally, metaphysics has been used as a 
misnomer for the occult sciences. It seems more useful to employ the 
terms a) metaphysics, b) ontology, c) theology, and d) occult to describe 
the four differing concepts. 
4 
The first (and most proper) meaning of metaphysics is first prin-
ciples or arche protas. This designation emanates from a dilemma that 
Aristotle states both in the Metaphysics8 and the Posterior Analytics. 9 
He argues persuasively that every argumeni must begin somewhere with 
either an unproven statement or with an undefined term, because of the 
problem of infinite regress or vicious circle. If we prove A by B and B 
by C to theN, the logical progression must stop at some point, or else 
repeat the process, proving C by B and B by A. Hence, the unproven pre-
mises (gratuitously called self'-evident) of any philosoph:.' constitute 
the metaphysics of that school of thought, which in turn will generate 
the aesthetic bases of any art flowing from it. :t is necessary to note 
that it makes no difference whether the philosopher starts with undefined 
terms (the preference of logical positivists) or with unproven principles 
(the preference of classical philosophies) because every principle, being 
a proposition, is composed of terms; ar.d the definition of any term is 
composed in a sentence. Therefore, i~ follows that the attempt to re-
solve metaphysics in terms of a prefe~ence either for first terms or for 
first principles leads once again into the dile~~a of infinite regress 
or vicious circle. 
':'he metaphysician uses first prin·~iples to discover new knowledge. 
Not every random thought or prejudice has much of a chance of being gen-
erally accepted as a self-evident proposition, nor as an intuitive term. 
R ~Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in Basic Works, ed. Richard r1cKeon 
(New York: Raudom House, 1941), pp. 715-751. 
9Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," Basic ·works, pp, 110-113. 
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(For these purposes, Newton's length, time,and mass are terms, whereas 
Aristotle's laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction, 
are principles.) From these considerations it follows that the terms of 
metaphysical discourse, as well as the concomitant principle~ must be 
posterior to the act of knowing, since the function of metaphysics is to 
proceed from the known to the unknown. 
To attempt to understand comprehensively, historical semantics 
tries to discover perspectives thinkers and writers have used over the 
centuries. The present author has been fortunate enough to have become 
acquainted with a systematic analysis which is almost perfect for the 
present purpose. In this system, the act of knowing involves four ele-
ments: a knowing subject (anthropology), a way of knowing (epistemology), 
a language which communicates that which is known (linguistics) and a 
known object (ontology). Each of the possible metaphysical positions has 
the general form stating that man is an A (anthropological term like will, 
intellect, body or agent) who by E (epistemological term such as intuits, 
perceives, senses or alters) the I (a linguistic index such as meaning, 
category, matter or utility) of 0 (ontological term such as existence, 
essence, event or relation). Eight possible real philosophies result. 
(See Appendix I) 
The chart contained in the appendix shows a complete catalogue of 
all possible first principles, which can be confirmed by taking a standard 
history of philosophy and correlating the first principles of each of 
the philosophers discussed with the schema of the chart. Although this 
eight-fold analysis may not be the last word in historical semantics, it 
is adequate for the purposes of this study. 
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The statement above that principles determine methods is now 
demonstrable. If a philosopher starts with one principle as he does in 
any of the monistic systems, (which reduce all reality to only mind 
or only matter), he must use an analytical logic for the simple reason 
that some logical forms, e.g., syllogism, can only begin with two paral-
el propositions (s isM, and M is P); and a dialectical logic must have 
two partially contradictory first principles. The H-egelians, Marxists, 
Buddhists and Spinozans use the notion that every unity eontains internal 
contradictions; no such contradictions would be possible unless every 
experience contains more than one principle. 
The monistic philosophers, who start from one principle and then 
analyze it (because all that can be done with one reality is to examine 
it), nevertheless differ' from each other in the results of their analysis 
by virtue of the content they choose to consider. 
Some illustrac,ive examples will be profitable at this point. 
(It should be added that the labels employed to designate some of these 
philosophies are by no means satisfactory; one hardly thinks of Thoreau 
as a r1aturalist, Rousseau as a mystic or Gautama Buddha as a materialist, 
but the rigors of logic in this field force the analyst into such seem-
ing anomalies.) The mystic begins with his gi·ren revelation, and con-
fronts his opponent by accepting his antagonist.'s :"acts, but denies his 
rationale. Thus, Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution begins with his 
all-absorbing intuition of ~he Hebrew Father-God and then confronts the 
Darwinian evolutionists by accepting their data but showing that Darwin's 
rationale of the survival of the fittest coupled with the idea of natural 
7 
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selection is inconsistent with these data. Once having shown Dar-
win's mistake, Bergson is free to assimilate evolution as the creative 
working of God in the universe. Rousseau confronts the social contract 
theories of materialists like Spinoza and Hobbes with a defense of his 
own mystical belief in freedom by arguing that mankind entered the social 
contract only to preserve its own freedom, and that when the social con-
tract stands in the way of human freedom, it is null and void. Thus, 
Rousseau is free to use the argument that when any social contract fails 
to meet the needs of human freedom, men must revolt and create a new 
contract. This is another example of mystical assimilation. 
The idealist finds in his experience (which, ex-hypothesis, is 
I 
the only possible ground for his empiricism) various categories which are 
always two analytical pairs perpendicular to each other, e.g.' the wet-
dry, hot-cold of AnaxL~nder. Perhaps the most fecund modern. example is 
contained in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. In The Function 
~ R h . t . th t th f f 1 k · t 1' t 11 OI eason, e maJ. ~. aJ .ns a ere are our ways o oo J..ng a rea J.. y. 
In his attempt to refute the notions of entropy and the death of the world, 
arguments extrapolated from the common understanding of the second law 
of thermo-dynamics (the hypothesis that the degenerate form of all ener-
gy is heat and, therefore, when all the bodies in the universe have 
reached the same temperature, all action--including life--will stop), 
1 01 A ) ~ / .L , 
10Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt, 
passim. 
11Whitehead, The Function of Reason, nassim. 
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Whitehead posits an idealist scheme. His two sets of opposite terms are 
Bergson's God against Einstein's materialist universe and, perpendicu-
larly, Plato's ideas contrary to Aristotle's prime matter. (See Appen-
dix II) While it is perfectly true that the closed-universe, as seen 
from Einstein's point of view, is slowly reaching a heat-sink death, an 
examination of the other positions on the chart reveals that Bergson's 
God continually shovels new Aristotelian prime matter into the universe 
and organizes it into the forms of :Plato's ideas. In this metabolis-
tic analogy, the anabolism that destroys the universe for Dr. Einstein 
balances a continuous creation which replaces all which was lost by en-
tropy, and indeed this process increases the intensity of reality and 
even its amount by catabolism. The process involved in all such idea-
listie philosophy is one of categorization. 
A light-hearted but apt example of such procedure would be con-
tained in the preparation of spaghetti sauces. Each tomato-based spaghetti 
sauce is unique; but each contains tomato sauce, onions, garlic, and 
olive oil. It is important to note that for every idealist, all four of 
his categories are immanent, but that only one is also transcendent (e.g., 
Bergson's God, or whatever is the principal ingredient giving the spa-
ghetti sauce its essential savor). The model Whitehead erects derives 
from Plato's idealistic trilogy (The Sophist, The Statesman,and 
Parmenides) in which it is taught that the four categories are motion 
and rest perpendicular to being and non-being. 12 As the opposite of 
1~lato, "The Sophist," in Dialogues, ed. Benjamin Jowett 
(New York: Random House, 1937), ii. 221-280. 
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nothing, Being is transcendent, and as substance it is immanent. 13 It 
should be noted in passing that only in this trilogy does Plato use 
language precisely in this way. 
The naturalist seeks to reduce all reality to only atoms of time 
and space. Two of the more famous examples are the atoms of Democritus 
or Epicurus, and the moments of time in David Hume 7 s thought, moments so 
radically discreet that they even deny the possibility of any causality. 
In a naturalistic novel, two characters cannot even understand each other 
unless they share the identical experience, and it follows, from the s~~e 
point of view, that a man and a woman in such literature are never able 
to 1mderstand each other because of his masculine and her feminine points 
of view. (Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms is a classic case in 
pcii-t.) Because abstract no~~s have no meaning for the naturalist, he 
will impose no categories. He can write about Joe or Harry, but not about 
mankind, just as Halt Hhitman writes about leaves of grass, or a song of 
himself. The naturalist is usually obsessed with the perverse, the uni-
que, the different, the freak. Much of the modern American theatre, the 
stages of Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller, is the domain of natura-
lis~s. Their works are usually short, because all they can give is 
immediate detail. 
The pragmatist is concerned solely with the context in which 
knowledge is gained. For hL~. there are actions without actors. The per-
son is the sum total of those actions whose utility he is capable of 
10 
altering. An obvious example is Ayn Ran~ who uses, or perhaps abuses, 
Aristotle's rules of logic as captions for her chapters in The Fountain-
14 ~· The only real people for Miss Ra_~d are those who are able to al-
ter the world. There is a distinctly similar view in neo-Freudianism, 
neo-Marxism, and neo-Darwinianism. The vast majority of American psycho-
analysts are representative of the neo-Freudian viewpoint; Leon Trotsky's 
opportunistic communism is the prime example of neo-Marxism; whereas the 
relativism of John Dewey or the social parwinians adhere to a pragmatic 
neo-Dar,;inianism. Many, though by no means all, of the attempts of struc-
turalist critics to accept nothing but relationships within a text as 
the only valid mode of treating a piece of literature are but further 
means of presenting pragmatism as the yardstick by which all insight is 
gained. In another case, that of Jean-Paul Sartxe's ~eing and. Nothinsness 
under the label of "Existential Psychoanalysis," the author gives the 
reader the paradigm of the skier who, like all of Sartre's anti-heroes, 
possesses an essence that is merely a whim, and who has an existence made 
manifest only by that essence. 15 · He maintains that the snow by itself is 
nothing, or rather, that it is both a bridge and a swamp; it becomes 
what it "is" by virtue of·the use that the skier makes of it. But the 
skier only enters reality by using himself as a skier. He has no reality 
14 Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead. 25th Annivers~J Edition 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), passim. 
l5Jean-Paul Sartre, Bein and Nothin ess: An Essa• in Pheno-
menological Ontology, tr. Hazel E. Barnes Citadel Press, 
1956), passim. 
11 
in himself; he is only his project, i.e., his being as skier. 16 
Turning to the dualistic philosophers (those who hold that 
reality has at least two natures, e.g., mind and matter), in the Republic 
of Plato, in which both the idealistic mind and the r~turalistic body 
are principles, it is found in the Allegory of the Cave that the body 
truly senses but does not perceive that which must be understood by dia-
lectical climbing. Rationalistic literature, written on the assumption 
of the tr~th of this stage of Plato's development, consists of works of 
discovery as, say, in the novels of Thomas Wolfe where he delights in 
playing with the concepts of Hegel's logic, the sole function of which is 
to supply Plato's Republic with a methodology: "A stick is not a stick, 
but also the negation of stick. "17 A thesis has cha."lged into an anti-
thesis from which synthesis is possible. In the long,' searching ~ovels 
of Wolfe, the actions do not exist for the sake of those actions, but 
rather far the sake of the self-revelation of the main character, who 
only at the end comes to know who he is. 18 
In contra-distinction to the rationalism of Plato is the will-
intellect dichotomy of Aristotle, or realism (ontologically, St. Thomas 
Aquinas's distinction between essence and existence), 19 which in the farm 
16Ibid. 
i?Thomas Wolfe, Of Time and the River (New Yo~k: Charles 
Scribners' Sons, 1935), Such dialectical horseplay is scattered 
throughout the text. 
18Ibid. passim. 
19st. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949), p. 56. 
12 
of the Poetics, is probably the source of more verbiage than all the 
other critical tools combined; the all-pervasive influence of the Poetics 
on nee-classical writing is too well-known to be mentioned except in 
p:tssing. The contemporary audience is perhaps familiar with the films 
of Alfred Hitchcock, the actions of which are never very far from 
Aristotle's understanding of catharsis. Hitchcock himself maintained 
that he designed his films with the express intention that his audience 
20 
experience intense emotion, and then be purged from it. 
. 
It is a truism that because Aristotle treated man as a mixture 
of substance and accident, and because he held that only formal and final 
causes are of the nature of the divine beast, he regarded only those 
emotions capable of universalization as being proper perfections of 
humanity. Hence ~and happiness make a man to be a man because they 
are the same in all men, but fear and anger are ·unique in each man, and 
hence they are defects in his humanity which must expunged by catharsis 
so that he may return to his universality. One may remember Tolstoy's 
famous opening line in Anna Karen ina' "Each happy family is happy in 
the same way, but that each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. n 21 
20Francois Truffaut and Helen G. Scott, Hitchcock (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1967), passim. 
21 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, tr. Cons~~ce Garnett (New York: 
Heritage Press, 1952), p. 15. 
13 
In materialism, which is a combination of naturalism and mysti-
cism ~ee Appendix 17 (Marx would have said base and super-structure, 
or Freud would ~Ave said instinct and conscious ego), a writer so minded 
produces works with an immense amount of naturalistic detail; every bit 
of this detail is organized to some central fruition such as the withering 
of the state to be reached at the end of Marx's communism, or the achieve-
ment to be attained by Freud's psychoanalyzed man. The function of 
thought to the materialist is to resolve his contradictions so as to 
reach his inevitable nirvana. An excellent literary example is found in 
Herman Hesse's Siddartha. 22 The hero (Buddha) conquers temptation by 
giving in to it, and is, therefore, no longer bothered by it. Because 
materialist authors by their nature must take their readers through a 
seemingly interminable number of contradictions before a_~iving at their 
ultimate heavens, they tend to produce huge works like the Cowperwood 
trilogy of Dreiser, 23 and because they do not believe in a transcendent 
good and evil, they must show even capitalistic heroes like Cowperwood 
as great and glorious beasts in life's jungle. Materialistic writers L~ 
the guise of Calvinistic determinism (absolute determinism is the hall-
mark of this philosophy) have provided a wide literature which includes 
the works of Melville, Hawthorne, Somerset Maugham and Marcel Proust. 
The remaining position is that of the conceptualist, who is de-
termined to retain both Aristotle's distinction between the will and the 
22Herman Hesse, Siddhartha, tr. Hilda Rosner. New Classics 
Series (New York: New Directions, 1951), Passim. 
23Theodore Dreiser, The Financier (New York: Bell and Cock-
burn, 1912) The Titan (New York: Bell and Cockburn, 1914); The Stoic 
(New York: World Publishing, 1972), passim. 
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intellect, and Plato's distinction between the mind and the body inasmuch 
as--for the conceptualist--will, intellect,and body are three separate 
principles. Th~s position is perhaps best understood by turning to 
Dostoevsky's The Brothers Kararr~zov, though philosophically it is better 
understood in terms of Kant's three types of propositions (synthetic 
a priori, analytic,and synthetic a posteriori), 24 Soren Kierkegaard's 
Three Stages on Life's Way (aesthetic, ethical,and religious), 25 Dun 
Scotus's addition of haecceitas or thisness to matter and form as princi-
ples, 26 or the Socra:tic is, could, and ought of the Euthyphro, 27 In The 
Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky presents the sensualist Smerdyakov, 
the idealist Ivan, and the mystical Alyosha as the three stages in the 
life of the whole man Dmitri, who goes through sensualist~ intellectual, 
28 
and mystical stages. The sine qua non of conceptualist aesthetics is 
that a work of art should attempt to balance these three etages with each 
other, so that it takes b.oth the extra-artistic premise that the artist 
holds as a man, and the sensuous aesthetic detail of the world he chooses 
to describe, and synthesizes them into a wholly new intellectual form 
created for a specific resolution, i.e., the individual work of art. 
24 Immanuel Kant, The Criti ~r. Norman Kenny 
Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
25soren Kierkegaard, Stages of Life 1 s Way, tr. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), passim. 
26Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Parisl Libraire ?hilosophique 
J. Urin, 1952) pp. 464, 466, 469. 
27 Plato, "Euthyphro, " Dialogues i, 38 3-398. 
28 Fyodor Dostoevsky, ':'he Bro-chers Karamazov-, tr. Constar1ce 
c;arnett (New York: Macmillan, 192J), passim. 
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It follows from the previous considerations th4t artists, who are 
after all men, and who have philosophies (which is simply another way of 
saying that all men have some view of reality--and in mature men these 
views are coherent and internally consistent)--it follows that their works 
of art are embodiments of their philosophies, and that, therefore, there 
can be no theory of aesthetics that does equal justice to the conceptual-
ist Dostoevsky, the materialist Dreiser, the realist Pope, the rational-
ist Wolfe, the mystic Camus, the idealist Keats, the naturalist Whitman 
and the pragmatist Rand. The beginning of wisdom in the criticism of lit-
erature is to discuss the writer's success or failure in following 
the criteria of his own philosophy. 
CHAP!'ER II 
THE Al!STHETICS OF CONCEPTUALISM 
Easily the most influential schools of aesthetic thought in the 
history of the Western world are those descending from ~lato and Aristo-
tle, which usually go by the names of romanticism and classicism respec-
tively. There is, therefore, a tendency of critics to reduce most works 
of art to being examples of one or the other of these schools. Unfor-
tunately, a term like romanticism may be misapplied ubiquitously to Words-
worth's naturalism, Shelley's rationalism, Keats's idealism, Blake's mys-
ticism and even (under the theory of guilt by association) Byron's realism, 
which is poetry with an Aristotelian structure. Byron's famous comment 
that he preferred a beginning, a middle, and an end rather than to plunge 
into his work in medias res (the typical gambit of the romantics) is on~ 
. 1 
one of the many Aristotelian hallmarks of his works. Perhaps the most 
obvious realistic device in his writing--which should be cited to lay a 
groundwork for dstinguishing realism from conceptualism--is his insistence 
on maintaining the regularity of his form, and to keep it simple and 
traditional. Not for him are the sprung rhythms of a Coleridge or a 
Hopkins. On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between Coleridge's 
rationalism and Hopkins's conceptualism. For Coleridge, a poem 
1 George Gordon Noel Byron, Lord Byron, "Don Juan," in Complete 
Poetical Works (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1905), pp. 747-748. Byron in 
this passage deliberately distinguishes his intentions from those of his 
contemporaries by alluiing directly to the Poetics in the opening 
sentence of Don Juan. 
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progressively reveals what he takes to be a higher truth, and that anta-
gonism between the worlds of farm and content can only be asserted by 
the poet, who destroys by synergy the rhyme and the meter. 2 
In HopkinJs work, however, the violation of the standard rules 
of rhythm is not a product of the antithesis between the prison of the 
body and the eye of the mind. Rather, sprung rhythm is the necessary con-
sequence of three levels of meaning in his work, and in these three levels 
are contained the result consequent of holding a conceptualist aesthetics. 
It has already been established that the conceptualist accepts both the 
Aristotelian distinction between will and intellect as well as the 
Platonic dichotomy between mind and body. To express both these distinc-
tions in poetry, it is necessary to begin with a statement of the will, 
that is, with a statement about good and evil •. This non-artistic, or 
extra-literary statement comes from the artist himself (note Kant's idea 
that men make each act representative of all mankind).3 Such a proposi-
tion being a general principle must be stateable in a sensuous milieu. 
But a sensuous milieu cannot be reduced to an intellectual principle or 
to the logical form of the work as it would be for an Aristotelian. Many 
realist poets shy away from specific detail, seeking their poetic truth 
in universal statements. To argue the truth of this statement in the 
case of Byron would require a long digression; Pope is a more obvious 
example of_such universality. On the other hand, the conceptualist de-
lights in the sheer joy not only of the sensuous detail, but also in the 
~or a complete discussion£!· Richard Harter Fogle1 The Idea 
of Coleridge's Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1962), pp. 49-69. 
3such a tendency seems implicit in nearly every applicable 
page of his writing. 
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sensuous suggestiveness of the language in which that detail is des-
cribed. Hopkins delights in words like dappled, minion, vermilion and 
fretted. Because both the detail and the statements of moral belief are 
first-premises for him, he simply offers both; they need not be proved. 
It follows, therefore, that far the conceptualist in general, and 
Hopkins in particular, the logical form of a work will be unique. No two 
works of a conceptualist will be exactly the same in structure, far the 
function of the structure is to unite a very specific moral principle with 
a very specific net of sensuous details. A Hopkins line is usually ex-
tremely concrete: "As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame. "4 
Also he erects variation of meter into a principle; as other writers may 
vary their rhythms only to avoid monotony, so Hopkins varies his meter as 
the result both of the external truth he states and of the internal necess-
ity of suiting form to function. But for all the richness of the detail, 
and for all the complexity of the form, the entire kingfisher sonnet is 
dominated by the line: "Crying What I do is me: 4 for that I came." It 
is the only line that is subjective to the artist, whereas every other 
line is either sensuously objective to him or categorically objective, 
such as the statements about Christ. 
One may gain aesthetic distance from conceptualist literature by 
referring to the equivalent aesthetics in the other art farms. For exam-
ple, in the history of painting, the early medieval mystics care nothing 
for sensuous exactitude. In a given painting may be found a tiny donkey, 
4Gerard Y.ianley Hopkins, "As Kingfishers Catch Fire Dragonflies 
Draw Flame," in Poems, 2nd ed. ed. by Charles Williams (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1931), p. 53. 
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a medium-sized St. John,and a towering Christ. In short, sensuous detail 
exists only to express meaning. By the time of Giotto, and the concomi-
tant naturalistic revolution, many paintings exhibit the tortured features 
of a tortured Christ and a distinctly suffering Mary, both of whom are 
unique, and the viewer can know them solely from the analogy of the models 
who posed for the projects. The struggle to bring some formal order into 
the naturalistic revolution was the work of the Monumentalists--Uccelo, 
Castagno, Piero della Francesca, Peruginq and Mantegna: 
While they were all students of the new "realism," (read natural-
ism) they were even more s~gnificant in being bold and original 
thinkers in the sphere of pictorial design. Their aim was the 
life-giving disposition of mass, line and color.5 
This means that they attempted to synthesize naturalistic detail with the 
underlying idea--which, by definition, is Platonic rationalism. 
This romantic "realism" then gave way to the true realism of 
Leonardo. In the famous Last Supper, the classical form, balanc~ and 
structure of the work come close to forcing the observer into calcu-
lating so that he can determine which one is Christ. The volitional 
meaning, the extra-artistic, and the religious dimension are nearly lost 
in k~s determination to view his subjects in a perfectly harmonious syn-
thesis. Despite his many artistic virtues, in a Leonardo the viewer search-
es in vain for the power of the simple, early medieval cartoon of the huge 
Christ dominating the medium-sized St. John and the tiny donkey. 
Michelangelo led the artist of his epoch out of the near banal-
ity of form and content without meaning. In one of the most important 
5navid Robb and J.J. Garriso, Art and the Western World. Jrd 
ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 644. 
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works, the eighteen foot tall statue of David, with the exception of the 
right hand, the entire work is carried off in a relatively true-to-life 
manner. The proportions do not violate what might be reasonably expected 
in a well-proportioned athlete. Unlike the ancient Greeks, Michaelangelo 
does not shrink the size of the head to make the muscles appear powerful, 
but that hand, that right hand, that right hand that held the sling that 
slew Goliath, that right hand that saved the children of Israel and kept 
the flame of Judah alive for Christ and Christianity--that right hand is 
five times the size of the left hand. The moral significance of the work 
resides in the proportion of the hands. Many people see this statue and 
understand the importance of it, but only on reflection do they notice the 
disproportionate size of the one hand, because, if the audience were imme-
diately to spot a gross difference, that very grossness would so offend 
as to render ineffective the statue as a work of art. By a subtle appli-
cation of what plastic artists have come to call harmonious distortion, 
Michaelangelo blends that hand into the whole figure in such a way as to 
preserve the unity of the total conception. 
Michaelangelogs process of harmonic distortion next finds life 
in the paintings of El Greco. To understand El Greco's work, one may take 
as an analogy the columnar supports of the Gothic cathedrals. The medie-
val architects tended to break up the facade of a ten-foot thick column 
into minute rivulets which appeared as enormous chords aspiring after God. 
Similarly, El Greco elongates his figures in recognition of the tension 
in any human being between the downward gravity into the City of Man and 
the upward pull into the City of God. (A tangential remark is necessary 
at this point; some critics who evidently practice medicine vicariously 
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have alleged that they have discovered an astigmatic condition evident in 
El Greco's work. Anyone who has an experimental bent may view a human 
figure and a painter's canvas through a lens that distorts a model to make 
it look taller. Using the same lens to see what he is painting--on the 
hypothesis that an artist sees his canvas with the same eyes that see his 
. 
model--the painter will see both his model and his representation as tall 
and thin, but both would then be shorter and fatter than he sees them. 
Hence the astigmatic explanation of El Greco's painting is absurd.) His 
harmonic distortion suffers from only one possible aesthetic objection--
that the elongation is too obvious. 
The need to distort with sublety receives its final culmination in 
Rembrandt. That Dutch master painted in his studio by candlelight, not 
with one large candle, but with innumerable small candles, each of which 
was movable to permit its use to distort the expression of the model, or 
to distort the significance of some part of the model's body. The viewer 
readily discerns the sensuous detail the artist sees, but he is not the 
passive receptor of his model. Rather he both receives sensations from 
the mass which is his model, and he creates in part those sensations by 
determining where and how the light will fall. Subtly he can make a man 
into a saint, a fooJ,or a devil. The dominating spiritual quality of 
Rembrandt's vision necessitated the invention of such techniques. 
Subsequent impressionists and their successors reveal obsessive 
concern with various experiments with light, ~ut because they lack his 
vision, they do not fully comprehend the use of lighting. Hence they 
produce a series of interesting intellectual exercises: Seurat's 
pointillism, Cezanne's cubism, or Monet's out-of-focus tecbnique. 
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In Michaelangelo, El Greco11 and Rembrandt, there is the grand 
sweep of conceptualist aesthetics in plastic arts. Alternatively one can 
turn to architecture to see the naturalistic buildings of Mies van der 
Rohe, the idealistic structures of Le Corbusier,and the conceptualist 
houses of Frank Lloyd Wright. 6 ~~apartment building by Mies, with its 
massive glass walls, oppressively brings in the entire world to the apart-
ment dweller,who becomes nothing but a naturalistic product of his experi-
ences. Only his tiny bathroom shuts out the world where he stands naked 
in front of large mirrors which give him to himself as object rather than 
as subject. Such contemplation correlates precisely with Zen Buddhism. 
Zen of course takes the attitude of the object treated objectively 
and ... the subject, i.e., the Poet himself as theme, treated objec-
tively ... ordinary people being in the state of ... the subject treat-
ed objectively ... still wandering about in ignoFance of the laws of7 their being, which govern them even while they wander in ignorance. 
If Mies's man is a product of his experience, and his art is an 
intensification of his experience, then Le Corbusier 1 s man is outside his 
experience and his art is a revelation of new experiences. He seems to 
care nothing for the man who lives in his buildings; they confront the in-
habitant. If an inmate finds a lavatory perfectly proportioned to its 
adjoining sink, but neither of them in proportion to his own body, so much 
the worse for this poor misshapened and misproportioned soul; should he 
decide to read a book, he might find a beautiful blinding light (like the 
1976), 
6 CL ~eter Blake, The Master Builders (New York: 
passim. 
Norton Library, 
7Roger Blyth, Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics. 
Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1942, p. 71. 
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one flooding into Plato's cave) assaulting his eyes through a narrow 
clerestory. It may even remind him of what Edna St. Vincent Millay says 
somewhere, that burning a candle at both ends makes for a glorious light. 
Under the conceptualist maxim "form follows function," a typical 
Frank Lloyd Wright house does not merely provide a home far the one who 
purchases the building, but it indicates who he could and should become. 
It may contain a dramatic kitchen two stories high, reaching through the 
roof of the house, stage-lit to illuminate it, and it may be surrounded 
by half-walls, turning the whole work-space, normally a. prison, into a 
stage where the housewife is the star. The half-walls may permit the 
housewife to be seen from every part of the house. {No woman living in 
such a Wright house ever rolled into the kitchen in curlers.) One can 
then enter the massive walk-in fireplace, having no equal since the Table 
Round. Beside it stands one of Wright's five-foot thrones. Huge four-to-
eight-foot deep eves even project beyond the glass doors, forming a sym-
bolic extension of the occupants' control of the space beyond him. It is 
the passer-by who feels the domination of the owner, rather than the 
owner feeling the criticism of his environment. The purpose of Wright's 
designs is to turn the Willie Lomans who buy them into Siegfrieds. In 
New York he constructed the Guggenheim Museum for abstract art as a spiral 
staircase leading up to a skylight whose ribs form an inverted star of 
David. On the ground floor, a tree grows out of the water reaching up 
to Guggenheim's Jewish God through the abstract skylight. Far the 
Unitarians of Madison, Wisconsin, Wright built a long church, open only 
at the apse behind the minister. The apse is only a large picture 
window, for the Unitarian sanctuary is nature outside the church building. 
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The vision through that window.is a forest, a beach, a lake,and a sky. 
Again, in Milwaukee, Wright's Greek Orthodox church is an acoustically 
perfect inverted saucer of stressed concrete over a smaller saucer 
facing upward, holding the congregation. At the time of construction, 
the Orthodox Church permitted no musical instruments since only the human 
voice was allowed to praise God. Thus his acoustically perfect auditorium 
is an apt expression of Eastern Orthodox theology. The decision far the 
a cappella choir reflects the ethereal spirituality of the Orthodox 
Church with its enormous passion far the Holy Ghost. 
This mystical aesthetic of music finds counterpart in the ration-
alism of Brahms, when, true to the principles of German Platonism, he 
wrote the North German Quartets. In this work, sensuous melodies are 
dialectically extended into logical harmonies which squeeze these tone-
poems into abstruse musical ideas. Finally, a synthesis of mind and body 
brings back some, but not all, of the original music, and some, but not 
all, of the logical form--neither being allowed to destroy the other. In 
the resolution, both sense and reason must limit themselves to provide a 
compatible vehicle. The beautiful melodies swell just to the point, but 
not beyond the point, where the form would be lost. Brahms is supposed 
to have said to the young Mahler, when both of them were watching a rock 
drop into a pond creating great ripples, "after me, the deluge. ,B He 
clearly foresaw that a composer like Wagner would go beyond the point where 
the swelling lyricism could conform to the logic. When the logical form 
broke down, he knew that the romantic rationalism that he and Wagner 
8This is an oft-repeated story; whether or not it is true 
historically does not affect the truth of the statement. 
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shared must dissolve as it did in the abstract intellectualism of 
Schoenberg. 
Against the rationalism of Brahms and Wagner, the clear, lucid 
Aristotelianism of Mozart's perfect symphonies imposes sanity in a world 
of passion. Like Aristotle, Mozart believed in moderation. Each note 
is clear and distinct, joining together to form a perfectly constructed 
unity. This is the essence of classicism, it is not that this clear, 
lucid melody lacks meaning; it is only that the meaning has restraint. 
Against this dichotomy, or rather to unify both the classical and romantic. 
Beethoven in the Ninth Symphony creates a new form for the·symphony 
(adding choral poem) in order to bring forth the extra-aesthetic premise. 
He takes for his text Schiller's "O:le to Joy," the premise of which is 
"Oh, how happy I am that my God exists." The form which he creates is one 
that unifies that premise with the sensuous elements that began the 
symphony. In the previous symphonies of Haydn and Mozart, the fourth 
movement invariably intends to resolve rather than to transcend the pre-
vious movements. Beethoven in transcending his instrumental movements 
with a chorale to God is followirrg Bach's lead. Bach redesigned many of 
the musical instruments of his time, and altered many of the musical 
forms in order to make the music carry his spiritual beliefs. Thus the 
harmonic distortion necessary to weld the spiritual to the material in a 
new logical form reveals itself in all the arts. 
Conceptualist art is often attacked on the grounds of being pro-
grammatic, and clearly it is antithetical to theories advocating "art for 
art's sake," or that the "medium is the message." Nowhere is this criti-
.. 
' 
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cism so strong as in the attacks on conceptualist writers as polemicists, 
and the attempts to rule them out of court. Dostoevsky would have freely 
confessed that his works were religious polemics; Dickens is nothing if 
he is not a social polemicist. For Hopkins, the meaning of his poetry is 
an expression of Dun Scotus's philosophy.9 What must be understood here 
10 is Aristotle's discussion of the uses of la.ngua.ge. Ia.ngua.ge may be used 
to describe empirical detail; this is the subject of grammar or semantics. 
Language may be used to describe logical processes as 1n logic or syntac-
ical considerations. Or language may be used to convince other persons 
to change their values. This is the function of rhetoric. The concep-
tua.list might easily accuse his opponents of lack of rhetoric, which is 
to turn their antagonists' charges against them, for rarely is the power 
of writing 1n its formal elements. One may generally state that the rbe-
torical premises of nearly all conceptualist art are statement·s about re-
ligion, se~ or politics. The works of Euripides are the perfect examples 
of all three--the gods, women, war. He does not shrink from having his 
11 deus ex machina literally deliver the ~ on stage. If the deity must 
be invoked to solve the problem in front of the artist, the artist must 
call for the workman capable of performing the task. 
This brings us to another defining characteristic of conceptual-
1st writing: its extreme concreteness. The God of the conceptualist is 
9w. H. Gardner, "Introduction to the Fourth Edition," The Poems 
of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. xxi. 
10 £!.McKeon, Thoughts, Actions and 1assions (Chicago: University 
of Chicago lress, 1954), pp. 158-169. 
11
s1r Richard Claverhouse Jebb, "Euripides", Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 11th ed. (New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910), ix. 902. 
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not a being-qua-being, a first principle uncaused, a symbolic meaning of 
life, the greater conception than which nothing can be conceived--rather 
his God is the patriarchal Father, not too different from the first 
bearded patriarch. The conceptualist poet does not demur from real evil. 
Dostoyevsky's devil, Dante's hell, and Dicken's slums are not mere nega-
tions, privations or absences of perfection--they are hovels of hell, as 
much as in the words of another conceptualist, Francis Thompson, God is 
"The Hound of Heaven. " Dante's prostitute in hell is submerged in a 
layer of excrement; the stench of the feces is not a privation, not an 
absence of perfection, nor does it have any connection with the ennui of 
the modern existentialist. 12 
The conceptualist writer differs from both the Platonists and the 
Aristotelians by his insistence on using his art as a form propaganda; 
but it is still necessary to distinguish between the propagandistic art 
of the conceptualist and the propagandistic art of the materialist. Most 
readers are familiar with the long and somewhat tortuous novels of Hardy, 
Melville, James T. Farrell, ~· al. The hallmark of these works is their 
total and absolute determinism, in which the pathetic heroes can only 
curse a world they never made. As the materialist philosopher shares with 
the conceptualist both the rich, sensuous detail and the intuitive, extra-
artistic premise, the difference between them must be found in the former's 
acceptance and the latter's rejection of a logical form created to unify 
the sensuous with the moral. Observe how the sense detail in a Melville, 
a Dreiser, or for that matter a Norman Mailer, rises up like a rich, 
England: 
1~ante Aligheri, Hell, tr. Dorothy L. Sayers (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1949), p. 185. 
pounding, heavy ocean, eternally, dialectically smashing whatever it 
creates. Such writers are often accused of using grand passion in the 
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place of farm. Their very formlessness gives them drama--which is the 
epitome of their greatness, when they have it. The doctoral candidate, 
seeking to show his mastery of form, might be excused from even dealing 
with the materialist school of literature, were it not for the two major 
exponents of the schools Tolstoy's War and 1eace and the tragedies of 
Shakespeare. In War and Peace we are told that we must reject the view 
that a man named Napoleon conceived, implemented, and willed to conquer 
an area named Russia. Rather, we are told that for no fathomable reason 
a mass of humanity, from urges it did not understand, was impelled to 
march across half of Eurasia; and then for equally incomprehensible 
reasons, turned around, and in a disastrous rout, fled. 13 Further we 
are told that the battles were not won by generals, but were lost by 
virtue of unforeseen events. The author's allusion seems to be to the 
old saw that for want of a nail, the shoe was lost ••. It is to Tolstoy's 
humanity that we owe the abandonment of this determinism to the maturity 
of his later works such as Anna Karenina. 
-.: .. :j:'OCf 
~ 
In the tragedies of· Shakespeare - including Richard III or Romeo 
and Juliet, Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, Othello--we find that the central 
characters are personages who look or sound much as one might picture 
Shakespeare himself at the age when each of the plays was written. From 
the Hunchbacked Richard III through the star-crossed lovers Romeo and 
Juliet, to Macbeth destroyed by the prophecy of the witches (the Fates of 
13Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, tr. Louise and Aylmer Maude 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 1253-126). 
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the Old Greek tragedy), can be seen a series of heroes whose destruction 
is an inevitable consequence of forces against which they have no control. 
In Othello, the character, Iago--who is clearly an embodiment of 
Fate--possesses a one-dimensional evil, which is a preliminary study far 
the less incarnated fate preached by the witches in Macbeth. If in Lear 
it is learned that people must do as they do, in Macbeth it is learned 
that people cannot do other than as they do. 14 And once again, a female 
Iago, Lady Macbeth, plays the role of Fate, guiding Macbeth to his 
destruction. This digression into materialism was made necessary by the 
need to distinguish the propagandistic art of the conceptualist, which 
is grounded in free will, from the deterministic art of the materialist 
which, even when it has the image of the god of a Calvin or a Spinoza, 
is intlistinguishable from the laws of physics. 
The hallmark of a conceptualist fiction is, then, the story of a 
hero, who by conscious choice of the good (defined by the author) enters 
into a struggle with evil. It will be seen later that just as a material-
ist writer often uses an impersonal antagonist, such as society in the 
hands of a Marxist writer, so at least one conceptualist writer, the one 
with whom this work deals, uses the impersonal force of the good through 
whom many characters in the same piece may rise for moments like a parade 
of Christian saints in their martyrdom, making their small sacrifice in 
imitation of the great Sacrifice by Him who redeemed us all. The separa-
tion of the momentary embodiments of the good from the good itself as an 
impersonal hero is a necessary device for a pious Christian author who 
can neither excel the gospel, nor add a jot or title to it. 
14La~os Egri, The Art of Dramatic Writing (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1960), p. 109. 
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As the conceptualist views morals from intention rather than from 
objective act, his heroes will blunder, for they hung the last perfect 
Man on a Cross. His heroes will at times 9e temporarily bested by evil 
men whose intention he does not divine, but always it will be with his and 
their intentions that the reader will be concerned, and as a consequence 
the conceptualist novel will always be a struggle between good and evil. 
Yet in spite of this generic struggle, the conceptualist's heroes, as well 
as his villains, will remain concrete human beings; in other words, peo-
ple the audience can know. In an analysis of conceptualist art and also 
of a novel of the author whose work forms the inspiration far this thesis, 
these areas must be brought to light: 1) the sensuous milieu and the 
concrete detail that form the area and the character of the gladiators 
in the particular works, 2) the moral premise, the extra-artistic state-
ment that is being made and far which the author wrote his wark,and 3) 
the formal structure of the work, for only after an analysis of the sensu-
ous and moral elements can the audience discover the rule of proportion 
or logic which he has created in order to unite the natural with the 
supernatural. The criticism of his effectiveness must wait until is dis-
covered from the physical and moral elements the body for which they must 
form a skeleton. Something more needs to be said of this requirement, 
for criticism most often proceeds from an analysis of form first, and 
thence to such physical or moral details as may appear within the work. 
In the conceptualist novel, not to mention conceptualist criticism, the 
reversal of this process is true; for the individual conceptualist, the 
discovery of the form is the last and the crowning artistic achievement 
rather than the beginning. It may be said that the conceptualist discovers 
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his form in medias res; for that very reason, it is the most difficult 
part of his artistic creation, and the place where he is most likely to 
fail. At such times he is quite likely to envy the materialist who can 
simply allow the grand passion of his milieu to lead whither it will, 
without needing any unity of these two elements {sense and moral), where-
as the materialist is free to occupy the bulk of his work with the sensu-
ous and then to abandon it in a monologue of morality after the fact. 
The conceptualist, on the other hand, needs to keep, at all times, 
both his morality and his milieu onstage and, as a result, his form must 
always be present to hold the work together. Because his physical de-
tails and his conscious moral intent (as expressed in his characters) 
must constantly interact and affect each other, his artistic form must al-
ways be present and yet be unobtrusive, for a common failure of bad con-
ceptualist art is the work whose skeleton is so obvious that it obliterates 
the body and the soul it was meant to unify. One might readily think of 
John Wayne's film The Green Berets, which has all the good and evil elements 
of Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, yes, and even all the rich de-
tail of the Brothers, but whose skeletal form stands out like the bones 
on a man whose body has been emaciated by starvation. Where the con-
ceptualist artist has made this scientifically correct but artistically 
unappealing mistake, his propaganda reduces his performance to little 
more than a diatribe, pedantic and often unintentionally comic in its 
banality. It is against this danger of triteness that one should first 
measure the success of the conceptualist author in the criticism that 
comes after a consideration of his three foundation elements--sense, 
meaning,and form. 
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But there is an opposite danger that will also have to be con-
sidered; the opposite of too much bone and too little skin is too much 
fat on too little farm, for a conceptualist work can also be destroyed 
where the form is not sufficient to give structure to a then too rich 
detail and too pompous phraseology. William Saroyan has often been 
accused of static premises like "life is wonderful" which seem a bit 
weak to carry the artifice of his rich characterizations. 15 In the con-
ceptualist writing which fails in this way, the reader is lost in an 
over-lush jungle of sensuous delight which drowns the awkwardly placed 
sermon like a minister ranting against the joys of Tahiti. 
To examine an author who avoids both the Scylla of formlessness 
and the Charybdis of sermonizing, it is refreshing at long last to be 
able to turn tQ the work of Charles Williams. In his writing, the sensu-
ous details of his narrative and his moral premise will be traced, lead-
1ng to discovery of the critical form which he creates to unify the first 
two elements; and finally we shall consider the fine line, or rather, 
the taut wire he walks between banality and decadence, and his success 
in avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis which wait either to engulf him 
in the decadence of purple prose or to reduce him to the didacticism of 
a newspaper column. 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE CONCEPTUALISM OF CHARLES WILLIAMS 
The only comprehensive account of Charles Williams's thought to 
date is The Theology of Romantic Love,by Mary McDermott Shideler. 1 Be-
cause so much of Williams's needs elucidation for those who do not feel 
he speaks directly to their condition, she culls his central doctrines as 
they are spread out in over forty of his volumes. To discuss the underly-
ing assumptions of Williams, however, it must be assumed that the reader 
has first garnered a mastery of his explicit ideas. It is beyond the scope 
and space limitations of this dissertation to explain the massive techni-
cal vocabulary in Shideler's explication Qf Williams's thought. Neverthe-
less, it is necessary to alert the reader that this thesis presupposes 
the validity of all of what she has had to say about the meaning of such 
concepts as the Co-Inherence, 2 Substituted Love,3 the Way of the Affirma-
tion of the Images, 4 the Way of the Negation of Images,5 the Beatrician 
Vision, 6 the Flying Moment,? and the Way of Perversion. 8 
1Mary McDermott Shideler, The Theola of Romantic Love: 
in the Writings of Charles Williams (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966 . 
2Ibid., pp. 61-63, 65-66, 68-69, 79-80, 108-109, 190-191. 
3Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
4Ibid., pp. 33, 84, 114, 170-171, 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. , pp. 29-42. 
?Ibid., pp. 115-120 
8Ibid., pp. 121-138. 
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Quite often a writer who thinks philosophically, whether he is a 
formal philosopher or a literary man, will compose one short work that 
sheds light on his whole output. As St. Thomas Aquinas gave us On Being 
and Essence, as Kant wrote Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, or even 
as Keats's letters or Thomas Wolfe's The Story of a Novel gives the "basic 
thrust of those authors' thoughts, so the complete shape of Williams's 
philosophy and theology~-even to the possibility of deducing his ethics, 
epistemology and aesthetics--can be seen in He Came Down From Heaven, 
his Christology and his discussion of the nature, of heaven and its reve-
lation on earth.9 Early in his argument he reverses the usual insistence 
on the pure spirituality of the Eternal state: "It is not, of course, 
possible to deny that heaven--in the sense of salvation, bliss or the 
presence of GodT~C~~ exist in space; that would be to deny the Incarna-
tion."10 This statement, as with everything Williams wrote, is fully or-
thodox. But it is another "arrangement of doctrine," to use his own 
11 
charming phrase. 
Rather than rehearse the contents of this remarkable book (anyone 
could do that for himself), it is of more profit to analyze directly the 
premises that stand behind selected passages, particularly those that 
~-" 
directly bear on matters of body, intellect,and will in order to be able 
to understand his "arrangement of doctrine." Such passages most readily 
9Charles Williams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness 
of Sin (London: Faber and Faber, 1950). 
10Ibid., p. 10. 
11Ibid., cf. p. 119. 
35 
yield meaning to anyone searching for systematic meaning, because often 
they instantly reveal what an author will admit into his system. For ex-
ample, because James Joyce in his imaginative literature will admit sense 
impressions only, he is a naturalist (see Appendix). To show conceptual-
ism it is necessary in an author to demonstrate that he admits each of the 
three elements. Sense knowledge is real knowledge for the conceptualist; 
it is not for the realist. Similarly, intellectual knowledge is 
admissible to the conceptualist in a manner scarcely imaginable to the 
materialist, whereas the goodness of the will in action transcends all 
knowledge, a statement unintelligible to the naturalist. 
Why then would Williams wish to use another ordering of the 
Church's dogma? When he refers to using a different "arrangement of doctine," 
he seems to mean that the pre-eminence of St. Thomas Aquinas as Universal 
Doctor of the Church has relegated to obscurity those Catholics who view 
reality from other perspectives. In the lines quoted, he is insisting 
on the reality of things physical as part of the full scheme. Indeed, 
corporeality plays so much a part in Williams that, taken out of context 
from the rest of his work, some of his essays (were it not for overtly 
Christian passages) could be mistaken for the thought of D. H. Lawrence. 
This demand for the reality of incarnation on the part of the optimist 
Williams would in the hands of a pessimistic Fatalist become Manicheanism, 
a charge which has been brought against him on occasion. 12 
1~ancis King, Ritual Ma~ic in England.; 1887 to the Present 
Dax (London: Neville Spearman, 1970 , p. 112. 
Yet no Manichean could write: 
The events far which we sincerely implore the fulfillment upon 
earth are already perfectly concluded in heaven ••• Heaven then is 
beatitude and the eternal fulfillment of Will, the contemporaneous-
ness of perfection.13 
Nothing could be farther from Lawrence or Manicheanism than that state-
ment; in the eternal state, the will reaches its fullness. One cannot 
tell whether "fulfillment of the Will'' in this context (1. e., its object, 
the Good) means God or his creation. The capitalization would make one 
tend to think he was speaking of the Omnipotence, but how can omnipotence 
be fulfi~led? The statement appears nonsensical unless one applies what 
Scotus calls the formal distinction. 14 Either God and his creation are 
really one (a nominal distinction), or else there is something greater 
than God, namely God and his creation (a real distinction). But if there 
were a distinction mare than nominal, but less than real, then God and 
his creation could be separate but one-in-God, paradoxically. By defini-
tion, this is.what the term conceptualism means, a way of solving the pro-
blem of universals without falling into the extremes of realism (Poly-
theism) or nominalism (Unitarianism), by maintaining that the universal 
is an ontological concept, having ontological status, a third possibility 
altogether. 
If we examine Williams's sentence quoted in isolation, it is 
irrelevant whether he is talking about God or his creation when he dis-
cusses Will, because whatever is true of God is true of those made in His 
lJWilliams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 11. 
14 
Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris; ·Libraire Philosophique 
J. Urin, 19S2), P1J. 244-246. 
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image, at least analogously. His Will is metaphorically fulfilled in 
eternity--because of his own existence--but men can become fulfilled 
literally, and thus share in the Will. This is classical conceptualism. 
And Williams next announces that religion is the definition of the rela-
tionship between Will and creation, 15 1n other words, Will mediates (an 
intellectual process) between itself and creation (Body). He has avoided 
the problem of conflict between will and creati·on which led to many 
aberrations of theologians. He makes mystery his first principle, as did 
Scotus, and proceeds. 
The supremacy of the will, not only to the body but also to the 
intellect as well, has serious ramifications in the ordering of the 
branches of thought. From man's point of view, if the will and its con-
sequent choices and resultant actions are more important than what a man 
knows, then ethics (or moral theology) will be prior to metaphysics (or 
sacred theology); beliefs and understanding will always be less important 
than the setting of the heart to the Good. In terms of the virtues, the 
Good will always precede the True. This does not mean Williams or any 
conceptualist disparages the intellect; far from it. He is usually, how-
ever, concerned with its possible abuse (what may be called a form of 
intellectual hedonism); it is far more important, nay (and here is the 
difference from a Thomist) urgent for him to show the superiority of a 
good man to one who merely discourses on goodness. A legend states that 
St. Thomas Aquinas once visited St. Bonaventure; the great Dominican said 
to the Franciscan, "Where is your library?" The Seraphic Doctor pointed 
15Williams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 11, 
to a crucifix saying, "There is my library. "16 That statement could 
have been made seriously only by a conceptualist or a mystic. 
It £ollows that this extreme voluntarism attempts to reveal that 
the will is £ree, radically so. Williams takes great pains ~o show that 
we are responsible £ar our intentions (always mare important than actions 
to the conceptualist). 
The devil, even if he is a £act, has been an indulgence; he has, on 
occasion, been encouraged to reintroduce into Christian emotions the 
dualism which the Christian intellect has denied, and we have relieved 
our own sense o£ moral submission by contemplating, even disapprov-
ingly, something which was neither moral nor submissive.!? 
Any shift or motivation £or evil from the responsible party draws Williams's 
ire. Each man is responsible £or his own intention. 
In a magnificently composed argument, Williams proceeds to discover 
the relationship among the books o£ the Bible, its worth as a collection 
o£ writings, and the intentions o£ the men who wrote the individual books: 
"Setting aside supernatural beings, the central figure of the Old Testa-
18 
mentis Israel; the central £igure of the New is the Church." This 
stark dichotomy lets us see that "individuals and companies, and mankind 
itself, are all £inally set in relation to that non-human cause and centre 
which is called God."19 Williams tells us that the introduction o£ evil, 
16 Ampli£ication of this famous story can be found in Etienne 
Gilson, The Philoso h of Saint Bonaventure, tr. Dom I. Trehowan and 
Frank J. Sheed London: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 470-495. 
17Williams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 19. 
18Ibid. , p. 14. 
19Ibid •. 
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the severing of will from intellect by the introduction of a contradic-
tion, with the resultant loss in preternatural power, is the given of 
the Old Bible, and that the rest of it consists of building-blocks to 
restore mankind's health. This attempt to understand the human race and 
to find the way to its healing is the sole reason far the scriptures: 
By a deprivation of the central idea, and of the personification of 
that idea, the Bible does not cease to be metaphysics and become lit-
erature; it ceases to be anything at all but little bits of 
literature rather oddly collated.20 
This is a direct attack on the once rather popular notion of treat-
ing the Bible as literature without regard to its religious teaching, a 
belief that could be held only by one who reads anything merely for its 
artistic value--a typically idealist tendency. This statement in itself 
excludes Williams from the camp of.those who hold that aesthetics is the 
primary philosophy. 
Certainly there are some books whose words, once we have studied them, 
seem to demand from us a moral, even a metaphysical assent or dissent. 
Literary criticism, however, may lead to or even be transmuted into 
something more intense even than itse1f.21 
He goes on to give The Pilgrim's Progress, the Commedia, De Rerum 
Natura, as well as the Bible, as examples. Williams is in no way dimin-
ishing the value of the aesthetic response to these works; but he is 
placing them in a hierarchy of values, with the moral (or ethical)placed 
above the aesthetic. The distinction in this passage between "moral" and 
"metaphysical" requires a comment, however. 
At the risk of sounding repetitious, it cannot be too strongly 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. , p. 15. 
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stressed that for the conceptualist, metaphysics may be prior in the sense 
or first, or fundamental, knowledge; but it is ultimately inferior to 
ethics, which is prior in the sense of being first known, or the resident 
of will. The only reason a man lives the truth is that he is good. Evil 
men avoid it. Typically, for someone who is not a formal philosopher 
(especially one who lives in a culture dominated by another philosophy--
in this case English Aristotelian realism), a conceptualist will yield 
hesitantly to received opinion when he does not wish to argue a side issue. 
In the passage under consideration, Williams is arguing for the superiority 
of religious responses to solely aesthetic ones. To have further compli-
cated his thought with a digression on ethics and metaphysics would have 
needlessly compounded the discussion. That he was aware that he was so 
doing seems likely from his phraseology: tl a moral, even a metaphysi-
cal, assent ••. " introduces the idea of metaphysics tentatively, almost 
reluctantly, perhaps as an assuagement to skeptical readers who are al-
ready being attacked on one front. 
Williams offers in the next paragraph, as an aside, a very re-
vealing statement about his own assumptions. 
"The famous saying 'God is love', it is generally assumed, 
means that God is like our immediate emotional indulgence, and not that 
our meaning of love ought to have something of the 'otherness' and 
terror of God."22 Love and goodness are almost interchangeable words to 
the conceptualist; the mystic would concur. (It should be noted that 
many of these statements could have been made just as easily by a mystic; 
22Ibid. 
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no mystic, however, could have as high a respect for intellection for its 
own sake, or show as much pure rejoicing in the body for its own sake as 
does Williams.) He is complaining that our intellectual concepts of the 
Good (love) should mare often be checked against the way we experience 
Goodness. He employs the phrase "a terrible good" e.g., "The Hound of 
Heaven" in Descent Into Hell. 23 Let it suffice here to say that Williams 
says that love (goodness, will) is something other and greater than our 
assumption (intellect) or our emotional indulgence ( sense). 
By this point, a scant seven pages into the text of He Came Down 
From Heaven, he has already made his point presuppositior>.a.lly; the rest 
of the examples from the book are offered not to belabor the thesis need-
lessly, but rather to show exhaustively how passages in a book reveal an 
author's presuppositions when the overt subject matter is another topic. 
Admittedly, when an author's subject is his ultimate beliefs, his presup-
positions are far easier to see; indeed, that is why this book is germane, 
so that when faced with a novel of Williams, it will be unnecessary to 
prove anything, but rather to discover how his beliefs affect the plots 
and characters. 
There remains one danger, one that may well require a willing 
suspension of disbelief. We have argued that each philosophy demands its 
own aesthetic, that the canons of idealism should determine whether or not, 
for example, Keats succeeds in Endymion. Whether or no he was politically 
motivated, Croker (a realist) had no business judging the work on 
23williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
p. 16. 
24 
eudaemonian aesthetic grounds. On the other hand, Frederick Crews's 
Freudianism makes him an admirable judge of the merits of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne's materialist stories. 25 Even a cursory glance at Crews's 
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prose demonstrates that he, like his subject, is a thorough-going deter-
minist.26 In a like manner, the critic competent to judge Williams must 
properly proceed £.rom conceptualist grounds. Shideler certainly shows all 
the hallmarks, even down to her somewhat highly wrought style (crabbed, 
if one does not like it), much like Williams himself. The tendency to 
discursiveness is almost as inevitable in discussing a conceptualist 
author as is the pull of the critic to be drawn into a Platonic dichotomy 
when discussion a rationalist author like Shelley. His critics have 
been compelled to submit to the idea of the divided line even to begin 
discussing the content of a poem like "Oie to the West Wind."27 
Perhaps the reason far the tendency of conceptualist writing to 
become kaleidoscopic, or better, cubistic, is that in order to reason 
both syllogistically (will-intellect distinction) and dialectically (mind-
24John Wilson Croker, Unsigned review, Quarterly Review 
(April 1818), xiv, 204-208. 
25e.g.Frederick Crews, The Sins of the Fathers: Hawthorne's 
Psychological Themes. (New York: Oxford University Iress, 1966). 
26His constant reiteration of Freudian concepts as a means of 
understanding Hawthorne's inherent Calvinism is only possible because both 
systems are materialistic. 
27For a detailed discussion of Shelley's Platonism cf. J. A. 
Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1949). 
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bodY -distinction), the author is often required by the grammatical con-
straints of language to retrace a point in order to treat it a second time 
from another angle. As Chesterton said in another context, "An author 
must be orthodox in most things, or else he will not even have time 
28 
enough to explain his own heresy." The grammatical structure of English 
early became dominated by Aristotelian realism, and until recently it 
came naturally to an Englishman. 29 Logical relationships in clearly re-
lated categories, set in three-point logic--these are the mainstays of 
English prose. A real Platonic rationalist in English prose, like Carlyle 
and the Cambridge Platonists, appears barbaric because he has been forced 
to reshape the language somewhat for his own purposes. Hence, such a 
writer does not read as clearly as a Dr. Johnson, or in our own age, a 
c. S. Lewis. Lucidity in English, or better, pellucid English prose is 
the domain of the realist. No purple crowns his prose. Add to these lucid 
tendencies a desire to bathe in detail, and the pure writing of a con-
ceptualist often repels those out of sympathy with its adherents, and 
his style may be called either over-wrought, needlessly obscure, or even 
incompetent. Williams has been called all three.3° Yet it should con-
stantly be borne in mind that an author who composes in Williams's fashion 
is not merely entertaining an indulgence; for him to have taken the advice 
28G. K. Chesterton, George Bernard Shaw (London: John Lane, 
1910), p. 8. 
29Will Durant, The Story of :Philosophy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1965), p. 91. For several hundred years, every student who 
attended Oxford and Cambridge Universities was required to master 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in Greek. 
3°At a special session of the convention of the Modern Language 
Association held in Chicago (December, 1977), nearly every speaker--all 
of whom were sympathetic to Williams's content--found something dis-
paraging to say about his style. 
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of his critics by writing another way would have under-cut the very 
heart of his thought. It is a testimony to Williams's integrity that he 
never wavered from his vision nor sought to modify his style. 
The discursiveness of the conceptualist may seem almost like 
free association to someone who does not enjoy his methods of ratiocina-
tion. The tendency of the ?latonic argument to move from topic to topic 
is easy to tolerate because the rationalist will usually move from thesis 
to anti-thesis to synthesis. So may a conceptualist; but he may seize any 
part of the dialectical movement of an argument, and analyze a portion of 
it before returning to the main thrust of the dialectic; or he may reverse 
the process altogether by offering an analysis but, realizing its 
necessity to the gist of his thought, he might suddenly enter into dialec-
tical debate. To many people this will seem as if he is shifting the 
grounds for discussion too suddenly. Yet in a successful conceptualist 
argument, one can break down the argument into its parts and show that 
each step is necessary, or at least that it is an amplification of the whole. 
An example of the use of contraries in a conceptualist argument 
appears in the second chapter of He Came Down From Heaven, a discussion 
of the Fall of Man. Williams states, "Will is rather a thing we may choose 
to become than a thing we already possess--except so far as we can a 
little choose to choose, a little will to will.Ji The antithesis of the 
surface statement is obvious= we have already seen man as the image of 
God, who is pure Will. How then can will (the heart of our nature) be 
other than what we already are, but "a thing we may choose to become?" 
JiWilliams, He Came Down From Heaven, p. 21. 
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The Fall of Man is the answer, and the synthesis would be that the Fall 
altered man's ability to know his will. The title of the chapter is 
~'The Myth of the Alteration of Knowledge". The ensuing paragraph should 
be quoted in full because only a conceptualist, fully conscious of his own 
position, could have made it. In this sense it is supposition as opposed 
to presuppositions 
The change in knowledge /J,he Fal]] is indicated by one detail. The 
tale presents the Adam as naked, and in a state of enjoyment of being 
naked. It was part of their good; they had delight in their physical 
natures. There is no suggestion that they had not a delight in their 
sexual natures and relationship. They had about them a free candour, 
and that candour of joy was a part of their good. They were not 
ashamed. They then insisted on knowing good as evil, and they did. 
They knew that candour as undesirable; they experienced shame. The 
Omnipotence might intelligently know what the deprivation of that 
candour would be like, and yet not approve it into existence. The 
divine prerogative could not enter other beings after that manner; 
they had to know after their own nature. The thing they had involved 
confused them, because its nature was confusion. Sex had been good; 
it became evil. They had made themselves aprons. It was exactly 
what they had determined. Since then it has often been thought that 
we might recover the single and simple knowledge of good in that 
respect by tearing up the aprons. It has never, so far, been found 
that the return is quite so easy. To revoke the knawledge of unlovely 
shame can only be done by discovering a loveliness of shame ~o much 
for naturali~(not necessarily that shame, but something more pro-
found) in the good. The Lord, it may be remarked, did not make 
aprons for the Adam; he made them coats. He was not so sex-conscious 
as some of the commentators, pious and others.32 
What is important to notice is that Williams, unlike the l'latonist, 
can imagine an unfallen sexuality totally physical, and good, but he 
does not stop with the common presentation of the flesh becoming 
corrupted by the Fall. He makes it exceedingly clear that no guilt was 
attached to flesh, but that sin was an insistence, an ungratefully chosen 
act of the will. It was not the intellect that caused the primal curse, 
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because 11 merely saw the possibilities; actually the intellect's in-
ability to cope with the choice is almost gleefully put before the reader, 
something an Aristotelian would never do. Further, the inability of man 
simply to deny the effect of the will on the body is a refutation of 
naturalism; that he is concerned about body and intellect immediately 
puts him 1n a camp other than the mystical; that he does mare than simply 
analyze events denies the possibility of pragmatism. His insistence on 
free will in the paragraph means that he is not a materialist. Six of 
the seven alternate positions are refuted in some way by this paragraph; 
only idealism is left unchallenged, and, as we saw earlier, he had taken 
great pains in the first chapter to refute idealism. 
It has previously been observed that Williams, as an Englishman, 
primarily faced an audience of Aristotelian realists; thus far he has 
taken no direct action in discussing the distinction between the will and 
the intellect, and this understanding is crucial far underst~~ding any 
conceptualist discussion of human responsibility: a knowledge of good and 
evil does not make a man moral; that knowledge was the Fall. Morality 
is not just a compiling of action by habit based on intellectual know-
ledge and development, Aristotle's and St. Thomas's position; it is a 
setting of the will on the Way to the Good. Williams calls Babel 
that symbolic legend of the effort man makes to approach heaven 
ob.iectivel:y _onlr, as by the vain effort of the removal of aprons. 
(Italics mine.)J.J 
He sees the account of the Tower of Babel in the book of Genesis as a 
paradigm far the relationship of the intellect to the will: 
33Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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unless something is ~, nothing happens. Unless devotion is given 
to a thing that proves false in end, the thing that is true in the 
end cannot enter (Italics mine.)34 
He almost immediately quotes that paradox so beloved of him, "This also 
is Thou; neither is this Thou", a statement he attributed to St. 
Augustine but which no one has to my knowledge tracked down. Again I 
must refer the reader to Shideler for explication of the Way of the 
Images if Williams's meaning is not readily apparent: he is assuming the 
reader's knowledge of his superstructure. One can see without further 
aid, however, that Williams saw intellectual pride (hubris) as the sin 
of Babel, and offers action submitted in devotion to an Image of something 
good as proper behavior. Even though an image fails us finally, it is a 
precursor to the good, as St. John the Baptist was of Christ. 
In the peroration of his chapter on the Fall, Williams's prose 
becomes exceedingly lyrical in his paean to the Goodness of the Lord: 
The heavens go before the host, the habitation of the proceeding 
Power, and of the single voice in and beyond creation that is able 
to proclaim its own identity, the voice of the original good •.. It 
is the law of exchange that advances, of the keeping of one life by 
another, of the oath that cannot be controlled by man, it is the 
knowleqge of good as good breaking out of the knowledge of good as 
evil.35 
Among other things, this is a prose hymn to the Goodness of God's Will, 
and our participation in that Will. 
Once Williams has unequivocally established the superiority of 
the will to the intellect, he can then proceed to discuss the absolute 
validity of the mind. Because the will is of greater importance than 
34 . Ib1d. , p. 25. 
35Ibid. , p. 28. 
48 
reasoning does not mean that there is any inherent wrong with the intel-
lect. On the contrary, it is a gift of the Creator, and it should be 
used to the full: 
••• it has been ••• too often Lbelieveg? by the pious to encourage ••• 
[the fai thfuY ••• to say, in love or in laziness, 'our little minds 
were never meant ••• ' Fortunately, there is the book of Job to make 
it clear that our little minds were meant. A great curiosity ought 
to e~st concerning divine things. Man was intended to argue with 
God.3 
The third chapter, then, on the presuppositional level, is, in 
part, a discussion of the goodness of the intellect, its powers and its 
sphere of influence, the previous chapter already having placed it in a 
secondary role to will. Man should pursue knowledge where it leads him 
for ~own sake but with charity. "Humility has never consisted in not 
asking questions; it does not make men less themselves or less intelligent, 
but mare themselves".3? The only danger, he seems to be implying is 
that haughtiness can lead to belief in intellect as the primary good, as 
was the case with Job's comforters. 
Williams relates the mental anguish of Job to his question's 
fulfillment at Sinai: 
Moses went up into the Mount as myth; he descended as moral teacher. 
He was a leader in both periods, but there was a difference--as 
there is a differegce in the God to whom he went and the people to 
whom he returned.3 
These are unexpected sentences for a twentieth century literary figure to 
have written. The structure of the first antinomies is a pattern that 
36Ibid. , p. 30. 
3?Ibid., p. )2. 
3Bibid. 
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almost invariably means that the :former is in:ferior to the latter, e. g., 
"he went away a boy, but returned a man." As a novelist, Williams'stock 
1n trade was mythical materials such as the Graal and the Stone o:f 
Suleiman; it was his li:fe's blood in one sense. He could have hardly 
underestimated the value o:f myth; but the moral teacher transcends any 
embodiment o:f myth. He says that the reason this highest plane o:f Moses's 
being is in his role as moral teacher is that " ••• I AM has sworn that he 
and it Lman's naturi/ shall be known as good, and only good, to whoever 
chooses."39 
The prophets are the inheritors o:f the Mosaic triumph, keeping 
alive the spirit o:f the law and the glory o:f the Will who gave it. This 
leads Williams to another o:f his key asidesJ 
The word glory, to English ears, usually means no more than a kind 
o:f mazy bright blur. But the maze should be that o:f a geometrical 
pattern.40 
The framing of the Old Covenant into factual law should be a reason for 
rejoicing, not an occasion for the characteristic modern objection that 
morality is a set of cold rules. The glory o:f God and his Commandments, 
in Williams's writing, becomes a kind of baroque game, a playing with 
41 the immense, much like the juggler in The Greater Trumps. Once again, 
however, Williams must re-iterate his trichotomy: 
..• certain patterns in the web of Glory are already discernible: 
the recognition of the good, everywhere and always, as good, the 
39Ibid. , p. 33. 
40Ibid. 
41Williams, The Greater Trumps (New York~ Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1950) In the preface to this edition, William Lindsay Gresham 
provides a preliminary explication of Williams's Tarot symbolism. 
reflection of power, the exercise of intellect, the importance of 
interchange, and a deliberate relation to the Centre. 42 
A rough translation of this passage into the terms of this discussion 
might reads we can already tell parts of the pattern of God's inten-
50 
tions even before the Inca.rna.tion; they are the ability of ~ople to know 
the good when they sin while relating its origin to God, to use the mind, 
and to participate actively with others for the sake of their Creator. 
Slowly Williams is preparing us for his understanding of the coming 
of Christ, and for the neglected doctrines he believes flow from His 
appearance. But first he must show the anchoring of this revelation in 
the moral goodness of the Father. "'lhe glory is the goodness, but even 
the goodness is not he."43 Rather, the goodness is His Will. 
That will must be taught by instructors to his chosen people. The 
prophets are sent out from the visible mathematics of the glory. 
Morality is either the mathematics of power o~ it is nothing. Their 
business is to recover mankind--but first t~ inclusive--exclusive 
Israel--to an effort to know only the good. 
Thus the need to instill in the Israelites the fear of the Lord; to make 
a people whole, to be active witnesses before the whole world by the 
coming of Messiah. The inculcation of a sense of sin, of the unworthi-
ness coeval with the Fall, was absolutely mandatory because those folk 
were to bear His witness; but to Williams, sin is only known in operation, 
and that operation consists of a dreary sameness. The will is only known 
in act. This Ding an Sich is never known (Kantian conceptualism, of 
course). 
42williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness of 
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Sin has many forms but the work is all the same--the preference of an 
immediately satisfying experience of things to the believed pattern 
of the universe; one may even say, the pattern of the glory. It has, 
in the prophets as everywhere, two chief modes of existences impiety 
against man and impiety against God--the refusal of others and the 
insistence on sel£.44 
It is in the st~gle for perfection by precept that the Israelites lived. 
Only the nature of repentance, of forgiveness, remains. "The prophets 
are too much concerned with their demand for penitence and their message 
of pardon to have time for metaphysics."45 Once more ethics reigns 
supreme, and ontological truth and natural theology are of relative unim-
portance. Indeed Williams seems almost impatient with analysis that would 
be only a striving for that knowledge which does not have the perfection 
of the human will as its aim. "But Ezekiel and his companions are no 
more concerned with a metaphysical analysis of the absolute than they are 
with a defence of the myths of a co~descended ~pposition fthe anthropo-
morphic representations of the deityJ They are hammering at the heart. "46 
The effect of his "hammering at the heart" was to be the reward 
of Israel. Realism teaches the reduction of virtue to the formation of 
good habits and the avoidance of evil practices, but for Williams the 
primary point of the old covenant 
is the making an inward thing of the law. It is no longer a thing 
known and obeyed by a difficult decision; it is to become an in-
stinct, a natural desire of body and spirit.47 
The inclusion of the body is significant; visceral reactions against evil, 
and a movement of the flesh toward the good without agony was the reward 
44 36. Ibid. , p. 
45Ibid.' p. 36. 
46 39. ~., p. 
47Ib"d 
__L·, p. 40. 
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of those that followed the way. This calmness o~ body and spirit is not 
identical with the intellectual application ~ good practices associated 
with the Aristotelians; 1n that philosophy, 1f one knows the good, he 
must will the good, ~or no man can will his own evil. 48 Williams denies 
-
that position by his understanding ~ the covenant as something ~reely 
chosen or rejected. One can will his own evil 1n Williams's schemata, 
as 1n the philosophy o~ Duns Scotus. The crux o~ each choice is how one 
reacts to the haeccitas (thisness) o~ a given situation. 49 
After similar discussions o~ Ecclesiastes, and a portrait o~ 
St. John the Baptist, Williams gives us his picture ~ the Christ. Seldom 
does he anywhere simply speak o~ Jesus or Christ. In speaking o~ God, the 
Father, he usually uses words like the Omnipotence, the Mercy, the Pro-
taction. Of the Incarnate God he pre~ers locutions like the Divine Thing . 
and the Hero. In a parenthetical statement, he tells us why he so 
designates the deity: 
••• it will be remembered that Saint Matthew uses the neuter--that 
holy thiAS; students o~ the Gospel may be excused for sometimes 
following the example, if only to remind ourselves of what the 
Evangelists actually said.50 
In others words, Williams desires to seek an accuracy that is sometimes 
obscured by well-worn custom. Nor is it too fanciful to assume that his 
enthusiasm made him seek out terms (like "the Hero") that make Jesus 
sound like the archetype of an epic ~igure, because 1f He was mare than 
hero, he was at least hero as well. Actually most o~ Williams's account 
48Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Basic Works ed. Richard 
McKeon (New York: Random House,1941), pp. 935-936. 
49williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness o~ 
Sin1 pp. 29-45. 
50ibid. ' p. 49. 
53 
of Christ simply re-states the Synoptics in highly colored, joyous prose, 
and g1 ves something of a mythical cast to the events s little in the 
account helps elucidate his conceptualism, however. 
Several passages, nevertheless, ~revealing. Messiah le:ft us 
only few of His words, but some of them put the nature of morality on a 
plane higher than that known to Israel. 
Half a hundred brief comments, flung out to the mob of men's hearts, 
make it impossible far a child of the kingdom, for a Christian, to 
talk of justice or injustice so fa:r as he personally is concerned; 
they make it impossible for him to comElain of the unfairness of 
anything. They do not, presumably, stop him noticing what has 
happened, but it can never be a matter of protest. Judgment and 
measurement a:re always discouraged. You may have them if you will, 
but there is a sinister note in the promise that they shall be 
measured l:ack to you in the same manner. 51 
Higher than the moral precepts of the old Law is the fulfillment of that 
law in the Christ; what is revealing, and perhaps almost shoc~ng to some, 
is that Williams seems able to break into lyrical rapture over that stern 
statements "For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judgeds and ••• 
with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."52 '!his 
sentence would hardly seem a quick candidate for waxing ecstatic; but 
Williams delights in the law whenever he discusses it. At times he goes 
out of his way to posit moral paradoxes and problems where only someone 
obsessed with the idea of a moral universe could see even the possibility 
of a trouble. ''It is not surprising that Messias saw the possibility of 
an infinitely greater knowledge of evil existing through him than had 
been befare ... 53 The verse he is referring to is "blessed is he whosoever 
51~., p. 53. 
52 Ma+tkviw, 7:2. 
53Williams, He Came 'Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of 
~. p. 54. 
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shall not be offended by me." The denial of what the Christ has done must 
exceed, ar at least intensify, other evil. 'lbe Scotist doctrine (which 
Williams held)54 is that man was made for the Incarnation rather than the 
converse, the purpose of all that makes a man human through Christ, be-
cause humanity was designed for his coming whether or not there had been 
a fall. Once a man recognizes Christ as the Chosen, he is fully obligated 
to pursue the goodness and truth to where his perceptions lead him. To 
do otherwise does violence to the very arder of creation itself. In that 
way Christ's coming can be a cause far greater evil than if he had not. 
Williams's statement, then, is specifically Scotist. 
The meaning of the Crucifixion is especially a maral one far 
Williams. Christ attained the knowledge of good and evil as man, but as 
God he could possess that knowledge without experiencing it; therefore, 
his act of vicarious suffering far all humanity became all mankind re-
united .to its maker by the One who was at once God and his Creation • 
• • • the Thing that was man rather than a man, though certainly incar-
nated into the physical appearance of a man; the Thing that was Christ 
Jesus knew all things in the deprivation of all goodness •••• Man had 
determined to know good as evil; there could be but one perfect remedy 
for that--to know the evil of the past itself as a good, and to be 
free from the necessity of the knowledge of evil in the future; to 
find right knowledge and perfect freedom together; to know all things 
as occasions of love.55 
This is a position conceptualists share with mystics; in this passage 
williams may possibly have had in mind the meditation of the Lady Julian 
of Norwich when she said, "all shall be well and all shall be well, and 
all manner of things shall be made well • .. 56 It was one of Williams is 
54Schideler, The Theology of Romantic Love, p. 67. 
Sin1 p. 
55williams, He Came Down From Heaven and the Forgiveness of 
58. 
56Lady Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love ed. Dom 
Roger Huddleston, 0. S. B. (Westminster, Md: Newman 1ress, 1952), p. 48. 
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favorite quotations and he makes frequent reference to Lady Julian 
throughout his work. In fact, one of his characters in War In Heaven may 
possibly be named for her.57 Of course, this view of Christ's even-
tually reconciling of all evil into good, in what the theologians call 
aeviternity, is the final result of the felix culpa.: "pardon is no longer 
an oblivion but an increased knowledge, a knowledge of all things in a 
perfection of joy. 58 Not only will all things be made well, but even in 
the matter of the pardoning of actual sin, the pardoner must recognize 
that a desire of the sinner to do the right is all that is necessary in 
order to forgive. The constant failing, the not doing of sin, can never 
be a condition of forgiveness because "it would be a slur on intelli-
gence"59 as well as not a genuine reconciliation. 
Here we see the conceptualist differing in moral theology from 
the realist perhaps more than anywhere else. To a realist, a man is 
judged by his actions; 60 to a conceptualist like ~eter Abelard, evil 
always lies in the intention. 61 In this way, a man can commit all manner 
of atrocities and not be guilty if his intentions are not evil; for 
example, the actions of Torquemada's tortures may have been genuinely 
meant to help save souls. That he should have been stopped, or that the 
57Williams, War In Heaven (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
Julian Davenant, Archdeacon of Fardles, accepts his martyrdom through the 
course of the novel in an effort to make "all manner of thing well." 
5Bwilliams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of 
§lg, p, 59. 
59Ibid. , p. 60. 
60
st. Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings ed. Anton ~egis (New York: 
Random House, 1945), ii. 758-761. 
61~eter Abelard, Ethics tr. D. E. Luscombe (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1971), pp. 40-47. 
actions were objectively evil ara not denied from this point of view. 
But the state of Torq uemada' s soul is known only in heaven. This ar-
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gument applies both ways; say a man attempts armed robbery and the con-
sequences were that his victim found courage and defended himself from 
assault. The evil of the one occasioned the good of another. This 
attitude toward morality is vital to the understanding when we come to 
Williams's fiction. 
The remainder of He Came Down From Heaven consists of an exposi-
tion of the three basic tenets of Williams's beliefs which he understood 
to follow from the very fact of the Incarnation: Romantic Theology (the 
Beatrician vision), Substitution, and the Coinherence of the City. 
62 Schideler and, to a lesser extent, Charles Moorman have discussed these 
so well that it would be useless to tread over this ground again. It 
should be noted in the context of t~is discussion that the sight of the 
beloved as the God-bearing image is, from the beginning, a clear example 
of genuine knowledge that is of body: "It is a result of the Incarnation 
that opened all potentialities of the knowledge of the kingdom of heaven 
in and through matter. 
' 6 
'My covenant shall be in your flesh.'" 3 
Williams does not enter into a needless digression in his argument 
to talk in terms of academic philosophy in what is really a literary essay 
on the coming of Christ and its consequences; he seems to recognize Dante 
as a kindred spirit (conceptualist): 
62 Charles Moorman, The Precincts of Felicit : The Au stian 
City of the Oxford Christians Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 
1966), pp. 30-64. 
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The first encounter with Beatrice had awakened physical, mental and 
sni:r-Hual awareness; later encounters had communicated to Dante mo-
ments of humility and pure love, however far he might be staying 
in them. (italics mine)64 
Williams was not in the habit of applying trichotomies ("physical, mental 
and spiritual awareness") where they would be gratuitous. At the beginn-
ing of the chapter, he had introduced his explanation of theological ro-
mantic love by quoting the famous "spots of time" lines from The Prelude~5 
He only attributes to Wordsworth the kind of naturalistic understanding 
that what the body knows is a form of true knowledge. Often the concept-
ualist Franscicans made much of their unique doctrine of the form of 
matter, i.e., matter was truly an object of knowledge. Many other instances 
could be cited where Williams repeats what he perceives to be the partial 
knowledge of other philosop~ical positions. His attitude at such times 
does not seem ons of thinking his position correc~ and the othe~s wrong; 
but rather that, as in the familiar fable of the blind men and the ele-
phant, each man understands part of the truth. Where Williams might 
claim a pre-eminence for his own philosophy is that it readily recognizes 
the partiality of any truths that can be reached; we never have the whole 
truth. 
Yet it is only in terms of conceptualism that the thought of an-
other conceptualist can truly be known. In explaining Dante's meaning 
of the term love (as made of the Good), Williams introduces the parallel 
65_rbid.' p. 62. 
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thought of another of the medieval Franciscans, St. Bonaventure. (Dante 
was a third order Franciscan.) 
About the same time Bonaventure was writing that God was a circle 
whose centre was everywhere and its circumference nowhere. The dia-
gram of process is clear. Dante is on the circumference, and the 
things that happen there make a difference to him; he has with them 
no fixed and equal relation: only he sees the centre. The Love of 
the New Life is in the centre; to it all parts of the circumference, 
all times, all experiences, have this equal relation. In humility 
and goodwill Dante answered Love when things went well, but Love 
answers Love however things ~ But beyond that is the state where 
there is in effect, no circumference; or rather, every point of the 
circumference is at the centre, for the circumference itself is 
caritas, and relation i96only between the centre and the centre. This is love-in-heaven.b 
It has seemed advisable to quote this paragraph in full, because we can 
now see that without an understanding of the conceptualist position (at 
least in the flesh, as Williams himself might have said), these words are 
utter gibberish. So understood, they become perfectly and easily intell-
igible. It seems like a celebration of physical love--but then the end 
result is love-in-heaven; it could be Plato's divided line, but what is 
below the line is good in itself. He seems to reach for universal truth, 
but with full knowledge of particularities. No wonder Williams per-
plexes and defeats so much of his audience. It is like the readers of 
Dante who try to allegorize Beatrice into a representation of Theology. 
She is a representation of Theology; the reason she is a representation 
oi Theology is because she was Beatrice first, a girl who lived and died 
i~ Florence, a girl whom Dante Aligheri loved and celebrated. 
To understand fully the theology of romantic love as Williams and 
Da:Ite expounded it, the student must learn to participate in acts of 
Christian charity: 
66Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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But it is hardly possible to follow it without proposing and in-
volving as an end a state of caritas of the utmost possible height 
and breadth, nor without allowing to matter a significance and power 
which (of6all the religions and philosophies) only Christianity has affirmed. 7 
Such acts of the will take the natural state of inter-person~l human rela-
tionships and elevate them to the status of divine deeds. 
Williams, however, was fully aware of the possible dangers of the 
Affirmative Way: 
A theology of this kind ... will give rise (within itself) to heresies. 
Extremists of one kind will claim for the beloved a purit58as non-existent as the purity of the Church militant upon earth. 
All heresy, from this view, is the result of keeping a morbid imbalance 
among the elements of human experience whether physical, intellectual~or 
moral. 
The rigor with which the lover pursues the way of love can lead to 
several possible pitfalls. Important in the context of this qiscussion is 
"the assumption that the Beatrician state is everlasting ... "69 The drive 
to physicality alone, which easily leads to perversion and despair, be-
sets the human condition. The body may be good in and by itself; the min-
ute it becomes isolated from the rest of experience, it asserts a domin-
ance in excess of what it is able to deliver. The devotion of the· lover 
must be undertaken with humility, so that he or she may understand what 
it learns from the beloved and be prepared to return to life refreshed 
and with new life (vita-nuova Y. 
67rbid., p. 77. 
68Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
69Ibid., p. 79. 
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Another problem can arise from intellectual snobbery; the lover 
thinks the sight of the beloved private property; but, "love does not 
belong to lovers, but they to it.•· 70 To defeat jealousy--the intellec-
tual pride of romantic love--the mind must be brought into a right re-
lation to the limitations of the beloved. Jealousy "is, always and every-
where, idolatry; it is a desire to retain the glory for oneself, which 
means that one is not adoring the glory but only one's own relation to 
the glory,"71 The kingdom of heaven perceived in the beloved becomes, 
then, a perverted parody when not directed to its proper end. "A sin 
which is, by its essence, destructive of goodwill is worse than a sin 
which need not be, in its essence, more than disordered goodwill." 72 The 
flame of love comes only to those who choose to see it; the will must 
guide. 
A discussion of the doctrine of substituted love, that is, vicar-
ious suffering freely entered into by willing participants in the imita-
tion of Christ's suffering--the doctrine is easily the most controver-
sial of any Williams held, and conceptualism has direct bearing on the 
essence of that doctrine. His readers, even his Christian readers, who 
seem reluctant to give credence to the doctrine that one person can assent 
to taking on the sufferings of another should try to learn the meaning 
of the word empathy; in its origins, the word has all the strength of the 
literal bearing of another's burdens. This is the moral heroism of Kant 
?~bid., p. 80. 
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and the commandment of Donne, to seek not whom the bell tolls; it tolls 
for thee. Several~ statements Williams makes along the way, i.e., in 
He- Came Down From Heaven, bear: emphasis. He mentions that tbe ~elf 
who attempts the converted way "w~s to be removed and renovated, to be a 
branch of the vine, a point of the pattern. It was to become an article 
of love."73 Thus, as soon ashe addresses the subject, love is defined as the 
otherness of God. In other words, the convert must be remade into the de-
sire and will of his Creator, which is the spilling over of love into joy, 
the Commandment to people to love one ~~other. Men are to enter into a 
pattern of God's love in the same way that they were made in His image, 
and as Christ has taught our minds and bodies: 
We are to love each other as he loved us, laying down our lives as he 
did, that this love may be-perfected. We are to love each other, that 
is, by acts of substitution. We are to be substituted and to bear 
substitution. All life is to be vicario~4-at least, all life in the kingdom of heaven is to be vicarious.'( 
This is the true righteousness the Pharisees never understood, and their 
failure is the reason Christ condemned them. 
The Church has recognized a form of substituted will in the rites 
of infant baptism in which the will and intuition of the sponsors enter 
the eternal state to co-mingle with the will and intention of the child's 
soul. Williams uses this example to show how substitution forms part of 
the very pattern of sacramentalism, and that the effect on the soul is the 
result of will and intention. 
7Jrbid., p. 86. 
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Part of the fact which such an exhibition ritually and sacramentally 
presents is the making a commitment of oneself from another's heart 
and by another's intention. It is simpler sometimes and easier, and 
no less fatal and blessed to do it so; to surrender and be offered 
to destiny by another rather than by oneself; it is already a little 
denial of the se1f.75 
From this point of view, even to lend a book is a step to~ entering 
the kingdom of heaven. Here Williams lifts to a principle the typically 
conceptualist love of the Divine viewed in what would never appear momen-
tous {like Hopkins rejoicing in rose-moles).76 
When Williams enters into a discussion of techniques for putting 
into practice the doctrine of substituted love, he immediately draws a 
tripartite distinction among the contractors' obligations. Conceptualism 
can be doubly seen here because the three parts have a body, intellect• 
and will equivalency; and he speaks in terms of what is morally obligatory. 
'!he persons entering into an agreement to sharins; burdens must know what 
the burden is. This constitutes a knwwledge of the physical sensations. 
Next, the second party must give up the burden; to the person taking on 
the burden, the result would be an intellectual awareness of the desire 
of the other to have his burden undertaken. Finally, the one who takes 
the burden must indeed accept its this acceptance is an act of pure will. 
The one who takes has to set himself~-mind and emotion and sen:_ 
sations--to the burden, to know it, imagine it, receive it--and 
sometimes not to be taken aback by the swiftness of the divine grace 
and the lightness of the burden.?? 
75 ~·' p. 87. 
76Gera.rd Manley Hopkins, "l'ied Beauty", in Poems 4th ed. , ed. 
by W. H. Gardner and W. H. MacKenzie (Londons Oxford University :Press, 
1967), p. 69. 
77Williams, He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of 
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What we have here is the doctrine of the scapegoat, combined with the 
doctrine of the imitation of Christ. The reader is exhorted, albeit by 
literary devices, to take up the suffering of all his fellow human beings, 
just as Christ took up the sufferings of all mankind; in other words, he 
is asked to participate in the pe~ect imitation of Christ. 
Williams's expression of this doctrine could have been made only 
by someone in the Franciscan tradition, Franciscan because an inordinate 
number of conceptualists have been attached to Francis of Assisi and the 
order he founded: Duns Scotus, St. Bonaventure,and Dante are the prime 
examples. Williams employs the early Franciscans as exemplifications of 
the idea of good will in acts of substituted love: 
All goodness is from that source Lihe MessiaE7, charged and exchanged 
in the process. It was said of the Friars that one went patched for 
another's rending, and in the kingdom men go glorious for others' 
labours, and all is grown glorious from the labor of all.78 
Williams asserts that a person must deny the self, but to him the 
Fall means we must work to co-inhere in nature once more, not simply to 
overcome it; this process invites all decent men to enter the communion 
of the saints, because we are unable to save ourselves: 
the only thing that can be ours is the fiery blush of the laughter 
of humility ~hen the shame of the Adam has become the shyness of 
the saints.79 
To enter such a communion, men form societies, the City as 
Williams invariably calls it. Recognizing that ordinary moral effort is 
78Ibid., p. 93. 
79Ibid., p. 94. 
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not enough because such effort is usually fraught with pain, he makes 
clear that the moral effort he prescribes is not that of the materialist 
stoicss "It is not enough to be full of an effort towards good will unless 
it is a joyous goodwill. ,BO 
The final chapter is an attempt to demonstrate the idea of the 
City of Man in conceptualist terms; the great bishop of Hippo, a Platonic 
rationalist it will be remembered, thought the body was something to be 
overcome, that the City of Man was to be superseded by the City of God. 
Williams, contrariwise, envisions the Cities as they interpenetrate each 
other. Suffice it to say that if individual men can exchange parts of 
their being in acts of substitution, societies--which are collections 
of men--may enter into acts of exchange as well, Further, the communion 
of the saints, pictured from this perspective, is then the co-mingling of 
the City of Man with the City of God--the Churches militant, suffering, 
and triumphant. 
Inevitably, Williams must address himself to the problem of 
suffering; even though theologians avoid blaming God for evil, Williams's 
conceptualism places the responsibility on the Creator of all. Even if 
evil were a privation (which a conceptualist is not willing to concede), 
then that privation paradoxically was integrated into the nature of His 
creation: He understood suffering, pain, fear, death, sin, evil. He 
created: 
80 
Ibid., p. 95. 
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Without him it could not have been; and calling it his permission 
instead of his will may be intellectually accurate, but does not 
seem to get over the fact that if the First Cause has power, in-
telligence and wil~1to cause a universe to exist, then he is the First Cause of it. · 
Such an outburst could easily turn into a prelude to despair. 
What saves the Christian conceptualist from this invidious sin is his 
orthodox position that the Incarnation became God's sharing of this con-
dition with his creation; He was willing to enter i~to suffering and 
death, and.by His Resurrection redeem us. But to deny God's part in evil 
is at best an evasion: "The pious have been--as they always are--too 
anxious to excuse Him; the prophet was wiser: 'I form the light and create 
darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all these things. '" 82 
Evil is real to a conceptualist. 
Thus human duty is to pursue the wa~ of his Creator, our wills 
conforming to His Will. "There is orily one reason why anything should be 
loved on this earth--because God loves it. 83 To accomplish this end, 
it is imperative for a man to change his actions to con£orm to God's 
commandment: "To think of the pattern is not to be part of the pattern; 
84 to talk of exchange is not to exchange". Here, in the conclusion of 
his discussion, Williams drops any pretense that he is primarily analyzing, 
and concludes,as a conceptualist will, with uncompromising exhortation, 
8~bid.' p. 99. 
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81b.d ~·· p. 100. 
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proclaiming that men should have a change of heart, and he tells his 
reader that our separation from God is attributable more to our evil 
intentions (which can only be rectified by adhering to Christ's will) 
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than to anything else. The problem can be overcome by the honest person 
allowing his will to fade away from him through repentance and prayer. 
Thus, 
••• the schism of intention is deeper than any other; where is cer-
tainty7 who can be sure of any motive in any act? Lit is axiomatic 
to the conceptualist that one man never knows the intention of another. 
It is to be remembered that Socrates refused to serve on a jury for 
this reason~ Yet the choice, the wish that may become the will, may 
be there, whatever our ignorance; to desire to follow the good is 
important, to desire to follow the good from the good is more 
important.85 
What then is the moral duty, the highest good to this Christian concep-
ualist? It is to believe (body), to define (intellect) and to accept 
God by not being offended by Him (will); with these considerations in 
mind, it is possible both to realize why Williams has been misunderstood 
by his critics, and to demonstrate the internal coherency of his 
imaginative art. 
CHAPrER IV 
THE CRITICAL RESPONSE TO CHARLES WILLIAMS 
The monumental task of discovering the presuppositional thought 
of Charles Williams--a task which has generally intimidated his critics--
has been heroically undertaken by R. J. Reilly. Ironically, Reilly is un-
able to pin down Williams to any of the standard pigeon-holes that typi-
cally categorize philosophical thought: 
It is perhaps worth remarking here on the eclectic ~uality of 
Williams's thought. So far as he is a transcendentalist, he is with-
in the great stream of nee-Platonism; so far as he is an occultist, 
he is part of a minor eddy of the same stream. But his evaluation 
of the body and of matter, his insistence on the goodness of mrtter, 
place him closer to the tradition of medieval Aristotelianism. 
(italics mine) 
Reilly might have avoided the imprecision of the term "eclectic" by pushing 
his analysis a step further. Nor is Reilly's ~uandary an isolated case; 
as perspicacious a writer as Thomas Howard has implied as much in describ-
ing Williams's ideas. 2 In fairness to these men, who are literary scho-
lars, it should be noted that philosophers and theologians seldom recog-
nize the separateness of conceptualism from other systems;J in a like 
1R. J. Reilly, Romantic Reli ion: A Stud of Barfield, Lewis, 
Williams and Tolkien (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971 , p. 166. 
Zrhomas Howard, "Charles Williams's Experiment in the Novel", 
Dissertation, New York University, 1970, pp. 11-12. 
3William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston: Ginn, 
1929), pp. 287, 391. 
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manner (no matter what his reputation in other areas) as insightful a 
historian of German philosophy as was Dr. Rudolf Steiner discusses Kant 
as if he were a failed idealist, not fully recognizing the tripartite 
4 
nature of Kant's thought. It comes as no surprise to find 
that a conceptualist who is also a man of letters will tend to confound 
his critics. 
Therefore, it is desirable to examine Reilly's analysis of 
Williams's thought in some detail. Reilly observes that Williams was a man 
"to whom the unity of things had been revealed--but revealed by natural 
means, exciting moments of imaginative insight."5 By itself, this could 
mean something like Wordworth's "spots of time," and so it does. But 
Williams, in distinction from the early Wordsworth, was an orthodox 
Christian,,. "a religio-li terary phenomenon. "6 Without a deeper understand-
ing, Williams might be classified as an orthodox naturalist, a twentieth-
c~ntury William of Ockram or Roger Bacon who also conposed literary crea-
tions. But according to Reilly: "What we find in Williams's work is em-
phasis on th~ union of the intellect and the imagination as the highest 
means of reaching religious truth."? This further plunges Reilly into 
the trouble of classification, and forces him to sei~e somewhat arbitrarily 
on the term transcendental to describe Williams. 
4Rudolph Steiner, '='he Philosophy of Freedom: The Basis For 
a Modern World Conception (Spring Valley, New _ork: Anthroposophic Press, 
1964), pp. 49-53. 
5Reilly, Romantic Religion, pp, 150-151. 
6Ibid., p. 151. 
'7 
'~b"d ~·· p. 152. 
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Central to transcendentalism, as Reilly defines it, is the typi-
cally Franciscan doctrine, expounded most fully by Duns Scotus, that the 
world exists for the Incarnation rather than the more usually held con-
verse; in no way does holding such doctrine offend orthodoxy, but it does 
offend both Thomistic realism and Augustinian rationalism, and has been 
shunted aside by the adherents of both schools. What follows logically 
from holding that the Creator desired Incarnation from all eternity is 
admirably put by Reilly himself when describing what Williams believed: 
The universe, including the unity Man, is to be seen as a vast inter-
~ocking web of glory; all things manifest God in their degree; the 
hills skip for joy and the sons of God shout his praises. All things, 
man included, are glints of God; He is not in all things, but, as it 
were, bShind all things; the creation is an array of masks or images 
of God. 
Each part of creation images its_Creator as the images of a poem echo the 
author's mi~d; but the great Author gave'his images life in existence as 
well as in essence. The duty of man is to participate in that "web of 
glory". Thus the very nature of existence, for Williams, may be nearly 
paraprxased by the Scholastic definition of accident as that to whose 
nature it belongs to exist by virtue of another. "All things, it may be 
said, are accidents existing by virtue of each other and by virtue of the 
substance (the only substance) of the co-inhering trinity of God".9 
Etienne Gilson's analysis of the Subtle Doctor in The History of Christian 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, makes clear that Reilly's paraphrase of 
8Ibid. , pp. 153-154. 
9Ibid. , p. 155. 
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Williams is a Scotist statement and, therefore, is a conceptualist 
'ti 10 pos~ on. But philosophers have as much trouble with Duns as they 
have with Kant, or that literary critics have had with Williams. 
Actually Reilly is the only critic that has recognized a simi-
larity of approach between Williams and Kant, though he does not draw the 
full implications of his observations. 
Though Williams rarely mentions Kant, he seems to hold the Kantian 
notion that time is a mode of perception; we reduce the timeless to 
temporality and sequence because otherwise we could perceive nothing. 
Strictly speaking, past, present and future are relative and provi-
sional terms. Existence operates in timelessness: the past and the 
future are happening. The practices of substitution~mpathy in Kan!7 
and interchange can and do operate in the past as wel~ as in the 
present and future.11 
This paragraph reads as a gloss on a central aspect of the thoughts of 
both Kant and Williams. Reilly's.purposes do not impel him to pursue the 
Kantian parallels further. Had he more tightly defined a conceptualist 
tradition, he would have detected consistency. 
Another author has listed a number of Williams's reading interests 
and dubs the list with the increasingly ubiquitous appellation "eclectic". 12 
10Etienne Gilson, Histor) of Christian Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages (New York: Random House, 1955 , pp. 454-464. 
11Reilly, Romantic Religion, _pn. 155-156. 
1~iann Barbara Russell, "The Idea of the City of God" Diss-
ertation, Columbia University, 1965, p. 12. Here is the relevant passage: 
"Charles Williams's approach to most of his central ideas was ... an eclectic 
one. In developing his central ideas, Williams selected from religious 
and philosophical systems, from history, and from literary works of all 
ages. Thus, Williams can be said to lack an acute historical sense because 
he is not seeking to place an idea in the context of its age so much as 
to relate the particular idea to what he considers a basic pattern of 
reality". 
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Her list, as with the list of projects Williams's initiated in his pub-
lishing career; shows he had nearly single-minded interest in conceptual-
ist and mystical writers. He was the first professional editor of the 
poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, the first editor of a major house of an 
English-speaking firm to promote the writings of Kierkegaard;and he edited 
Evelyn Underhill's letters. 13 His devotion to the Lady Julian of Norw~ch, 
his Dantean scholarship, his persistence in adhering to the Scotist doc-
trine of the Incarnation, his nearly single-handed resurrection of Thomas 
Traherne and Coventry Patmore, and indeed his enthusiasm for any author 
who saw images of the divine in concrete nature--all these form an un-
mistakable. pattern and a unity of vision no critic has previously noticed. 
When Pauline Anstruther enters the timeless state of her ancestor in 
Descent into Hell, and her aveternity accepts the burden of his fear so that 
he can be martyred without fear "four centuries earlier--when this happens, 
Williams is not merely indulging in fantasy or mere pious speculation. 
He is portraying in action a doctrine held by religious conceptualists. 14 
Only the Fall, so the argument runs, prevents these perceptions from being 
common knowledge: "The nature of the transcendental, interlocking universe 
is good, as it is a divine facade". 15 In the discussion of Shadows of 
Ecstasy, more will be said 'about perception of time and space. It should 
i3Alice ~7 Hadfield, Introduction to Charles Williams (London: 
Robert Hale, 1959), pp. 125-126, 181. 
14
charles Williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1965), pp. 168-171. 
1 ~eilly, Romantic Religion, p. 156. 
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be pointed out here that nearly every Williams character achieves sal-
vation or damnation by choosing how and why he enters time and space in a 
particular novel's action. Two more examples: in The Place of the Lion, 
Adam Durrant rectifies the cleavage of nature by choosing to allow him-
self to become a vehicle for the Platonic intelligences to return among 
16 the Forms. In Many Dimensions, Clohoe Burnett gives herself to the Stone 
to bring the separated elements of the divided stone to unity--thereby 
accomplishing her own salvation, whereas Sir Giles Tulmulty tries to di-
vide the stone for himself and is both physically and morally undone. 17 
Of course, such occurrences in novels partake of romance, and 
Williams is nothing if not a confirmed romantic, in whatever sense one may 
wish to use that much maligned term--whether he is to be considered a 
writer of romances, or whether he exhibits the hallmarks of a nineteenth-
~ntury romantic. But Reilly observes that "Williams's romanticism is 
what might be called a 'corrected' romanticism,"18 i.e., he brought his 
orthodox Christianity to bear on the romantic tradition. Uncorrected ro-
manticism in this context would consist of that myopic view that dwells on 
this world without regard for theological truth of any kind: "If Words-
worth had been content to revel in the experience of nature which haunted 
him like a passion instead of looking for its meaning, he would have been 
16
charles Williams, The Place of the Lion (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1965), pp. 192-206. 
17Charles Williams, Many Dimensions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1965), pp. 235-246. 
18Reilly, Romantic Religion, p. 1_59. 
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an uncorrected romantic." 19 Thus, Williams often borrowed the phrase 
"the feeling intellect" from Wordsworth; in other words, feeling (body) 
must fuse with intellect, and the whole be ordered to the teleological 
purpose (will); once again we have backed into the primary definition of 
the conceptualist position as it has been described above. Williams has 
thus achieved the goals and refuted a famous argument of his friend 
T. S. Eliot, and Reilly recognizes the fact: 
If we may borrow Eliot's phrase, we may say that Williams's true ro-
mantic is one in whom there can be no 'dissociation of sensibility', 
one whose thoughts are experiences which modify his sensibility. In 
Eliot, however, the unified sensibility serves largely as a faculty 
for the writing of poetry. In Williams, the union of thought and 
feeling serves ... as a means of arriving at religious truth.20 
The central passage that clearly demonstrates that the thrust of 
Williams's thought can only be understood through conceptualistic 
analysis is the one in which--as if so often the case, from ~eter Abelard 
forward--the critic seems to view his subject as a muddled Platonist, 
as if he misperceived the Platonic Tradition; Reilly does not see the 
Scotism in his description of Williams's position. This "arrangement of 
doctrine" 
... makes one point very clear: it is not possible to regard matter 
as in any sense evil. If the Fall necessitated the Incarnation, then 
one may be Platonist enough to hold that Christ's love for man enabled 
Him to take on 'even' matter to save him; it is possible to retain the 
Platonic view of matter as evil and the body as punishment ... But if 
the Incarnation would have occurred even without the Fall, then this 
possibility no longer exists. We can no longer be pained that God had 
to assume matter; and therefore, any indignity we see either in His 
19Ibid., p. 160. 
20-rb•d 
.::_2_. ' pp. 1'50-161. 
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assumption of matter or in matter itself must derive not from the ob-
ject, matter itself, but from our misconception of it. In fact, it 
seems to follow that the usual view of matter as somehow less than 
spirit is simply a result of the Fall, part of our postlapsarian 
blindness.21 
Because he does not perceive the fundamental difference between the con-
ceptualist view and Platonism, this admirable summary of what Williams did 
genuinely hold as truth, a recapitulation of the Scotist and Bonaventuran 
doctrine (indeed, the Franciscan doctrine) of the Incarnation, is called 
"tenuous". 22 If a critic as sensitive to theological literary creation 
as Reilly can only feel tenuousness and unclarity from this theological 
perspective, is it then surprising that almost all Williams's less philo-
sophically attuned critics feel that they need apologize for his obscurity 
and "fuzzy sentences" as Charles Huttar said at the 1977 M. L. A. con-
ference special session on Williams? In Williams's case, non-philosophi-
cal or non-theological approaches fail to come to grips with his context, 
and like a true conceptualist philosopher, ~illiams is unable or unwill-
ing to compromise; the critic must meet him on his own grounds. Reilly 
objects to this but calls his objection minor. 23 Were such contradiction 
in the nature of the created universe to run rampant through Williams's 
corpus, it would do violence to the validity of his work; at any rate, 
the objection is far from being "minor". And Reilly sees it himself when 
he observes that, for Williams's "virtues exist in the body as truly as 
21Ibid., p. 165. 
22Ibid. 
ZJibid. , p. 166. 
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in the soul, though differently.•~4 If virtue resides in the body as well 
as in the soul, then that body is good, and our physical natures have good-
ness in their own right, and are a genuine mode of knowing. Or as Williams 
said in his poetry, "Flesh knows what spirit knows, but spirit knows it 
knows--categories of identity."25 
Such unity of flesh and mind leading to vision is precisely what 
led Williams to Dante, in whom he found a kindred spirit. From the pre-
vious discussion of Williams's conceptualism, it need not be stressed very 
hard what Reilly unwittingly reveals about Williams in this passage: 
It is in Dante, Williams thinks, that we find the first and greatest 
'true' rorr~nticism: the union of thought and feeling leading to 
beatitude {Wili7, the theologizing of the romantic experience ~s it 
came to Dru1te from the troubadors' treatment of courtly love.26 
From this FOint of view, the art of Charles Williams is an attempt to achisve 
the same unity of vision as Dante's in a contemporary context and to en-
gage the reader in a spirit of caritas. This Christian love he always 
sees as moral duty, " ... duties to be performed, Christian duties to be 
done in and through love."27 It is the rare man who rejoices in indivi-
dual moral obligations; they are the stock-in-trade of the conceptualist. 
"After the visions come the duties; but the duties are only made possible 
by that vision."28 A character in a Williams novel almost invariably 
24Ibid., p. 167. 
25Charles Williams, The Region of the Summer Stars (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 26. 
26 Reilly, RoKantic Religion, p. 169. 
27Ibid., p. 176. 
28Ibid. 
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confronts or shies away from his moral responsibility. Laurence Went-
worth's increasingly sinister refusal to participate in the world culmin-
ates in his acceptance of a succubus and total idiocy in the "ever-narrow-
ing circles of the void,"29 The Archdeacon of Fardles gives himself to 
the Truth and Goodness of the Holy Grail though it means his physical 
death.JO In each case, a character accepts or rejects God in his confron-
tation with physical truth. 
The immanence of God taken together with His transcendence was em-
phasized over and over again by Williams; in countless passages he stresses 
that when confronted by an image, it is the duty of a man to remember 
"This also is Thou; neither is this Thou. ,Jl He was neither engaging in 
speculation, nor in an effort to retain a merely intellectual balance. 
Williams means that immanence and transcendence must be seen in all crea-
tion to achieve a proper love of God. If this is true, it clears up what 
Reilly implies is a potential scandal in the heart of Williams's thought: 
If Williams is right, then Dante loved, not Beatrice, or not only 
Beatrice, but God-in-Beatrice; more accurately perhaps, in view of 
Williams's insistence on the Athanasian creed, Dante loved Beatrice-
in-God. Bluntly, he loved both woman and God at the same time in 
seemingly the same way. Eros and agape merge: a single human 
affection may encompass both God and man.32 
29Williams, Descent Into Hell, p. 222. 
JOWilliams, War In Heaven, (New York: Pellegrini & Cudahy, 
1949), pp. 281-290. 
1966), p. 
31
williams, The Descent of the Dove, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
viii. 
32Reilly, Romantic Religion, pp. 183·-184. 
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Yet Reilly fails to see that it is the love of Beatrice in Dante that up-
holds balance, and he further claims that the Williams-Dante view tips 
the scales toward immanence: 
Even if we distinguish as carefully as the Athanasian creed does 
between substance and person, the identification of Beatrice and God 
seems hardly avoidable.33 (Italics mine) 
This statement simply is not true; that which transcends an immanent 
manifestation is the eternity of that person, what there is of the Creator 
in the creature. In one way, after the conceptualist hierarchy of first 
principles is established can anyone ever really confuse creature with 
Creator? It is scarcely possible. 
Etienne Gilson has repeatedly pointed out the differences between 
the Western theology of being (I am who am) and the Eastern theology of 
images (man is made in the image and likeness of God);34 this greatest 
of modern Thomists has stressed that the commingling of sentences from one 
of these theologies into the corpus of the other has almost invariably led 
to heresy, but that no such heresy need occur where each of these theolo-
gies is restricted to its own area. Most Western critics, that is to say, 
most writers available to us, are product of the theology of being; Reilly, 
from the philosophy of being,finds potential heresy in Williams's work, 
but it is Reilly himself, by his importation of the philosophy of being 
into Williams's theology of images, that has created the mischief. 
33Ibid., p. 184. 
34Gilson, History of Philosophy, p. 70. 
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Further, Reilly does not recognize the conceptualist creation of 
a new form, what might be called the in-Gadded novel-romance: '~he 
'occultism' of the novels prevents their being taken seriously as exam-
ples of romantic theology or of theologized true love."35 This does not 
seem to follow. Why do the devices of myth discount the presentation of 
a theological attitude with characters that manifest those attitudes in 
an extension of the novel form? That such a procedure produces a new form 
(a bastardization if it is not liked, a synthesis of novel and romance 
if it is) is only another way of saying that Williams's conceptualism for-
ces him to create form, as w~s anticipated by the discussion in the chap-
ter on aesthetics. The straight-forward novel does not permit a steady 
depiction of the supernature that appertains simultaneously in mundane 
physical action; the romance does not allow for the psychological effects 
of the supernatural on three-dimensional characters. To engage the ad-
vantages of both genres, Williams must create his own sub-genre. To 
those unaccustomed to the body-intellect-will trichotomy, Williams's novel-
form requires a slight restructuring of aesthetic acceptability. By 
Re~lly's criterion, if we eliminate Simon the Magician from All Hallows:_ 
Eve because of his occultism, Simon Magus should be removed from the Acts 
of the Apostles; the skulls of children that still occasionally turn up 
at the site of Giles de Rais' estate testify to the genuine use of the 
occult by those with perverted senses of power. Williams iF~gines such 
power unleashed in the twentieth century; the geometrice.2. increase in the 
35Reilly, Romantic Religion, p. 184. 
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amount of satanism rampant in the world in recent decades has propor-
tionately increased the relevancy of Williams's fiction to the modern con-
dition and aecreased any chance of accusing him of inventing plots 
implausible or bizarre. 
Reilly further attempts to shake the foundations of Williams's 
thought by accusing him of a possible misinterpretation of Dante: 
But it is a commonplace that the medieval habit of thought was in-
curably analogical: it saw most earthly things as analogues of hea-
venly things, and what it saw in thi§ was as a matter of course 
without, as it were, premeditation,J6 
He cites Guido Cavalcanti as an example of another poet who says much the 
same as Dante, which is somewhat true; but Cavalcanti focuses our atten-
tion not on the blessedness of the lady in her physicality, but rather he 
feels that she is blessed because of her body, which is a difference pre-
eluding theologizing. Nor has anyone tried to theologize the mistresses 
of Cavalcanti. To the degree his imagery approximates Dante's, Cavalcanti 
is to that extent a lesser Dante. Yet Reilly claims that 
... what Williams seems to ignore in his continual citation of Dante 
as a teacher of the Way of Romantic 1ove is that Dante, in treating 
love philosophically and even theologically, was doing no more than 
the other writers of his schoo1.J? 
True, but he did it best, and through the ages recognizably so, becoming 
the Model for men of the Romantic way. Dante fused theology and physical 
love in a conscious manner. The lovers follow the Way without reflection: 
flesh knows what spirit knows/ but spirit knows it knows ... 
36Ibid., p. 185. 
J?Ibid. 
80 
As Dante's career presents the paradigm for the conceptualist 
literary man, Williams is the man who recognizes that pattern across se-
ven centuries. Yet Reilly--who aga~ it must be re-iterate~ has come 
J 
closer than any other critic to understanding Williams's philosophical 
approach --Re~!Iy:il:iOws an innocence of the nuances of conceptualism by 
claiming that if Beatrice is more than Beatrice she was not personal, and 
thus undermines Williams's romantic theology. If Dante merely articulated 
what was implicit in his fellows, the pseudo-problem collapses; and if 
Williams explained that vision to his own generation, recognizing Dante 
as a man on the same path, then all is consistent and coherent. And, in-
deed, Reilly, in his succeeding paragraph, sees that Beatrice and the 
characters of Williams must follow-the path to moral duty and he is dis-
appointed. (Hefails to see the internal consistency also.) 
... the only real objection~.to Williams's--and Dante's--syste~ ••• 
is not theological but purely natural and human: it seems disappoint-
ing as its analogue, the Christian religion, so often seems disappoint-
ing. It seemed at the outset to promise so much for daily living--
for the time being--beeause it deal::fu with one of the truly ·unfor- .... 
gettable experiences in human life. 
He is referring to love between the sexes; it leads to loving one's neigh-
bor, marriage,.the rearing of children, all that is "unexciting" to those 
people seeking novelty. Lies, a conceptualist would say, ~ novel; the 
truth is mundane. Its very mundanity creates its beauty. And though 
Reilly may be disappointed, he also can see the other side of what the 
subjection to moral duty means: 
... all nature, including human nature, is an image of divinity, are-
flection of God ... all things are reminders of God, like Whitman's 
grass, a handkerchief of the Lord divinely dropped.J9 
38Ibid., p. 186. 
J9Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
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Only a person who sees the Christian religion as analogue may not be able 
to see the consistency of really believing that God created and saw that 
it was good. 
The testimony of T. S. Eliot confirms that Williams as a man was 
of a piece with his literary productions; but again, the realist Eliot, 
in his introduction to All Hallows' Eve, indicates that he believed that 
Williams partially failed as an artist because he did not or could not 
conform himself to accepted norms of composition. Eliot, who received his 
degree in philosophy at Harvard i~ may be recalled, does catch a glimmer 
of the necessity of form-manipulation • 
•.. Williams invented his own forms (sic)--or to say that no 
if he had obeyed all its conventional ~ws, could have been 
satisfactory for what he wanted to say. 0 
form, 
less 
Eliot fumbles badly searching for a manner of classifying Williams's 
thought; he is forced to fall back continually on his understandL~g of the 
man 's character: 
For him there was no frontier between the material and the spiritual 
world. Had I ever had to spend a night in a ntunted house, I should 
have felt secure with Williams in my company. 
Notice that Eliot sees that God's creation is all one for Willi.ams, and 
that our persistence in separating nature from supernature is a nominal 
distinction to him, or perhaps a formal distinction; it is certainly not 
real. Even to a theologically minded man like Eliot, such perception is 
to be considered "peculiar'' : 
40T. S. Eliot, "Introduction", in Charles Williams, All 
Hallows' Eve (Boston: Noonday Press, 1971), p. xiii. 
41Ibid. 
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To him the supernatural was perfectly natural, and the natural was 
also supernatural. And this peculiarity gave him that profound in-
sight into Good and Evil, into the heights of Heaven and the depths 
of Hell, which providea2both the immediate thrill, and the permanent message of his novels. 
Probably the most instantly recognizable aspect of conceptualist 
metaphysics is the idea that there is no break between nature and super-
nature; they overlap and interpenetrate at every level of being and ex-
perience. Even more vital to him is his insistence on the centrality of 
moral theology, or better, moral action. This emphasis in Williams leaves 
Eliot somewhat perplexed. He has just praised Williams for his "profound 
insight" into the nature of morality, and then just as abruptly praises 
him for not projecting this insight into the novels. 
The conflict which is the theme of every one of Williams's novels is 
not merely the conflict between good and bad-men, in the usual sense. 
No one was less confined to conventional morality, in judging good 
and bad behavior, than Williams: his morality is that of the Gospels. 
He sees the struggle between Good and Evil as carried on, more or less 
blindly, by men and women who are often only the instruments of 
higher or lower powers, but who also have4the freedom to choose to which powers they will submit themselves. 3 
If Eliot is only saying in a verbose manner that Williams is not judgmental 
toward people or the characters of his creation, then there is no argument; 
but Williams is never afraid to judge a character when we are permitted 
to share the omniscient author's peek into the intentions of his character. 
Wentworth's and Tulmulty's damnations come readily to mind, not to mention 
the otherwise incomprehensible conversion of Gregory Persimmons. 44 
42Ibid., p. xiv. 
43Ibid., p. xvi. 
44Williams, War in Heaven, pp. 265-280. 
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What Eliot probably means is that Williams is playing for much 
higher stakes than the individual fates of his individual characters; he 
is also showing the cosmic dimensions of Good and Evil that exist anter-
ior to the machinations of the particular actors. The simple refusal to 
perform an act of kindness can reverberate throughout eternity, as Evelyn 
learns in All Hallow's Eve~5 A submission to "the co-inherence" may lead 
to acts of glory passing human understanding, as Lester learns in the same 
tale. 46 In this way only, Williams's morality is not conventional. The 
content of good human behavior is unaltered by such a vision; in other 
words, the doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount is binding on all Christians. 
Williams's profundity comes from making clear the supernatural implication 
in Christ's words. As Eliot states the case, Williams could be open to 
the interpretation of holding "higher doctrines." This is an important 
consideration to raise in an author concerned as much with occultism as 
is Williams. One matter that is a constant in the esoteric societies is 
that they teach a "higher" doctrine, which is usually a contradiction of 
Christian morality; a number of them are satanic. 47 Later it will be 
shown that Williams will portray the occult only to reject it ultimately 
as either evil or at least unhealthy; the ~~tithesis between Williams and 
occultists will be apparent to anyone who reads Williams's rejection of 
the idea of matter as an evil,and his equally categorical rejection of 
45williams, All Hallows' Eve, pp. 172-201. 
46
rbid., pp. 240-273. 
47Francis King, Ritual Magic in England: 1887 to the Present Daz (London: Neville Spearman, 1970), passim. 
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gnosticism, i. e., neither his divinely inspired heroes, nor his demoni-
cally possessed villains have privileged information. 
Eliot, though, may only mean that Williams never openly preaches, 
which is true, and the statement is probably more a comment on Eliot's 
taste, Williams's and the twentieth C3ntury's,than objections based on 
literary criteria. The sermons of Cardinal Newman would be banished as 
literature by such canons, and that the great Tractarian works are less 
read than formerly could easily be explained by the distaste for exhor-
tation among our contemporaries. 
Further, as Eliot recognizes, what~ unusually keen in Williams's 
perceptions was his awareness of the loathesomeness of evil, which was 
tied firmly to his literary ability to make his audience share in his 
disgust and horror of that which offends God. 
Williams's understanding of Evil was profound. Had he himself not 
always seen Evil, unerringly, as the contrast to Good--had he un-
derstood Evil, so far as it can be understood, without ·knowing the 
Good--there are passages which could only be outrageous and foul. 
He is co.,cerned, not wlth the Evil of conventio~al morality and the 
ordinary manifestations by which we recognize it, but with the very 
essence of Evil; it is, therefore, Evil which has no power to attract 
us, for we see it as the repulsive thing it is, and as the despair 
of the damned from which we recoil.48 
Here Eliot may have touched on the real reason for much of the puzzlement 
and distaste for Williams among the reading public. Without the shared 
background of Christian morality, his stories are ridiculous, and they are 
meaningless (and melodramatic) to anyone who disbelieves in the objectivity 
of evil. A reader feels with deep emotions the abyss and emptiness of 
48Eliot, ''Introduction", p. xvi. 
that which separates itself from its Creator. Such writing requires a 
web of assumptions on the part of the reader. 
Thomas Howard has noticed that besides the context, the images in 
the novels force a consideration of the occult elements in them. 
Williams ... Lf0und7 special images that would suggest in themselves 
the centers of human aspiration( ... knowledge, ecstasy, power). This 
is what makes his novels seem occult. Williams was not interested in 
an escape from the actual. It is simply that, with his vicarious im-
agination, he saw these images as a frightful source of conflict.49 
No doubt, but assuredly his close association, no matter how briefly, with 
men like A. E. Waite as a member (like Yeats before him) ~f The Order of 
the Golden Dawn must have affected his sensibilities.5° Yeats continued 
to search for images from occult symbolism for the rest of his life. 
Williams used them more probably because he was both attracted and r~pelled, 
much like his own character, Roger Ingram, who shall be discussed later. 
It is Thomas Howard who has called the work of Williams's editor-
ial career disparate, noting that he wrote about writers with "as little 
in common" as Dickens, Hopkins and Kierkegaard.(sic)51 What they have in 
common is the ability to portray a conceptualist view of life. Somewhat 
like Eliot, Howard feels that he must justify discussing literary works in 
terms of their ideas, primarily because Williams leaves him little choice. 
It is absurd, however, for a literary man to feel the need for apologizing 
49Howard, Charles Williams• Experiment, p. 7. 
50King, Ritual Magic, pp. 9, 112. 
51Howard, Charles Williams' Experiment, pp, 11-12. 
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for talking about the manifest content of a piece of writing. What forces 
Howard to make the novel leap of discussing what a work is about happens 
because 
Williams's work •.. is peculiar. It does not proceed by focussing on 
a central figure; it is not mundane; it fails perhaps in magnitude; 
it lacks the structural subtlety that we look for in our novels: and 
it draws upon subj~ct matter and treats it in a way that is alien to 
the mode~- novel.)~ 
In other words, he sees that Williams has shattered the novel form, and 
has remade it to suit his own purposes, and that to make the statement 
that was i~ him, he was forced to do so by his content. As we have seen, 
this new direction of form is inherent in conceptualist aesthetics. 
After Mariann Ru.ssell makes the tell-tale error of calling 
Williams eclectic, she notes that he will use anything handy as part of 
his arsenal: 
In developing his central ideas, Williams selected from religious and 
philosophical systems, from history and from literary works of all 
ages. ~hus, Williams can be said to lack an acute historical sense 
because he is not seeking to place an idea in the context of its age 
so much as to relate the ~~ticular idea to what he considers a 
basic pattern of reality. j 
At best, this statement is a half-truth. Because Williams acts from with-
in a framework of thought, accepting across time those people he recognizes 
as kindred thinkers, Russell chides him for not being a systematic his-
torian, which is also untrue as a short acquaintance with Descent of the 
Dove, Queen Elizabeth or James I will quickly prove. Her inability to 
5Zibid., p. 44. 
53Russell, Iiea of the City of God, p. 12. 
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see unity in Williams's thought, impairs the usefulness of her otherwise 
painstaking work. Christopher Fullman's interesting study echoes the 
foresaid critics because he believes that "Williams will not easily fit 
into a school."54 Russell's study especially would have improved trcmen-
dously from a knowledge of conceptualism, because a number of her isolated 
observations have the ring of authenticity about them. For example: 
Williams's images of the city are for the most part attempts to 
present the unusual significance glimpsed in a personal religious 
experience. 55 
... Williams tends to seek archetypal meanings in personal experience 
and to_+elate such meaning to a system he derived from Christian 
dogma.Jb (From an eclectic yet!) 
To Williams, the supernatural appears as the prototype of the natural 
so that in ~he original creation, there existed in nature nothing that 
had not pre-existed in the super~tural. Creation is a kind of image 
of the Creator as the supernatural is the meaning of the natur;al.57 
Relationship is for Williams a natural image of a supernatural fact. 
The principle of the individual spiritual life is the perpetuation 
of Christ's historic substitution; substitution is the 'inscape' (sic) 
of the city.58 
54Christopher Edward Fullman, "The Mind and Art of Charles 
Williams: A Study of His Poetry, Plays, the Novel~" Dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, 1955, p. 415. 
5~ussell, Idea of the City of God, p. 43. 
56Ibid., p. 46. 
57Ibid., p. 50. 
5Sibid., p. 60. 
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Even more than the bishop of Hippo, who had a professional concern 
with voluntary evil, Williams empha~izes that voluntary evil lies 
in relation rather than substance.5b (The reference here is probably 
to The For~iveness of Sins, p. 132.)59 
These are little gems that float through Russell's book like leaves in 
water: beautiful but without continuity. Her refusal to come to grips 
with the unity of Williams's meaning leaves her work a collection of use-
ful aphorisms. The present study was begun in the hope of rectifying such 
misunderstandings of the man's accomplishments. 
One recent study puts forth some reasons for Williams's lack of 
popularity, and at the same time teaches (probably without conscious 
understanding) the reasons why he wrote as he did= 
A main reason why his work, for all its intrinsic excellence and ex-
trinsic historical usefulness.remains so little known is its unusual 
difficulty. At first sight his style at times is crabbed, mannered 
and wholly impenetrable. Many passages require repeated close read-
ings even for the necessary preliminary sympathl between reader and 
writer, let alone for a thorough understanding.vO 
To a scholar like Shideler, whose own writing suggests conceptualist 
presuppositions, or to the present writer, there are no such problems read-
. h' 61 lng l.In, Generally, however, (for many readers) the problem exists. 
Davidson proceeds to light on an obvious choice for making a comparison 
with Williams. 
58Ibid., p. 60. 
59Ibid., p. 61. 
60Alice Elizabeth Davidson, "The Fictional Techniques of 
Charles Williams", Dissertation, Indiana University, 1977, p. 1. 
61 l Mary McDermott Shide er, The of Romantic Love: A 
----~--~~------------------~ Study in the Writings of Charles Williams Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
p, J. 
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Like Gerard Manley Hopkins, who also struck even the most penetrat-
ing of his earliest readers as crabbed and affected, Williams needs 
time to build, to train his audience. Then he can be seen, like 
Hopkins, to give his complex materials powerful direct expr~sion.62 
?eckham and C. S. Lewis before him have observed that the only real traces 
of genuine obscurity in Willi~~s as a fault are the careless ways he some-
times uses antecedents. 6J The new farm of in-Godded romance-novel may ere-
ate one problem, however. Because of the Stevensonian or even Chesterton-
ian material Williams uses as a springboard for his own constructions, an 
uninformed reader will doubtless expect a story that moves rapidly from 
incident. to incident like The Man Who Was Thursday or "The Strange Case 
of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." Indeed, the plots of a Williams novel make 
one ~t to move with an adventuresome gallop through the stories. Such 
a reader will almost immediately become impaled on the reflective passages, 
and be forced to back-track because embedded phrases which seemed trivial 
are quickly shown to have a cosmic significance. Such attempts to read 
Williams for ~ight entertainment will most likely lead to frustration 
rather than to fruition. The novels are best read orally with the 
nuances savored by all the senses. It should be remembered that one of 
the tenets of conceptualist art was that it plunges the audience into a 
world of sensuous detail. (See pp. 17-18.) Like a play that only takes 
6Zoavidson, Fictional Technique, p. 1. 
63Robert Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Disser-
tation, University of Notre Dame, 196.5; C. S. Lewis, "A Commentary on 
the Arthurian :Poems of Charles Williams", in Arthurian Torso (London: 
Oxford University :Press, 1948), pp. 187-188. 
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on life in performance, those passages that so disturb Davidson make 
good prose sense on the first reading (allowing for the acknowledged 
antecedent problem) when articulated. 
Although it is offered tentatively, another problem may exist for 
the reader of a conceptualist work. That Williams shifts from sensation, 
to perception, and thence to intuition as modes of knowing, could possibly 
confound readers of other philosophical persuasions. The ground of 
truth forever seems to be shifting on them. Thus, a naturalist will be 
enjoying a passage of rapture, when suddenly Williams will show what the 
rapture means. The mystic will share a character's contact with super-
nature, only to be shown either the pattern in the truth or its physical 
effects. A reader must be prepared to proceed where Williams wishes to 
take him by not resisting his logic, or else he can easily become 
befuddled. 
His attitude toward artistic creation tells a potential reader 
how to interpret his ideas: 
I once very daringly asked him whether the line in one of the Taliesin 
poems, 'the feet of creation walk backward through the waters' was 
meant as a description of the effects of sin and the Fall. With 
characteristic humility he replied after a moment's thought, 'I have 
never thought of that before, but that is certainly one of the things 
it means'. Paradoxical and frivolous as this answer might seem to 
some, there could hardly be a clearer or more spontaneous avowal 
that the poet's function is not to give expression to the dredged-up 
precipitates of his own sub-conscious but to witness to his imperfect 
but nevertheless agthentic perception of the manifold aspects of 
objective reality. 4 
~L . . A ew~s, Arthur~an Torso, p. ~J. 
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This approach does not imply that what the poet expressly intended is 
of little or no meaning. Rather that meaning has ramifications and im-
plications far beyond what the artist consciously put in the work. Those 
interpretations arising from the work itself and which are in harmony with 
the conscious intentions of the author add to the original without dis-
torting its meaning. This attitude at first glance, seems related to 
ideas expressed in Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, 65 but a closer look 
at that monumental work shows that Frye constantly breaks down categories 
whereas Williams multiplies them. Frye may well be eclectic in the sense 
of having devised (to use his own terms) an encyclopedic approach, which 
seems to be a pragmatic manner of scholarship because true system is re-
jected ~ priori. Williams, on the contrary, delights in tidying-up and 
sorting-out in what seems a sh~er delight in using·his brain. This is a 
typical sentence from Williams's own criticism: "Eros need not for ever 
be on his knees to Agape; he has a right to his delights; they are part 
66 
of the Way." Literal fact is less important for him than creating 
paradigms for the channels of knowing (i.e., body, intellect,and will). 
For instance, in Religion and Love in Dante, Williams tells us in a foot-
note that whether or not Beatrice cut Dante dead in the streets of Florence 
is historically unimportant, because, "a literary convention is, at its 
best, a means of passion." 67 Such passion is a means of conveying truth 
65Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), passim. 
1941) 1 
66
wnliams, Religion and Love in Dante (London: 
p. 40. 
c7 
; Ibid. I p. 9. 
Dacre Press, 
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and goodness; therefore, any method of exciting passion to the ends of 
the transcendentals constitutes a valid literary approach (he would call 
it a "Way"). 
Patterns are the dare, as they are the necessity, of criticism as of 
life; they can be connected only by destruction, and no doubt this 
pattern will soon enough be des6~oyed. But their creation and 
destruction is our only method. 
So says Williams, the system-builder in criticism; his own critics 
have not recognized the pattern that pervades his own work. Since so 
many statements in this chapter have been brought up only to show their 
shortcomings, I should like to end these comments on the critics with a 
disclaimer. A tradition of conceptualism as here defined is not univer-
sally recognized in theology or philosophy, much less in literature. Be-
cause of this, no critic to date (except Shideler--and she only implicitly) 
recognizes the internal consistency, nay, the system in Williams's thought. 
The principal reason for these pages is to confront any future attempt to 
call Charles Williams by that pejorative term eclectic. 
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williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1933), p. v. 
CHAl"l'ER v 
SHADOWS OF ECSTASY AS A CONCEP'l.UALIST NOVEL 
Throughout his entire ouvre, Charles Williams retains the con-
ceptualist position with remarkable consistency, rightly having ignored 
the injunctions of his close friends to simplify his style (which we have 
argued would have destroyed his meaning). Though six of his seven novels 
have a small though devoted readership, one stands apart for provoking 
1 dispute even by Williams's following; that book is Shadows of Ecstasy. 
In the shorter of her two studies, Shideler sets it apart from the others, 
2 implying it to be singular in its obscurity. In his popular study of 
the Oxford Christians, Humphrey Carpenter likens the book itself to the 
confusion of mind of one of·its characters, who says that it is 
all such a mad mixture, purple rhetoric and precise realism, 
doctrines of transmutation and babble about African witch-doctors 
and airships and submarines.3 
Furthermore, he calls it "one of the oddest books ever to go under the 
1 Charles Williams, Shadows of Ecstasy (London: Victor GolJ~n~z, 
1933). Subsequent pages will be to the more readily accessible edition .. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965). 
~Y McDermott Shideler, Charles Williams: A Critical Essay 
(Grand Rapidss Eerdmans, 1969), p. 46. 
3Charles Williams, Shadows, as quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, 
The Inklin s: C. S. Lewis J. R. R. Tolkien Charles Williams and Their 
Friends Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1979 , p. 93. 
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•· 
name of a novel ••. "4 and claims that "Its lack of interest in ordinary 
chaXacter portrayal was striking • .,S CleaJ:ly Carpenter considers the 
work a total failure. 
Easily the most consistent and coherent reading of the novels is 
that of Robert l'eckham; even if one occasionally cavils at individual 
judgments, all Peckham usually lacks is an understanding of the threads 
holding Williams's thought together. But when discussing Shadows of 
Ecstasy, even Peckham follows suit: 
The book is indeed inferior to the other novels: it deals with 
difficult and odd situations clumsily; the characters tend to 
operate on their symbolic level; the theme is strange and is 
both philosophicalll difficult to sympathize with and psychologi-
cally unimaginable. 
What a reader can "easily sympathize with" is largely a matter of taste 
and not a criterion for literary discussion; but to maintain that no one 
can envision the underlying psychological validity of the novel is cleaJ:ly 
a wrong-headed statement as will soon be demonstrated. Peckham not only 
has no sympathy with the book, he totally misunderstands one of the cen-
tral characters, one of whom an understanding is vital for a proper reading: 
For the priest, however, the ecstasy has been intellectualized 
nearly out of existence. 'He defined men by morality; it was per-
haps inevitable that he should define God in the same wagr'.7 
4<ant has also been accused of defining God by moralitY. ) 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6 Robert Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Disser-
tation, University of Notre Dame, 1965, p. ?. 
?Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
8William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston: Ginn, 1929), 
p, 391. 
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First, Peckham calls this an example of the via negativa, which it is 
not. Morals are imperative no matter which Way one pursues God; the ele-
vation of morals to define man is not primarily an intellectual approach, 
as we have seen. Caithness carries the position Williams wishes to pre-
sent; if the novel fails at all, it is because central truths are not 
placed mare centrally before the reader's imagination. 
~eckham's perception of the principal character, Nigel Considine, 
is a bit closer to the mark' he sees him as a D. H. lawrence figure, and 
he is probably partially correct in calling " •.. the book ••• sort of a com-
mentary on the ideas of D. H. La.wrence."9 Here Peckham elucidates the 
character of Considine and talks about him as a man held up to our ad-
miration. No wonder Peckham and others who take this approach have 
difficulty understanding the novel. 
The book is a twentieth-century English recasting of an Anti-
Christ myth; the Anti-Christ character (Considine) denies his infernal 
nature at the only time the subject is broached in the text. But the .~ti­
Christ would lie. Upright men like Roger Ingram and Inkamasi, the Zulu 
king, follow him. But Christ warns, does he not, that the Anti-Christ 
would fool, if it were possible, the very Elect? Here is the question a 
reader must ask himself if he wishes to know whether or not Williams 
succeeds in this work; has he demanded too much from his reader by pre-
senting him with Anti-Christ and allowing that reader to risk misinterpre-
tation? 
9 Peckham, Novels, p. 23. 
96 
As Thomas Howard was aware in his study of the novels: 
Since Williams's seven novels represent seven different ima~in­
ative approaches to one single idea, an exhaustive rendering of each 
one would end up being intolerably boring,10 
But to give such a reading to but one of the books would be profitable 
and reveal how conceptualism can inform the working of a piece of fiction; 
and since even Williams's admirers seem baffled by Shadows of Ecstasy, if 
coherent conceptualism can be shown in that work, it should be readily 
transferable to the remainder of his imaginative literature. 
Unfortunately, what makes this novel in some ways easier to study 
is that Williams asserts the meaning explicitly. Too often in contemporary 
times this is perceived as a defect. A novelist is expected to show, not 
to tell, and the reader is then expected to interpret and analyze the raw 
data of the book for himself. This method is perfectly acceptable--if 
the writer or the reader is a pragmatist or a materialist. Once again 
the right aesthetics is needed to fit the right author. The following 
analysis is offered to help clear up the confusion generated by Carpenter 
and some of his fellow critics: 
1hese novels were all concerned with the rightful and wrongful use 
of power. And here somebody reading them may find himself in some 
confusion, for Williams's ideas of right and wrong often seem ex-
tremely odd. In Shadows of Ecstasy, it is disturbing to find the 11 
'hero' Roger Ingram becoming a disciple of the 'villain' Considine. 
10Thomas Howard, "Charles Williams's Experiment in the Novel," 
Dissertation, New York University, 1970, p. 6. 
11 Carpenter, Inklings, p. 96. 
12 But do not the exalted of the earth follow Soloviev's Anti-Christ? 
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Turning to the text of the novel itself, the story begins In medias 
res during the peroration of an address by Roger Ingram, a professor of 
-
poetry, which he is presenting after a dinner for the explorer Nigel 
Considine and the assembled geographical faculty of the University of 
London. Ingram's chair was that of "applied literature", i.e., its en-
dower wished for literature to be applied to life as the sciences are. 13 
The author, in omniscient voice, comments on Ingram's book, which attacks 
those who believe in "the purification of literature from everything 
14 
else". Already the reader realizes that action is superior to know-
ledge, or better, that knowledge exists for action. After some light 
banter (banter is the most noticeable characteristic of Williams's dia-
logue) the author says that Ingram, "would, in short, have been a bore, 
had he not been himself". 15 That truth to his own intentions supports 
his integrity and allows him to be integrated as a man, i.e., not a bore. 
In rapid order, the author introduces Isabel (Roger's wife) and 
Sir Bernard Travers (a retired, distinguished surgeon), who discuss Con-
sidine before the reader meets him. To an outside observer, Considine is 
simply an eminent explorer and something of a mystic; his public life has 
12
cf. Vladimir Soloviev, War and Christianitl (London' 
Constable, 1915), passim. 
1Ywilliams, Shadows, p. 7. 
14Th"d 8 
--1;_· ' p. • 
revealed nothing about what he intends. Throughout the discussion, and 
throughout the book, Sir Bernard speaks with a detached sense of ironic 
humor, as a sort of Oscar Wilde with retired scalpels; and he always up-
holds the intellect; at the moment, though, he is perplexed because he 
cannot remember where he saw Considine before. 16 
Williams is capable of dropping a piece of light, casual (but 
serious) moralizing (though oblique) into any part of his plot. As the 
evening closes, here is how Williams announces the playing of "God Save 
the King": "The National Anthem implored Deity on behalf of royalty, and 
dismissed many incredulous of both,"l? Such gratuitous moralizing per-
meates Williams's works, and-- as has been argued .~-is a conceptualist trait. 
Then Considine is introducedt. Roger had quoted Rimbaud's ominous 
. . 
lines, "I will encounter darkness as a bride/ and hug it in mine arms." 
Considine challenges him instantly by asking whether he means the lines 
as truth, or " •.. do you use apposite quotation merely as a social conven-
ience?"18 With exact detail, we are told that Considine's eyes "smoulder." 19 
Already it is possible to classify some of the characters as they align 
themselves along the chart of philosophical possibility. Roger erects 
poetry and the exquisite passions as the standard by which he makes his 
decisions for life; he is an idealist. Sir Bernard wishes to retire from 
action to contemplate and comment on life; he is a realist. Considine 
16Ibid., p. 11. 
17Ibid. I p. 12. 
18Ibid., p. 13. 
19Ibid. 
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burns passionately to put beliefs into action; he is a mystic. That such 
categorization is not a commentary on worth. will be seen; the categories 
do consistently describe the limits of what each character comprehends of 
what is happening at any given time. For instance, the aloofness of the 
idealist makes Roger have a "sardonic consciousness that the subservient 
listeners probably thought ... a little mad. 20 He relishes such super-
iority, but Considine in conversation is like "a hand of energy at rest."21 
The passivity of conversation appears foreign to his nature, as it generally 
will to a mystic. Sir Bernard constantly reflects,as in passages like: 
"The intellect hardly ever failed one eventually, if one fulfilled the 
d • t • • t • d II 22 con ~ ~on ~ ~mpose . Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas would have 
been pleased by such a statement; his intellect has allowed him to under-
stand that poetry is Ingram's religion. 
In the first ten pages then, Williams plunges the reader into a 
milieu of poetry professors, after-dinner speeches, African explorers with 
sinister implications, a retired surgeon who flashes wit, and his businesss-
man son Philip. The detail of the action and character is already ex-
tremely dense, just as an understanding of conceptualism has already pre-
dieted. But on the next page, Williams introduces to the reader and the 
members of the party, the character on whom the action will eventually 
turn: Ian Caithness, an Anglo-Catholic priest and friend of the Archbishop 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. , p. 15. 
22Ibid. 
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of York. He is described as looking ascetic, but we are informed that he 
2" practiced no austerities. ~ Intensity of devotion rooted in the active 
life is a conceptualist hallmark. 
At the moment, a masacre of Christian missionaries in the interior 
of Africa has disconcerted Caithness. 24 The Church has asked for no re-
prisals by the secular arm because the missionaries had anticipated the 
possibility of martrydom. Sir Bernard suddenly remembers an old photo-
graph and recalls that as a boy he took a picture of his grandfather in 
company with a man who resembles Considine remarkably, and they discuss 
the impossibility of Considine's being over a hundred years old. This is 
the only element in the plot that can be construed as "fantastic" (read 
impossible to the incredulous) that appears in the book. To date, no cri-
tic has noticed that the great age of Considine is not unlike that of the 
Grand Llama in Lost Horizon, or like Ayeeha in Haggard's She. What 
Williams is doing then, is employing a sub-genre of popular fiction and 
attempting to elevate it to the status of an enduring work of art. There 
is a difference, however; whereas Rider Haggard or James Hilton sacrifices 
character for the sake of plot, Williams tries to keep both in balance: 
One cannot imagine Shadows of Ecstasy without the precise contributions 
of the highly individualized characters. On the other hand, any explorer 
could be substituted for Alan Quatermain, or any adventurer may have been 
thrust into the action of Lost Horizon without loss to the work as a whole. 
2Jibid. ' p. 17. 
24Ibid., p. 18. 
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This bending of the form--this synthesis of, let us say, Robert Louis 
Stevenson and John Galsworthy--gives us a conceptualist form allowing 
an author to show the goodness of supernatural truth through natural ac-
tion mediated by intellectual understanding; and even if he neglects 
detail of background, the events continually transpire with great rapidity. 
In the second chapter, it is revealed that Philip works for a syn-
dicate developing parts of North Africa; conceptualist immersion in spe-
cific detail is never more in the forefront than when young Travers tries 
to read his morning newspaper only to discover that his employer, Simon · 
Rosenberg, has committed suicide, and that African hordes have taken over 
much of the area where his companies' holdings lie. "Philip goggled at 
the thick type, and instinctively tried to read both accounts at once."25 
All communication with the African interior has ceased; Rosenberg was 
despondent over his wife's death, and the ~wels he bought for her adorn-
ment lay at his home meaninglessly. In conversation, Rosenberg's love of 
natural beauty is held up as a pale reflection of Caithness's love of 
Church and God. 26 On the philosophical level, this means that a denial of 
physical goodness with its supernatural equivalency leads to despair and 
suicide. Philip, (the representative of the typical modern man) is left 
in confusion. Rosenberg had developed a mania for making "for his wife" 
the most wonderful collection of jewels in the world; Sir Bernard's imme-
diate reaction is to desire to discover what happened (to possess know-
ledge) as a result of the Rosenberg tragedy. 27 
25Ibid., p. 22. 
26Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
27Ibid., p. 27. 
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The next few pages consist of plot exposition: Considine is at 
the inquest into Rosenberg's death, he reveals that he was the deceased's 
last visitor {we are never told but we later assume Considine manipulated 
the death), and he says he was concerned about the dead man's state of mind. 
When the will is read, it is discovered that his fortune is left to two 
cousins, Ezechiel and Nehemiah, two fanatics who hate Gentiles, and that 
Considine and the Grand Rabbi have been named executors. 28 This much ac-
tion takes a scant two-and-a half pages. From this point on, the abundance 
of detail need not be mentioned again so as not to be distracting. 
When Sir Bernard and Considine engage in small talk shortly after 
the inquest, the first hint appears that the explorer has some gnostic 
motive: Sir Bernard says off-handedly that man has stomach and mirid 
(rational animal), but Considine counters with these words: 
0 so far f Considine answered, and normally! But it's the farther 
and the abnormal to which we must look. When men are in love, when 
they are in the midst of creating, when they are in a religious flame, 
what do they need then either with the stomach or the mind?29 
The implication is that men can overcome the limits of the body by sheer 
force of will, Gnosticism usually takes either an idealist or a mystic 
form. Considine's desire to enter a purity of action rather than of mind 
identifies him as a mystic. 
When Considine confronts Ingram, however, he applies arguments 
that appeal to the professor's mental constructs, especially in regard to 
28Ibid., pp. 29-JO. 
29Ibid. , p. 31. 
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his understanding of the nature of poetry. Considine constantly con-
fronts Ingram with a "pattern of imagery,'.' to use a phrase much beloved 
by idealist critics. Death is a form of poetry and the criticism of verse 
is a form of embalming-;..and vice versa; Ingram claims that people like 
"embalmed" (i.e., analyzed) poetry "better than the live thiilg. n30 Ingram, 
then, realizes the limitations of the subjective use of poetry and wishes 
to impose his categories in action, thereby recalling the perpendicularity 
of idealist thought. (See Appendix II.) 
Since Williams was a conceptualist, his characters, from his view-
point, will sometimes have insights beyond the limitation of their per-
spectives. Philip. the modern pragmatist, experiences an occasion of 
Beatrician love in Bonaventuran terms (Williams mistakenly attributes 
the words to Augustine) c "she. herself had no circumference. ·~ 31 This means 
that he is constantly feeding on the truth of her being. Once again we 
have a restatement of the Franciscan doctrine of divine incarnation as a 
reflection of God, coupled with the Scotist haecceitas ... But this is 
merely a toddler's first step for Philip: "He was still a child of the 
new birth; maturity of intellect as of morals was far distant ... 32 The 
young pragmatist has become a naturalist; he has yet to learn the validity 
of intellect and will. 
30ibid., p. 33. 
3iibid., p. 36. 
3Zibid. 
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Sir Bernard's reaction to his son's new-formed naturalism is 
predictable; he is the type of realist who has not yet concerned himself 
with final causes; therefore, "Dante was to him no more ridiculous than 
Voltaire; disillusion was as much an illusion as illusion itself. A thing 
that seemed had at least the truth of its seeming . .,33 He permits only 
what his intellect puts before him for his consideration, but he allows 
everything that comes before him thus as possessing equal validity. Even 
if his son is only infatuated. then tfte girl 1s ~apable of making his 
son infatuated. 
The eyes of Rosamund might or might not hold the secret origin of 
day and night, but if they apparently did then they apparently did, 
and it would be silly to deny it and equally silly not to relish it.34 
This means more than simply not poisoning the wells of philosophy; it means 
that truth and goodness and beauty can reside in apparent falsity, and 
that whatever verities come by whatever means, they are of the Good. This 
too follows from a conceptualist position. 
The African leaders have issued a proclamation which first reaches 
the reader filtered through Ingram's idealist understanding r "It says 
that the Socratic: method is done for." 35 He appears to have made the 
statement with a twinkle in the eye. The declaration itself turns out to 
be an announcement that the ways of Africa will soon overcome the ways of 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid., p. J?. 
35Ibid., p. J8. 
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Europe whether by force or by co-operation. The statement is a tissue 
of purple prose expounding pure naturalism with calculated appeals to 
others. In this context, the Africans play on Ingram's prejudices: 
to all who owe their devotion to music, to poetry, to painting 
and sculpture, to the servants of every more than rational energy; 
greater than those and more numerous, to all who at this present 
moment exist in the exchanged or une~changed adoration of love, it 
{the poweri7 calls more especially.36 
After serious reflection on the impending African invasion, Ingram can 
only comprehend what is happening in terms of Milton; thus is the ability 
of idealism to act projected off on a tangent, one with "the truth of its 
seemings" perhaps, but a tangent nevertheless. The chapter on the pro-
clamation ends on the sinister note of Ingram unwittingly introducing more 
than he can yet know, or more than he is subsequently to learn from his 
experience--he posits the possibility of the African leader as Anti-christ·. 
He suddenly quotes the familiar lines from Yeats' "The Second Coming," 
What rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born.37 
He muses on what the "prodigies of the birth" will be; Considine will soon 
_make clear exactly what those prodigies are. 
The next chapter opens with another gratuitous moral discussion; 
young Philip, the pragmatist-cum-naturalist, ponders the morality of fol-
1m-ring slavishly the desires of the beloved. That he knows nothing of 
romantic theology is beside the point; he is a man with the experience of 
36Ibid. , p. 41. 
3?Ibid., p. 45. 
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adoration, and wants to know what he should do. Morality is the natural 
state o£ men, Williams is telling us, no matter what a man may think he 
thinks. This placing of an average young_man into the identical situation 
which confronted Dante before Beatrice is another example o£ the extra-
ordinary risk Williams takes with his creations. Philip muses over 
Rosamund while he rides in the Tube.38 To thrust the reader into a time-
less condition contained in an otherwise mundane setting, either increases 
or decreases the verisimilitude of the action,depending upon the ind~vidual 
backgrounds and apperceptions of each reader; Williams is here attempting 
a solution in fictional technique to the age-old problem of appearance and 
reality. 
Caithness, the Christian priest, is not concerned whether or not 
the gospels o£ the Africans are true or not; the invidious quality of their 
doctrine of blood far exceeds the importance of such comparative niceties 
as to whether or not they are correct. For Caithness, "One can't trust 
one's own vision too far; that's where religion comes in."39 Such state-
ments lead Peckham to consider Caithness as a type "of those who wish to 
use force to destroy the evils of the world,'~ which makes him an equiva-
lent to Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor (even though Caithness overtly con-
demns such inquisitorial practices). The problem with this point of view 
is that the Grand Inquisitor seeks to preserve and protect Truth; Caith-
ness wishes to promote the Good. This is a difference in kind because 
3Sibid. , p. 46. 
39Ibid., p. 48. 
40 
Peckham, Novels, p. 14. 
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immoral means cannot be used to uphold Good (by definition) without self-
contradiction. The tendency to see Caithness as representing a position 
to be embraced--though it flies in the face of most modern readers' pre-
judices against people who strictly adhere to dogmatic belief--is yet 
another example of Williams's moral preaching to his audience. 
Almost on the heels of Caithness's announcement of his fears, fi-
nancial panic and an atmosphere of general lunacy begin to assert themselves 
41 throughout England. In a second proclamation, the Africans announce that 
they plan to reinstitute the old forms of blood sacrifice and darkness: 
Victim or priest at that altar, it matters not whether you inflict 
or endure the pang. Come, for the cycles are accomplished and the 
knowledge that was of old returns.42 
The effect on the people of London is almost instantaneous; they begin 
hunting blacks whereever they can find them. Subtly Williams has intro-
duced a pet theme of his, namely that a perpetration of evil locks_the vic-
tim into a situation that has only morally intolerable consequences. For 
example, take the case of an innocent people who are attacked; they must 
either fight back, thereby committing terrible acts of violence in their 
own right, or else they must not resist, allowing a greater evil to hold 
sway. This sullying of the victim's moral predicament is to Williams one 
of the worst features of the nature of evil. It is only natural that when 
faced with an alien doctrine manifestly evil directly threatening their 
lives, a London crowd could easily become a lynch mob. "Evil begets evil" 
41w·11· 1 lams, Shadows, p. 51. 
42Ibid. I p. 53. 
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may be a trite phrase, but Williams often clothes this bromide with 
believable situations. 
During the rioting the Ingrams grant temporary asylum to a black 
who had been threatened by the mob;43 he is soon to identify himself as 
Inkamasi, a king of the Zulu tribe. 44 In tJ~ical fashion, Williams stops 
the action to analyze his assembled characters by means of their conver-
sation: talk about boiling milk and talk about differences in temperament 
between the sexes. Various other chatter reveals the attitudes of 
Isabel, Sir Bernard and Philip. 45 Philip is still taken by Rosamund's 
Beatrician perfection, or rather what he perceives as such: "the movement 
46 
of her arm was something frightfully important ..• " The reader soon 
learns what resides in the heart of this woman with the important arm: 
she is spiteful and sneaky. 47 Notice that in no way does such a revelation 
vitiate Philip 1 s vision: what seems real seems real, and his vision of 
Rosamund as she could be in her beatitude will not be taken from him. 
Actually, Rosamund persistently shows petulant annoyance at Philip's ro-
mantic vision of her--the implication being that she despises the disparity 
between his vision and her actuality. 
43Ibid., p. 55. 
44 Ibid., p. 59. 
45Ibid. 
46Ibid., p. 56. 
47Ibid., p. 63. 
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All the characters in the company, and especially Roger Ingram, 
are quite taken by the young king who loves to discourse on poetry; reluc-
tantly Sir Bernard and Ingram begin to accompany the Zulu to his lodgings, 
and in what Humphrey Carpenter might consider one of the book's wild eo-
incidences,48 Considine suddenly appears before them emerging from a cab. 
Later we discover that under certain unspecified conditions, Considine (in 
one of his many resemblances to Christ) is able to read minds, at least 
imperfectly. This. explains why he may know where to find two people to-
gether for whom he has concern. Coincidence in Williams operates similar-
ly to the way it works in a Dickensian novel. There reader wavers between 
an admiration for character and action; Dickens and Williams do not shrink 
from tailoring one to suit the other, because people affect events, and 
conversely, events affect people. 
Immediately thereafter Considine places the king in a hypnotic 
trance, using more words identifying himself with Christ: "I will make 
you free". Considine is saying here that he is the Truth (the Truth will 
make you free), and of course Christ said that he was the Way, the Truth 
and the Life. 49 Another Biblical text often comes to mind when Considine/ 
Christ imagery comes forth in this novel: "By their fruits you shall know 
them".50 Throughout the book, in a way diametrically opposed to the 
formalists who would say, as Peckham does, that Considine indeed is a type 
48
carpenter, Inklings, p. 94. 
49John 8:J2; 14:16, 
5°Matthew 7:20. 
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of Christ,51 the actions and intentions of the characters have meaning 
only as they are filtered through an understanding of extra-literary pre-
mise, in this case orthodox Christian doctrine. Considine claims he will 
make Inkamasi free; what that means remains to be seen. The Zulu leaves 
with Considine, as the others agree to join them for dinner the following 
evening. 52 
At that dinner the reader learns that the Rosenberg brothers wish 
to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem with the proceeds from their inherited 
jewels. The Rosenbergs seem to represent the truth of other religions (in 
my Father's house are many mansions), and their tenacious adherence to the 
ways of their fathers is held up to the reader as an indication of moral 
worth; that they are also dupes of financiers and Considine is quite be-
side the point. Considine himself (as deceiver) often mouths true senti-
ments, as he does when he says of the brothers' desire, "It is a great act 
of creation; they prepare for Messias."53 That, according to the author's 
belief, Messias came two millenia ago is also beside the point; if 
Williams is a conceptualist, this passag~ is not ironic. A man enters or 
engages into time and space at his choosing, since time and space are modes 
of perception, and a man can literally prepare for something that has 
happened or infer something that will be. This accords with orthodox 
Christian doctrine; without some realization of the temporal condition as 
51Peckham, Novels, pp. 7-26. 
52williams, Shadows, p. 6?. 
5Jibid. , p. 69. 
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a mode of perception, neither atonement (redeeming the past) nor pro-
phecy (anticipating the future) would be possible. The Rosenbergs then 
are minor characters who counterpoint the theme by representing salvation 
in a foreign mode. 
During the dinner conversation, Considine declares that he believes 
that the African proclamations are authentic, and indicates the first clue 
to his real identity when he maintains that "It is gospel, perhaps a cru-
sade, which is approaching.".54 As Considine continues his pronouncements 
by declaring that the conquest of death (resurrection) is like the inti-
mations heard in the flow of great poetry, Inkamasi remains listless. 
Throughout the discourse it is obvious that he is still entranced.55 Ingram 
begins inclining toward Considine's position, since he believes that the 
magnificence hinted at and echoed in the best verse must reflect a greater 
reality, and Considine seems to offer that reality.56 When later the 
characters learn that death, destruction and nihilism accompany Considine's 
gospel, they might possibly have looked back on the next words Considine 
utters; it is a statement of mystical identification, but an inverted one. 
A religious mystic wishes to flow into the object of his vision, to be-
come one with God by submission to God's will. To desire to take the na-
ture of things and draw them into the self is an admirable definition of a 
perverted mysticism, a diabolism: 
.54Ibid., p. 70. 
55Ibid., p. 71. 
56Ibid., p. 72. 
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You can know your joy and direct it .•• When your manhood's aflame with 
love you will burn down with it the barriers that separate us from 
immortality. You waste yourselves, all of you, looking outwards; you 
give yourselves to the world. But the business of man is to assume 
the world into himself. He shall draw strength from everything that 
he may govern everything. But can you do this by doubting and divid-
ing ~~d contemplating? by intellect and official science? It is a 
greater labour than you need.57 (Italics mine) 
Such attempted assumptions of the world to the self were the way of the Fallen 
Angels; the rejection of intellect and official science was the way of the 
medieval witches in their covens and the Renaissance alchemists who attempt-
ed to conquer nature by transmutation of base metals into gold. Indeed 
transmutation is a word dear to Considin& as we shall see. Any attempt to 
continue identifying Considine as a Christ figure rather than as an Anti-
Christ figure, therefore, is absurd. In Williams's own terms, Considine 
co-heres, .but he does not co-inhere.58 
Further, Considine claims that those two great ancient figures of 
secular and religious power, Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ, were types that 
anticipated the gospel to come. Considine's speech reflects the almost uni-
versal tendency of the several occult gospellers whether ancient or modern 
to include Christ as one of the prophets, or as a figure who somehow pos-
sessed part of the truth that a new faith proclaims; often they also iden-
tify truth with some ancient secular achievement,whether it be the 
the temple of Solomon, the pyramids of the Pharoahs, or the grand empire 
5?Ibid. 
58Shideler, The Theolo of Romantic Love: A Stud in the 
Writings-of Charles Williams (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966 , p. 184. 
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bequeathed by Caesar.59 For Considine, Caesar was murdered before he could 
accomplish his goals of empire, and Christ was a failure: 
Ah, if Christ had known love, what a rich and bounteous Church he 
could have founded! He almost conquered death in his own way, but 
he was slain like Caesar before he quite achieved it. So Christianity 
has looked for the resurrection in another world, not here.60 
The meaning of Considine's character turns on what he means by the word 
~· He only understands that any kingdom that fulfills the desires of 
men's hearts must be in this world "by the transmutation of your energies, 
evoked by poetry or love or any manner of ecstasy, into the power of a 
61 greater ecstasy." Like Uncle Andrew's speech in C. S. Lewis's The Magi-
cian's Nephew, this grand-sounding speech when translated into simple prose 
means that people of power can do what they like to whomever they like for 
62 
whatever reasons please them. Far from being lost in a never-never land, 
Williams is depicting a character with strong political power who is attempt-
ing to harness occult forces so that he may unleash them upon the world. 
The Nazi Party was well under way toward making such a plan actual as 
Williams was writing this book. 63 
59H. Spencer Lewis, F.R.C., Rosicrucian Questions 
The Com lete Histor of the Rosicrucian, 13th ed. (San Jose: 
Lodge of A.M.O.R.C., 1977 , pp. 188, 292. 
60
williams, Shadows, p. 73. 
61Ibid. 
and Answers: 
Supreme Grand 
62c. S. Lewis, The Magician's Nephew (New York: Macmillan, 
1955), p. 18. 
63Louis Pauwell, Morning of the Magicians (New Yock: Stei~ 
and Day, 1964), This volume documents the Nazi affilation with numerous 
occult groups, many of which sound as if they had aims remarkably similar 
to that of Considine. 
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Shadows of Ecstas~, it should be recalled, is a romance as well 
as a novel. At this stage of the action, Considine reveals that he has 
already ~tially succeeded; he is over two hundred years old. He has 
reached this great age retaining youth and vigor while increasing dra-
matically in power by refusing to participate in the ordinary intercourse 
of society--refusing to participate in the co-inherence that is, living 
64 
on "by the power not of food and drink but of the imagination ••• " A 
passage such as this can easily fool a reader; it fools Ingram. A number 
of the audience is usually left startled at Considine; if he is evil, why 
does he understand so much about the important mysteries? Notice that 
his understanding is almost always slightly askew from a Christian per-
spective. Williams permits his reader to succumb to Considine's seduc~ 
tion if he is not wary; it is a risk the author took with the success of 
his artifact, and this conceptualist device (no compromise) has probably 
done more to limit an appreciation of the novel than any limitations of 
invention on the author's part. 
What intensifies the possibility of misreading the book is that 
by the end of the dinner, Ingram is totally mesmerized by the new message 
of power he has received. 
His intellect had shown him the marvelous glories of the line of poe-
try, but as he passed into it and between its glories his intellect 
revealed itself but as one of the elements. A moral duty swept him 
on. This energy was to be possessed, to possess him, and then--then 
he would have time to find yet greater powers even than that. 65 
That Ingram now mingles "moral duty" with his previously merely aesthetic 
64
williams, Shadows, . p. 75. 
65Ibid., p. 79. 
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responses to life indicates change, and as we shall see, it is change for 
the better. Yet only by listening to the occultism of Considine, and later 
by coming under his direct influence, is the moral improvement possible for 
him. The artistic dilemma of the plot is once again solved if we apply 
what is by now becoming a refrain of these pages: a man is judged by his 
intentions. By being allowed to enter Ingram's mind, the reader sees that 
the professor of Applied Literature genuinely wishes to apply the power of 
poetry to his life. He realizes that he needs a more fundamental ground-
ing than aesthetics can give him, but his intellect and moral vision speak 
to his growing maturity as a man as well. That he is only able to realize 
the good by becoming the disciple of an evil man is irrelevant; Ingram is 
never to realize clearly that Considine is evil. Considine propounds 
themes of music to his guests as a means of enticing them; only the impec-
able realist, Sir Bernard, keeps his head entirely, preferring to take his 
66 
music "like a gentleman". The spiritual cannibalism of Considine and 
his followers is made explicit when he tells the story of a composer: 
He had overcome all things except music, but that lured him to spend 
his powe~ and he died. We feed on what he did that we may do more 
than he.b7 
To the logical response that everything would die were he serious, Consi-
dine replies with imprecision and rnystag0gy that what awaits is a "passion 
68 
of ecstasy". 
66Ibid,, p. 80. 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid. 
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If the Rosenbergs have chosen how they enter time and space, so 
has Considine: "Time and space hung behind him, his background and his 
possession, themselves no more separate but woven in a single vision ..... 69 
In other words, he has chosen to stand aloof from time and space themselves 
so that he may try to dominate them. This might even be a Kantian defini-
~ of evil. Not only does Williams attribute images redolent of Christ 
to Considine, but he often speaks of him in sacerdotal imagery, thus making 
him a type of the priest. Since his function is already identified as 
evil and even diabolical, Considine would then represent some kind of priest 
of the black arts. When he greets two associates,,he "stretches out his 
hand, the other bows over it, genuflecting a little at the same time .•. .,70 
He speaks as if he were participating in a ritual, 71 .and promulgates 
. 
authoritatively as if he held episcopal dignity: "The pemision is in your-
self •.. I only hear · it, but that is right that I should do. Are you a 
. 72 
child of the Mysteries"? 
Much later we learn that the man to whom he is speaking has offered 
himself as a human sacrifice so that he may attempt to conquer death in 
the most literal meaning of that phrase, i.e., physical resurrection. What 
Considine says at this time, however, is only that earthly desire if it 
is transmuted into imagination preserves life. The words of the other man 
69Ibid., p. 81. 
70ibid., p. 82. 
7libid., p. 8J. 
72Ibid. 
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will later become horribly remembered by the reader, "I will go down and 
come again living'',?3 ~ds which when spoken sound merely as if they were 
part of a rite, Considine, we discover, has been having a ritual supper 
with associates by night in secret before a ritual death; that death is 
not his own but Nielsen's, the associate. Unlike Christ the Anti-Christ 
does not take the burden on himself. The parody of the Last Supper is ob-
vious. The sound of gunfire interrupts them. Considine asks, "Can it be 
the African planes? ... Has the intellect failed to guard its capital?"74 
Some of the assembled seem to realize that Considine and the High Executive 
of the African gospel are the same person.75 In response to Ingram's en-
quiry, Considine echoes Hamlet when he told Horatio that there are more things 
in heaven and earth that are dreamt of in his philosophy: " ••. there is more 
in verse than talk about smiles and metaphors, and ·you know it. Hark, hark 
there is triumph speaking to man ... 76 Power and passion lie behind the 
dignity of verse and Considine is quickly making Ingram aware of the 
consequences of such a belief. 
Chapter Six, "The Mass at Lambeth," contains both the most potent 
and the most realized power shown in the book; it is striking that those 
critics who have discussed this volume seldom refer to the Mass, because 
the actions of Ian Caithness are the only actions that the protagonists 
?Jibid. 
74Ibid., p. 86. 
?5Ibid., p. 8?. 
76Ibid. 
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(so to call them) ever use to counter Considine (except for using the 
traitor who will be mentioned in turn). Without the Church and her repre-
sentative, the movement toward evil would stand completed. Caithness was 
not at the dinner, but Travers reports what had happened. He is 
shocked, but as a Christian and a priest, his first concern is for the soul 
of the all-but-forgotten Zulu (who it appears is also a convert). Through 
all the purple prose, Caithness breathes some good sense; speaking of 
Considine, he recognizes immediately that the power is infernal and that 
he holds some kind of power over Inkamasi. 
Many modern readers prone to be receptive to the flippant wit of 
Sir Bernard may think somewhat less of Caithness because in the middle of 
the priest's deliberations on the soul of a man, the skeptical peer muses 
that he· "wouldn't remember that God had ever been known to disagree with 
Ian."?? A close look will show that the reflection is more on the charac-
ter of Sir Bernard when Ian announces that he plans to see InkamGsi; and 
he takes Sir Bernard along with him. This courage, knowing Considine's 
great power, goes far beyond Sir Bernard's off-handed epigram which is 
likely to remain in the modernist's mind. Again Williams takes a risk 
of being misperceived in order to increase verisimilitude. As to the gos-
pel of Considine, the priest simply says "That's all been done."78 He 
is stating what all Christians would say, and he is attempting to do the 
will of Christ. What more can a Christian author make a character do for 
the sake of goodness? 
??Ibid., p. 90. 
78Ibid. , p. 91. 
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~hey discover Inkamasi sitting alone in the dar~ and rapidly the 
priest understands that the king's will is dominated. For a conceptualist, 
as for a mystic, the capital sin would be to rob another man of his will, 
for it is by the will that man is most truly himself; thus Considine, by 
having the Zulu under his power, has to that extent deprived him of his man-
hood. Williams makes clear that in the center of man is the rock-hard 
freedom of the will that no man can damage; another person can only tamper 
with its ability to affect the world. 'When Caithness asks whether he 
sleeps by his own will, Inkamasi replies• "I watch by the will of him 
that rules me ... Inkamasi is hidden within me. It's I yet not I that 
sleep."79 Caithness attempts an exorcism: the name of God is what Con-
sidine has hidden, 80 as he has also hidden the name of the Mother of God. 
In turn, the Trinity, the faith.and the body of Christ are invoked, all to 
no effect. The failure of the exorcism does not show defeat, but rather 
how strong an adversary Considine is for the Church. Caithness and Sir 
Bernard take the Zulu back to London. 81 
Caithness's plan is to take Inkamasi on the following day to Lam-
beth,where his evil can be offered to God at the Eucharistic Prayer. All 
the poor, muddled waffler Bernard can understand is that Ian's conversation 
seems to him much like Considine's, this knight of the realm having become 
a pattern of the invincibly ignorant, the converse of how he thinks of 
himsel£. 82 This is an example of conceptualist irony. 
79Ibid., p. 92. 
80Ibid. 
81Ibid., p. 94. 
82Ibid., p. 95. 
Not so much the facts, though they were grotesque enough, but the 
manner of the facts, di§turbed him--the triumph, the fanaticism, 
the shadows of ecstasy.e3 
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For all his contemplative desire, Sir Bernard simply has gotten himself 
into something he is incapable (from his own philosophical position) of 
understanding. The "shadows of ecstasy" refers to the resurrected life 
the occultists wish to obtain; presumably real ecstasy would be synonymous 
with immortality. 
Philip, meanwhile, as he drives the company to the cathedral, con-
tinues to muse on his Dantean vision; he is now realizing the eternal in 
his exalted perception of Rosamund, and is beginning to be able to reflect 
on his experience. His naturalism has become a type of the rationalist 
who looks for the ordered perfection arising from the welter of physical 
data. Philip is becoming mature: 
The moment of vision in Isabel's kitchen, when Rosamund's arm had 
lain like a bar. of fundamental power across the whole created universe, 
dividing and reconciling at once, had stirred in him-something more 
than masculine .•• Even if it passed--though of course it couldn't 
pass--but even if it did.pass, still its passing had yet nothing 
whatever to do with it.84 
The perfection he had seen in its permanence remains no matter what ephemera 
interfere with the understanding of truth. Philip would now be at home 
in Plato's Republic. 
The reader observes through Philip (the new believer in Truth's 
eyes) the Mass celebrated for the African's soul, mixing his comprehension 
with elements of his romantic vision. The act of the Mass the author 
83Ibid.' p. 97. 
84Ibid., p. 99. 
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calls "the restoring of a will."S5 This act, for a conceptualist, would 
mean that sacramental imaging or incarnating of a truth reflects the spirit-
ual. The actions of the Mass bring the will of Inka.masi back to himself; 
in a passage making a rare combination of mundane fact with expression--
"! drive this time"86--and liturgical exactness--"the Archbishop as 
swiftly went back to the altar, genuflected, and returned, bearing the 
Sacred Gifts"87 natural images merge with supernatural so that nature 
appears quickened by spirit, and eternity is felt to contain nature as 
well. Williams thus upholds sacramental intercession. 
Later Inkamasi is able to reflect on Considine's power over the 
African chieftains, saying that "many of them had become conjurers, de-
based things" and that "those who had sold their magic to Considine were 
88 
very greatly afraid." This statement clearly supports the notion that 
Considine had consciously worked with the occult arts so that he might 
attain power over others. It is probably worth reflecting at this point 
that some ten years after this book was originally written, and five years 
after it was published, Williams wrote an essay in which he discussed the 
nature of creating an Anti-Christ character for narrative art. We have 
seen enough of Williams's own creation and have participated in enough of 
his thoughts, so that only a few statements are necessary about a concept-
ualist evaluation of his artistic intentions. The Anti-Ghrist is to be 
85Ibid., p. 101, 
86
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87rb·, 
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88Ib.d 
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a pure embodiment of evil. Why then does he not engage in obvious 
cruelties or perversions? In order for an author to devise a subtle plot 
for a tale, Williams says that "Anti-Christ must not be mad, to begin 
with. He must not, even, be too romantic."89 He must be plausible 
enough so that ordinary and extraordinary people can follow him. He will 
stir people, but not really to the depths. 
Anti-Ghrist is bound to be a kind of sterile romantic; there is hard-
ly anything else far him to be--classic he cannot be and realist he 
will not be, and therefore, he must be the one kind of romantic who 
can become neither--the sterile or pseudo-romantic.90 
This means that he must pass, like Considine, beyond caring for such evils 
as killing or the like; all conduct far him is pride, the pride that draws 
everything to itself, the despair of Dante's Satan. "Anti-Ghrist cannot 
be funny. But neither can he have a serious purpose except to himself. "91 
It will be noted that Considine cares little for the revolution he has 
begun, nor far its consequences. His sole real interest is in himself. 
Yet Considine is constantly presented in Christ-like imagery, as we al-
ready observed; that is because "nothing but Anti-Christ cari be Christlike, 
in the consciousness of a kind of otherness from men ... 92 Thus the imagery 
one can attribute to him reverses the usual pattern of Christ imagery; to 
some extent a figure of Judas or perhaps Caiphas would be found in the 
working out of the plot associated with Anti-Christ. Inkamasi's knowledge 
89Williams, The Ima e of the Cit and Other Essa s, ed. Anne 
Ridler (London; Oxford University Press, 1958 , p. 119. 
90Ibid. 
91Ibid. 
92Ibid. 
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has removed whatever lingering doubts the reader may have had about Con-
sidine when he declares about him: 
He desired a greater mastery, and that I think he found. Most men 
waste their energies, even at their best they waste them, on fantas-
tic dreams and worthless actions. Lffe ~ sought to restore its 
strength ... LE9 hail_learnt to arouse and restrain and direct.:.to 
such purposes as ZEe/ chooses. -
These characteristics are those Williams has ascribed to the Anti-Christ. 
Destruction is also part of the co-inherence, but Considine re-
jects it as he does all life. He had bound the king's will as a child, 
as he had the wills of all the African kings. 94 What he desires more than 
anything else is a continent where his gospel may flourish, where he will 
be able to draw followers to himself so that he can feed from their wills. 
Here Dante's Satan is the model again; notice the reality of evil and its 
banality. To divorce one's self from goodness and truth is to wed idiocy. 
As Inkamasi observes: "mankind cannot be saved without intellect and 
without God."95 
That Ingram announces himself squarely on Considine's side96 after 
so much knowledge clearly demonstrates that the young don's obsession with 
poetry has overmastered his rational faculties. An old maxim derides 
those who do the right things for the wrong reasons; Williams through his 
character Ingram is telling the reader that it is meritorious to do even 
93w illiams, Shadows of Ecstasy, p. 108. 
94Ibid., p. 109. 
95Ibid., p. 112. 
96Ibid., p. 11). 
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the wrong things for the right reasons. Again one must turn to the doctrine 
of intentionality. Ingram wishes to know the pure power that is the sub-
stance of poetry, i.e., he wants to learn to know God. With that invin-
cible ignorance already observed, Sir Bernard questions the universality 
of Ingram's emotions toward poetry and Considine;97 to any conceptualist, 
a genuine limitation of the Aristoteli~n is his inability to deal with the 
private comprehension of particular men, precisely .because he is lost when 
not participating in universality. Though Ingram's reply is made to his 
wife, for a moment the character echoes the sentiments of his creator's 
attitude toward any approach to scholarship or to life that only speaks 
objectively: 
And in these centuries you've nearly killed poetry, with your appre-
ciations and your fastidious judgments, and your livas of this man and 
your stttdies in that. What do you know about 'huge and mighty forms 
that do not live l~ke living men'? P~~er, power, it's dying in you, 
and you don't hunger to feel it live. 
Roger's religion is poetry; this outburst then is equivalent to 
an orthodox Christian's revulsion at scholars who intimate that their dis-
covery questioning the historical accuracy of some bit of Biblical datum 
somehow undermines the tenets of the faith. Only Considine of all the pea-
ple in his experiences has echoed what is in Ingram's own heart; that is 
why he will follow the adept. 
Philip has completed his transformation in the meanwhile; it will 
be recalled that he has progressively moved from pragmatism to naturalism, 
97Ibid., p._ 114. 
98Ibid., p. 115. 
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to rationalism. He now decides for Rosamund and belief because he feels 
the necessity of faith for completing his life. He is acceding to a Kan-
tian categorical imperative; he fully takes responsibility for the inten-
tions of his will.99 
Within a page, Williams introduces a character antithetical in po-
sition to what Philip has become, identical to what he was when the novel 
began. The Prime Minister, Raymond Suydler, governs the nation by making 
shrewd guesses; Williams hints that he drifts with whatever situation he 
discovers, and finds what best works. By definition, this is pragmatism. 
Aside from furthering the plot, to juxtapose the shallowness of Suy~ler 
with Philip's decision for the moral good only shows up the conceptualist 
view of the emptiness of the pragmatic way. 
To Sir Bernard, the realist, Suydler is equally absurd 1 he had 
visited his office to report Considine as the High Executive of the 
African invasion, but his thoughts were other: 
And what was the good of trying to defend the intellect in this 
place of the death of the intellect? Witch-doctors were invading 
Europe, and he had gone running to an ape for help .. ,100 
Thus two invincibly ignorant characters confront each other; both are de-
cent gentlemen in their way, and Williams treats them with the respect 
they deserve• Suydler never understanding the real point, and Sir Bernard 
never being able to live in the mundane world. Yet, Williams shows us 
that they do communicate, because no matter under what delusions they act, 
99Ibid., p. 115. 
100Ibid., p. 119. 
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they are each fully human. Although, as usual, he is incapable of coming 
down to earth, Sir Bernard correctly observes: 
If A is the same as B, and B is the same as C, then A is the same as 
C. Other things may be true; for all I know, they may be different 
at the same time; but this at least is true. And Considine will have 
to hypnotize me myself before I deny it. Suydler is wro~g~-a guess 
may be true once and twice and a thousand times, for man has known 
abstraction, and no gorilla of a politician can take it away from him.101 
Each man if he chooses (for the conceptualist) sees truth to the extent 
he wills. 
The will affects not only individual souls, but society as well. 
Materialists generally apply fiction socially more than others, because 
they are confronted with phenomena and then interpret meaning, bypassing 
the understanding. Conceptualists must first filter the meaning of pheno-
mena through human intellect and psyche before any social meaning can re-
sult. As a result, it is only after understanding the motives of men like 
Considine, the Rosenbergs,and Suydler--men who manipulate public- events--
that the reader can be prepared to understand the social implication of 
their actions. Only at this point does Williams indicate the social effect 
Considine is having on England as a whole. Financial panic is threatened, 
the people are afraid, and money is pouring into the hands of financiers, 
102 to the aquisitive advantage of the Rosenbergs among others. Williams 
clearly indicates the potential suffering Considine is weighing over Eng-
land's head; this is one way that does not have the solidarity of the peo-
ple, because they do not understand what they are fighting against. 
101Ibid., p. 121. 
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Another aspect of Williams's technique is becoming apparent; just 
as the reader is able to grasp the significance of one movement of the 
action, he jumps to another by a novelistic equivalent of what in cinema 
is called parallel cutting; thus he moves back and forth among the thoughts 
and actions of the participants with a temporal simultaneity. It may 
be possible that this technique relates directly to conceptualism because 
only complete awareness of what underlies an action will allow an audience 
to know all the complexities of a character's intention. Dickens and 
Dostoevsky use such cris-crossing of action, albeit in longer "takes" than 
Williams, no doubt because of the slower pace demanded from the writing 
of their epoch. The straightforward, linear.techniques of Trollope and 
Tolstoy, or the modern D. H. Lawrence, are less involved than the pyro-
technics of, say, Dickens. These thoughts are offered tentatively, however. 
Williams does "cut" to Philip's meditations on the social impli-
cations of Considine's actions; Philip's insights into the nature of Love 
are now intensified because he realizes fully the disparity between his 
vision of the beloved and the real Rosamund,who spurns him. 103 
Once again, Williams abruptly cuts, this time to Ingram,who by 
this time would smash windows (and probably the universe if he could) to 
get at the source of truth in poetry. 104 He does become the model of the 
man who tries to attain his intuition of ineffable truth and cannot be-
cause such truth is unattainable; he wants he knows not what, but he desires 
it with all his heart: 
103Ibid., p. 124. 
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I want--yes, I--the thing that's me wants to know, not like want-
ing ap.l:-'le-tart with or without custard, but like wanting breath. 
There's air outside the windows, and I shall smash them to get it or 
I shall die.105 
In other words, he wants God; the church has not spoken to his condition, 
and so he searches for his desire where he can, in this case in Considine. 
Even more, his desire is to touch the source of Considine's power, that 
which is like his life's approach to reality in masters like Beethoven and 
Michaelangelo. 106 
With Dickensian co-incidence, the maid announces the arrival of 
Considine and his confederate Mottreaux. (In a throw-away line, Williams 
calls the young servant Muriel "Unnameable"; such anonymity and subordina-
tion of social classes conceptualists almost invariably find intolerable. 
By so labeling her, Williams clearly intends to cast reflection on the 
Ingrams, who are consumed with their own affairs, but who are quite able 
to keep someone in an inferior position to themselves.) 107 The Ingrams' 
self-concern makes clear why, with encouragement from his wife, Roger a-
grees to accompany Considine to Africa. 108 Roger is to become a disciple 
in the most literal sense, like the fishermen who followed Christ. 109· 
105Ibid. 
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Considine tells him that he rejects anything that absorbs his en-
110 
ergy. Ingram,too,must learn to withdraw and take power from others. 
Once again Considine echoes Jesus: "I have meat to eat that ye know not 
of," and in his own voice he declares, "I am in obedience to all laws I 
111 have not yet mastered." This means that someone may yet be able to kill 
him by treachery, and he cannot take time to guard against such an occa-
sion too zealously because that also is an a bso:r·ption of energy, One feels 
that anything that would be vanity to the author of Ecclesiastes would 
absorb Considine's energy. Roger chooses to go with them. 
The reverse gospel imagery reaches one of its crescendos at this 
time. Rosamund (Judas) has betrayed Considine (Christ) to the government 
(Sarhedrin). They come for him by night. In this case, Anti-Christ sup-
presses his enemies by first creat~ng an oppressive atmosphere and then 
by using his will to brush aside the officers who attempt to take him. 
"Who takes me?" he asks spreading his arms in mockery of the crucifixion 
d +'1 112 an .1. ees. 
Until this episode, the reader has never really entered Rosamund's 
mind, except fleetingly to know that she finds some people repulsive. The 
reader has not had enough information to judge Rosamund's betrayal of 
Considine except by inference from her usual petty and spiteful nature. 
That information Williams now places before the reader. She has sought 
110Ibid. 
111Ibid., p. 1JO. 
112Ibid., pp. 1J2-1JJ. 
130 
ineffable desire in her own wa~ and it has thwarted her approach. She 
seeks revenge for her life of pain: "her outraged flesh rebelled and cla-
moured from starvation for food."ilJ She hates everything that would lead 
her to happiness, especially from someone like PhiliB who loves her. Her 
life is a pattern of revenge, and she suffers acutely from the sin of envy. 
That is why she also wishes to destroy Considine, not so much because of 
his evil as because of her jealousy. But the next day the realization 
of magnitude --not of her action but of her intentions--strikes her; 
II like all men and women who are not masters of life, she swayed to and fro 
in her intention and even in her desire."114 In one part of her being, 
she has a secret longing for Inkamasi. That is why she has acted the ra-
cialist toward him. 115 Though alive, "she hated life ... "116 Since she 
has withdrawn from life, she has not chosen to enter time.and space, 
the conceptualist equivalent to Platonic non-being: " ... the strait-jacket 
of time and place imprisoned her as it imprisons in the end all who suffer 
from a like madness."117 
In the meanwhile, Philip has gotten on a bus to try to think 
through the muddle he has made of his affairs, but as he passes Liverpool 
Street Station, he hears shouts, the bus stops, and he suddenly discovers 
113Ibid.' p. 1J4. 
114Ibid., p. 1J5. 
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himself pushed along by a mob who are intending to threaten the Rosenberg 
118 brothers. Williams obliquely pleads thit the Jews have become scape-
goats because of their reaction to international and financial speculation; 
the complaint of' the rioters is that these "dirty Jews" have stolen the 
people's money. No one could be more bewildered by the turn of events than 
the poor Rosenbergs; that their cousin may have had some culpability is 
probable; the mob holds them responsible. It is the innocent l';ehemiah 
Rosenberg who is lynched. Philip is able to usher away the surviving bro-
ther with the aid of' police. 119 The intensity of this scene becomes even 
more poignant when it is realized that Williams wrote before Hitler's as-
cendancy; he predicted a potentiality he saw. As the crowd disperses, in 
the distance is heard the sound of guns. 1~0 The disastrous 
intertwining of war and finance is complete. 
Over 800 airships have attacked England, totall~ destroying five 
villages; the voice of Considine comes over the radio warning that a third 
attack on the country will be a thousand times stronger and will destroy 
Londo~. Part of what Williams seems to be saying co-incides with the by 
now proverbial observation ofT. S. Eliot about "dissociation of sensi-
bility." Considine had cloven art from logic, and when he enters Sir Ber-
nard's home shortly after his radio speech, he revels in the potential 
118Ibid. , pp. 137-1)8. 
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destruction of intellect121 and that he will teach London what feeling 
122 
really means. ~he restored Inkamasi tries to attack Considine, but 
Montreaux shoots him in the thigh. 123 For extremely various motives, Con-
sidine leads to his secret retreat not only Montreaux, but Inkamasi, Caith-
ness, the surviving Rosenberg, and of course his new disciple Ingram. 
Even with the attempt at completeness tried in this reading of the novel, 
a complete detailing of the motives of each character would require a dis-
cussion of an interminable length. Suffice it to say that the specific 
detail has become almost too dense to recite each element of the action 
without equaling or exceeding the number of words in the text itself. 
Williams portrays a London in full disarray. Refugees march, red 
glares flash through the sky, and the night is full of "hysterical shrieks", 
124 
while looters fight over goods. As the party moves along, African troops 
greet Considine shouting "Glory to the Deathless One." The nature of 
this army shows why the English people are living in such terror; the sol-
diers often leap and scream. Considine's car kills some of them under its 
wheels, but yet they continue to dance in frenzy. When some of the English 
fire on them, the Africans increase the intensity of their entranced 
121Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
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. 125 126 act~vity. They even begin to stab each other. Considine says to 
his party that he is showing to England "things wild and possibly trium-
phant," and that the Africans will have the death they have asked for be-
cause they only wish to die for the Deathless One. For this reason 
they are engaging in a mass suicide. (This seemingly most incredible of 
the incidents in the novel unfortunately was also vindicated by time as 
being plausible in 1978 when the followers of Rev. Jim Jones committed mass 
suicide in Guyana.) It should be becoming clearer that Williams's fantasy 
always at least tangentially relates to religious and social possibilities, 
and the wild improbabilities of a fifty year old Williams novel may become 
tomorrow's headlines. Considine has no pity for the Africans because they 
are not adepts. 127 He compares the slaughter to the martyrdoms of the 
C~istian saints; and denounces non-magical warship: 
... man ••• desired immortality, and deceived himself with begetting 
children and with religion and with art. All these are not ecstasy, 
but the shadow of ecstasy,128 
Considine calls himself a true adept: one who wishes only to learn the es-
oteric secrets. The result of such "wisdon" the reader has just seen. 
What he desires is sheer power sucked from whatever source he can find, 
whether it be sexual or vampire-like from the desires of others. He had 
been forced to act swiftly because the adepts believed that "the religion 
of Europe" left to its own defense would overpower them. In the market 
125Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
126Ibid., p. 158. 
127Ibid., p. 152. 
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place of ideas and the wills of people who have heard the Gospels, Anti-
Christ would have no power unless he also used (or manipulated others to 
use) physical force to effect his ends. All the brother adepts, "the 
united lodges" as they are called, 129 reminiscent of the organizational 
structure of secret societies that actually exist--all of them are united 
in this effort to overcome the Christian cultural domination of Europe. 
Williams is referring apparently to the widespread use of non-European 
influences that permeate such esoteric organizations whether the supposed 
130 
source of this wisdom be Moslem, A:frican, or "Easte.rn." 
Ingram's disregard for others is so great that all that he can 
desire is for the full ecstasy of power in poetry to master him and for 
him to master it. 
His very physical body was being carried in towards the energy which 
created art. Art ••• the ancient word so often defiled and made stupid 
stood for a greatness only partially explored.131 
He had no hesitation to think thus a mere few moments after the bones of 
human beings have been crushed under the vehicle in which he rides; such 
juxtaposition shows Ingram's moral impenetrability and selfishness. It 
is an evil of omission. Williams leaves the understanding of this serious 
character defect to the reader's own comprehension without any comment on 
right or wrong. Right and wrong are for the author matters of intention, 
and if a man's own obtuseness prevents him from detecting his own evil, he 
is thereby protected. Further, it would be typical of a conceptualist to 
129 Ibid. , p. 155. 
13°Arthur Edward Waite, The Occult Sciences (Secaucus: 
University Books, 1974), pp. 1, 8. 
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plant a complex evil in a character and to let the reader make what he 
will of him. Many intellectuals have thought the intellectual Ivan, who 
is the final cause of murder and destruction in The Brothers Karmazov, 
the protagonist of the book. Such ambiguities run rampant in the stories 
of Dickens, dating as far back as the complex creation of Jingles in 
The Pickwick Papers. Ingram is such an ambiguous character. 
As Ingram dreams, London panics. The presence of the destructive 
and even self-destructive Africans has caused the city to lose control. 132 
The City, it will be recalled, is for Williams the City of Man reflecting 
the City of God; he is showing what happens when alien forces strike a 
separation between the two. After the raid, the London-of-Man, so to 
speak, has temporarily cut itself off from London-in-God. This imagery 
• 1 
is consistent with the Logres image~ from Williams's poetry. 33 In 
Shadows of Ecstasy, he paints a Walpurgis Night in Cheapside and Ludgate 
Hill. On the High Altar of St. Paul's, a woman cracks a bottle over a 
man's head. 13~ In philosophical terms, Williams is saying that without 
the engagement of mind, beauty (which the adepts and Ingram desire) cannot 
be manifested; any attempt creates only tyranny or anarchy. Only Love, 
like the Love in the Man that restored Inkamasi, can lead to the beginning 
of goodness (will). 
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Sir Bernard can only understand that Considine has torn away 
"stability". 13.5 Roger's wife, Isabel, who has remained in the background 
far most of the novel and will hardly be seen again, emerges suddenly 
as an image herself. When pressed into action, she had sent Roger on his 
way because it would move them both toward goodness. In the following 
passage, Williams presents two of his characters at the limits of his 
artistic complexity= 
Sir Bernard wished he could have heard Considine and Isabel arguing--
not that Isabel would or could have argued. So far as he could see, 
she was saying exactly the opposite of Considine, and yet they were 
curiously agreed. They were both beyond the places of logic and 
compromise, even amused compromise. They were both utterly, utterly--
well, they were both utterly, and that was that.136 
Even Sir Bernard can sense the mysticism in Isabel's, if not sacrifice, 
then ability to attempt what she and her husband sought by sending him 
. 
way. "He who would find himself, will lose himself; he who will lose 
himself will find himself," in the words of Christ. He is also able to 
see that what she has accomplished is the mirror opposite of what Consi-
dine has done. He has drawn power into himself; she has sent out power 
to do good. In this vignette, Williams has presented a type of the 
conceptualist mystic heroine, a little epicenter of good transcending 
itself. 
As Sir Bernard ~uestions whether or not Considine will keep his 
word not to attack London (his realism prevents him from discerning that 
such obvious deceptions have no place in Considine's character--they would 
absorb his power), Isabel's only immediate concern is for the welfare of 
13.5Ibid. , p. 162. 
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the wandering refugees and for trying to make sure the children have 
enough milk. 137 She has lost herself, and thereby has found herself. And 
by so doing she realizes what has always been potentially part of here 
I'm no good at words ••• and I'm a fool at knowing things, but when 
there's something in you that has its way, and when Roger's doing 
what he must do, and I too--0 every fibre of me's aching for him 
and I could sing for joy all through me. Isn't that all the ecstasy 
that I could bear?1 gome and let's do something before it breaks my heart to be alive. 3 
This type of mystical woman will later take stage--center as Clohoe 
Burnett in Many Dimensions. 
When Considine's party arrives at his house by the sea, Caithness 
demands to stay with Inkamasi and is taken to him. As Ingram obeys Consi-
dine's eyes (evidently the residing place of much of his power), the adept 
states that the Mass at Lambeth has made Inkamasi liable to pain. 139 Here 
is one of those instances where the adepts realize that even on the level 
of the magic they pursue, Christianity is its equal at the very least; 
Considine seems unaware of the contradiction of his statement, as do all 
the others. Lest it be thought that it is an accidental artistic flaw in 
this one work of Williams, he was to repeat the idea of occultists recog-
nizing the equality of orthodo~ much more explicitly in his next novel, 
140 War in Heaven. 
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The adept has arranged the rooms with a perfection of art; as 
Ingram makes ready for sleep he allows a phantasmagoria of images to 
141 
overwhelm him. He dreams of the youthful Wordsworth running after 
him carrying a shell which he waves aloft as he shouts, "A god, yea, 
138 
many gods. " 142 From the shell emerges a voice singing the word power. 
Conceptualists do not necessarily deny the validity of dream interpre-
tation. Materialists like Freud can make vi~l use of this method in 
their system, because dreams shut out the intellect, and are a blend of 
physical sensation and meaning totally determined by a person's life. 
For the voluntarist, however, dreams can examine the residue of body and 
wil!; i.e., sum up a person's condition. The shell Wordsworth waves re-
presents art and poetry, and the power Ingram desires seems to emanate 
from its source; Wordsworth and Considine (as mental icons) have become 
fused in his imagination. 
One of the adepts is impervious to the cold. They all call Con-
sidine by his first name, just as much contemporary calling of people by 
given names is part of the initiatory rite of entering a profession. 
Considine has absorbed so much power that he can literally feel the nation 
shifting to his will. 143 Caithness has taken this all in; when he sees 
the magicians gloating over their power, he imagines no elusive ecstasy. 
He rightly connects these men with the massacres of the Christian mission-
aries and the ritual deaths of the Africans, atrocities performed solely 
141W.ll" 1 1ams, Shadows of Ecstasy, pp. 167-168. 
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so that Considine and his party can increase in power, and he further 
realizes that they had spared London from convenience, scam, and whim 
144 
rather than from humanitarian concern. Yet Considine still justifies 
his actions by claiming that poets like Shakespeare (in the songs of 
Ariel) had predicted the Second Evolution of Man, as the African up-
rising is popularly known. 14.5 Considine and Ingram (and it is a belief 
their creator evidently shared) believe power lies in certain lines of 
poetry regardless of meanings thus the line "on the bat's back" re-
occurs with incantatory frequency. The claim is that somewhere in the 
rhetoric resides the power. 
Throughout the novel, Considine has only hinted at his full in-
tention: that he wishes to absorb power and to overcome death. He begins 
to work on Ingram's soul by initiating him into the mystery of the adepts. 
In a room with beautiful yellow hangings, the two men find Nielson lying 
on a low divan. Seven days earlier, he had died in ritual sacrifice. The 
company is waiting far the possibility of his resurrection by magical 
means; they are experimenting with the possibility of genuinely being 
able to conquer death. 
Was the old symbolism of the mysteries true 1n its reversal? was the 
supernatural itself a visionary exhalation of the natural, and 
could it hold nothing but what the natural held?146 
There is nothing either to a black magician or to a Christian conceptualist 
prohibiting such thought. The principal difference between the two lies 
144Ibid., p. 172. 
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only in the moral integrity of the attempt. Considine and his cohort 
would kill to achieve their goal, and would try to circumvent natural 
processes instead of submitting to them. A Christian would pray that 
"Thy will be done." Therein lies the gulf between them. The attempted 
resurrection seems to be working. A quiver seems to pass over Nielson's 
face which has only a light pallor covering it after a week. As his 
eyelids flicker, everyone waits with enormous expectation. In that 
ghastly experience, Roger has learned that there is no personified Death, 
147 
only dead people. The hideous finality of death without the possi-
bility of eternity faces him squarely; only in life is meaning. But 
Williams will not sentimentalize; Ingram must understand with his own 
being, with his own free will, the life God offers him. Nielson's hands 
move and jerk, and then he is truly dead; instantly, the adepts draw the 
148 
experience to their wills. 
Later Considine haughtily proclaims his own superiority to Caith-
ness. "You should have kept to your pupils, Mr. Caithness, to the morals 
you understand and the dogmas that you don't. 149 Though Caithness offers 
to stay, Considine and Inkamasi wish to speak alone. Because of the 
priest's interference, Considine says that the king must choose his 
future, that is, whether to follow Nielson to death or to stay with the 
Europeans. His regality, the only part of his physicality that means 
147 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
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anything to him, has been taken from him by the nature of the European-
African conflict. He also recognizes that the conquering of death would 
retain for him some share of kingliness, and that Considine for all his 
evil is genuinely committed to a passion for king-like strengths 
I have always, so far as I could, done according to the gospel which 
moves in me and my friends, the doctrine of transmutation of energy, 
of the conscious turning of joy and anguish alike into strength and 
will, and of that passionate strenrlh and will into all the explora-
tion of all the capacities of man.!50 
Considine has in no way destroyed Inkamasi. The occultist admits the Mass 
freed the chieftain (thereby acknowledging Christ again), and he offers 
ritual sacrifice to him. 151 Inkamasi is facing the dark night of the soul, 
the truth that comes through temptation to despair. Europe has forgotten 
the Crown (kingship). Considine offers him majesty in death and potential 
resurrection. What allures the king is that only Considine, of those in 
152 his experience, understands royalty. He had studied the ways of Europe 
for the sake of Africa so that he could better govern; since he will not 
be able to rule, he decides for lordly death. His conflict between his 
physical reality and his mental anguish has permitted him to attain a 
Platonic rati~nalism in that he sees truth as a dialectical process be-
tween mind and body, because he has united within himself, not in such a 
twilight but in a more wonderful vision of opposites, the day of his own 
individual being and mysterious might of holy and awful office. 153 
15°Ibid., p. 180. 
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The sight o£ Nielsen's £lirtation with resurrection has e££ected 
a pro£ound influence on Ingram. The following morning he reflects on 
what happened, and feels his intellect slipping from him. 154 Since this 
has been the young don' s only previous mode of knowing, he is anguished 
indeed; his idealism is beginning to slip away from him as well as his 
full devotion to poetry. Like Philip earlier, Roger is starting to grow 
up. "That dead hand moving had abolished the whole edifice of his 
mind. "155 He is at least aware that physical sensation is real knowledge; 
such commonplaces as cups of tea or snow seem more important than even poetry, 
and the image of the wave (eternity) has erected a sea-change in his 
mind. 156 Williams is far too subtle an artist to allow instantaneous 
change; Roger is now a little bit better able to will his will. Even so, 
that trained imagination can still take flight: 
Who could tell what wonders waited then, when emotion was full and 
strong and sufficient, no longer greedy and grasping, when the senses 
could take in colour and essence and respond to all the delicate vi-
brations which now their clumsy dullness missed, when deprivation 
itself should be an intense means of experiencing both the deprived 
self and the thing of which it is deprived, when--when space and 
time were no more hindrances, where (fg? all one could tell) the 
body itself, might multiply itself ••. 
Williams anticipates the possible personality shifts that can take place 
in Ingram. His new-found ability to engage in sensuous experience:-(" colour 
and essence") and the dim awareness that something lingers in him su-
perior even to his poetic understanding ("when space and time were no 
i54Ibid., p. 186. 
155Ibid. 
156Ibid., p. 187. 
157Ibid., p. 188. 
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hindrances") combine in him to create an ecstatic view of his own poten-
tialities; he is now able to pray, even though he does not know to whom 
or to what he lifts his voice. 1.58 
Further, he can see ·the chance of a similarity between Ian Caith-
ness's love for human souls and old Rosenberg's love for jewelsl formerly, 
he would have simply embraced a mental projection as a truth. With his 
new-found experience, he is able to discern that because a hypothesis 
contains certain advantages does not necessarily make it true. "".l'he fact 
that man wanted a thing very much never did make it true--or the body that 
lay within would now perhaps be walking in the house and even coming up 
to speak to him."1.59 
Caithness is the only character to have a total grasp of the 
cosmic significance that each of the characters participates in; he even 
says that Considine is like the Anti-Christ, which Ingram rejects as 
160 preposterous. Considine is in the process of returning the jewels to 
the surviving Rosenberg brother. Caithness thinks Considine may take 
the jewels. What restraint would prevent him? He kills. 161 The adepts 
let the power of color course through 
attracted to the jewels for their own 
1
.58Ibid. I p. 189. 
l.59Ibid. 
160Ibid. I p. 190. 
161Ibid. I p. 191. 
162Ibid. I p. 192. 
themselves, but Mottreaux is 
162 
sake, not for power. Even though 
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greed is grievous sin, to fall back on such sin is a step in the right 
direction when one has moved to the depths of spiritual pride which a man 
like Mottreaux has experienced; need makes him capable of action, because 
he has intention in the world once more. He says that he will kill for 
. . 16 
the jewels and die, and even asks, "let me hold them while you kill me." 3 
Such seeming insanity is actually a kind of recognition of having cut 
himself off from normal human feeling, feeling that can even yet save 
Mottreaux; he refuses to transmute his desire for the jewels for their own 
sake into a desire fur a power they could give him; in this, at least, 
he therefore rejoins the human race. 
Throughout history, Considine now informs his audience, many men 
. 164 have tried death and resurrection though they have fa~led. A message 
arrives, and he places the jewels temporarily into the keeping of Mottreaux 
who in turn eyes them greedily. 165 The effect of the action on the 
characters issues from this point on in a mosaic of intentions that will 
soon be completed by Considine's death. Roger has at long last learnt 
true Socratic humility, that he knows that he does not know, and thinks 
of "his feeble little understanding."166 Here is a real first step toward 
wisdom for any conceptualist's understanding. In the same terms, Caith-
ness's own position is made explicit. 
163Ibid., p. 193. 
164Ibid., p. 194. 
165Ibid., p. 195. 
166Ibid. 
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The nature of his intellect and the n~cessities of his office had 
directed his attention always not towards things in themselves but 
6 towards things in immediate action. He defined men by morality ••. 1 7 
Williams describes his character in the terms of Kantian philosophy; 
Caithness does not know the thing in itself, but only in action, and men 
can best be known by morality. This is nearly a definition of conceptua-
list metaphysics and philosophy of man. Furthermore, he must fight with-
in himself to avoid religious dualism (evil being equal to good), which 
is a temptation to a conceptualist. For him 
••• Omnipotence mi~ht permit what it did not and could not originate. 
Yet other origin (outside Omnipotence) there be none. It is true he 
always added that it was a mystery, but a safer line was to i~sist 
that good and evil were facts, whatever the explanation was.168 
Though the rest of the passage speaks of his limitations as a man, these 
thoughts of Caithness would easily find a home in the writings of St. 
Bonaventure or Duns Scotus. As Ingram's intention has led him to humility 
though he follows Anti-Ghrist, Caithness--though essentially a proud man--
wills and prays to will the good that God commands. 
A word to Caithness from Mottreaux triggers the final action of 
the novel. Mottreaux gives the priest an indication that he will try to 
stop Considine and that he looks for help; Caithness agrees, but to what 
169 extent he is not aware. He only sees a breach in the unity of the enemy. 
Mottreaux has deceived Ian into thinking they are on the same side spiri-
tually, whereas the former adept only wishes to secure Rosenberg's jewels. 
In Roman Catholic adult instruction classes, it is a truism that at con-
167Ibid., p. 196. 
168Ibid. 
169Ibid. , p. 198. 
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fession one can easily fool a confessor, but that the deception is not 
on the priest, but rather compounds the sin. Peckham somehow thinks 
this situation reduces Caithness's viability as the novel's true pro-
tagonist, to the extent one person can bear that title in a Williams 
novel. 17° If anything, Ian's position is streng!hened because Williams 
continually puts before his reader the priest's unflagging intention to 
perform God's will. That he also succumbs to a temptation to kill (a 
lesser evil) for a greater good (the defeat of Anti-Christ) only demon-
strates anoth~r conceptualist point, that evil affects and even diminishes 
the effect of good. No act of moral good can be perfect if evil has 
tainted it. In this way only are Caithness's actions tarnished. 171 
That night, Roger for the first time perceives his room as na-
turally one with his learning, as one act in time and space. He is now a 
man of free will, and well on the way to true learning, despite Considine, 
. 172 the central deception of his life. Considine's eyes still seem arch-
angelic to Roger, who remains as unable as some of Williams's critics to 
tell a Christ figure from an Anti-Christ figure. 173 After Considine 
relates his personal story, Roger's mind temporarily becomes clouded with 
a barrage of confused sea-imagery. 174 Williams often includes the 
17°Peckham, The Novels of Charles Williams, pp. 17~18. 
171Williams, Shadows of Ecstasy, p. 199. 
172Ibid., p. 201. 
173Ibid., p. 202. 
174Ibid., p. 204. 
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fantasies of characters in such confused states; if to a conceptualist, 
all experience is subjective, then the ramblings of a soul in confusion 
are as central an experience as any objective event in his life. Who 
can say whether Roger Ingram's actions or his frightened daydreams are 
more "really" his experiences than any other? Actually whatever experi-
ences affect his relationship to his will and to God are the most truly 
his own, because they are the most intense. The reader soon discovers 
that Ingram has taken his experience into himself in much the same manner 
as Considine advocates; once again, the intentions of a character weigh 
far more vitally with the state of his soul than whether the content of 
an action is objectively good or evil. 175 Ingram is becoming able to 
transmute his experience into the joy of heightened experience, but un-
like his master, he understands such transmutation as part of his bounden 
duty: 
He knew delight and named it; unafraid, he summoned it, and it came. 
He rejoiced in an ecstasy that controlled itself in great tidal 
breaths ••. Ecstasy was no more a bewilderment.176 
Yet even in the ecstasy of achievement, Williams, by the tone of this 
passage, shows Ingram's further experience of temptation to spiritual 
pride in its full allure: ",.,only those who had not known it were afraid 
of it, for it was man's natural life."177 
He comes to himself discovering the spiritual presence of Con-
sidine. Mottreaux becomes livid with rage when the adept gives Rosen-
berg his jewels; the orthodox Jew believes the Lord will reward Considine, 
175Ib"d 
__ J._,' p. 
176Ibid. 
l??Ibid. 
205. 
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who in turn announces that Inkamasi will be offered to death and possible 
resurrection. 178 Ingram is appalled at what is proposed to happen to 
the king; Roger's conversion from an idealistic position to one of moral 
duty is already bearing fruit. Caithness goes much further, threatening, 
"You dare not touch h1m."179 
The priest openly states at this point that Considine is Anti-
Christ; Considine's reply could easily mislead the unwary: 
Neither Christ nor Anti-Christ ••• but I living a gospel of redemption, 
and the ends of the world hear it: whom do men say that I, a son of 
man, am?180 
He denies his first statement by instantly ascribing the imagery and the 
very language of the Christ to himself; in other words, he must be lying, 
and of course, like the proverbial Prince of Liars, Anti-Christ simply 
follows suit. Considine continues to take on to himself gospel epithats, 
but he tips his hand when he says, "'what we do we do quickly. '"181 This 
is not language ascribed to Christ's action in this case but to Judas's; 
Considine's offering of Inkamasi is nothing more than simply betrayal, or 
more honestly, murder, whether or not he accompanies the slaughter with 
ritual religious trappings such as genuflections and the presentation of 
the divan as an altar. 182 Only Caithness realizes the full significance 
178Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
i?9Ibid. 
180Ibid., p. 208. 
181Ibid. 
182Ibid. 
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of what Considine is domg, and draws a cruc:ifix from near his heart and 
prays.183 
Inkamasi makes clear why he permits his own deaths "' ••• though 
I hold you jjhe adepti/ for my own enemies and for misguided .men, I think 
you are the only servants of the kingship that is more than the king. n 184 
In other words, hierarchy must obey the dictates of hierarchical structure, 
and Considine's is the only power he can see announcing human power; it 
is the king's limitation and his death. 
That death is executed when the king drinks a chalice filled with 
poisoned wine; because the motions ascribed to the participants are 
charged with liturgical meaning, and the actions culminate in physical 
sacrifice, these men are performing a variant of the Black Mass. Roger's 
disgust permits him to experience the superiority of the will to the 
intellect. 
Till now he had believed that sense of harmony to be all they--
Isabel or Paradise Lost--had to offer, but he had begun to learn 
that to pause there was to be too easily content. The harmony it-
self was but a prelude to some enrichment of his w~gle being, which 
in its turn must be experienced in every detail •.• 5 
Something,far deeper lies beyond the constructs of his mind. Thereafter, 
in rapid succession, Inkamasi drinks, the enraged Mottreaux stabs Consi-
dine and drags Caithness from the room; Ian goes to the car while Mottreaux 
breaks into Rosenberg's room, seizes the jewels, and then lays hands on 
183Ibid., p. 210. 
184Ibid. 
lB5Ibid., p. 211. 
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Rosenberg himself, whose martyrdom is complete far he dies wholly for 
the God of Israel: 
His face, as he lifted it, was full of a scorn deeper than time, the 
scorn of his God far the spoilers of the holy places. He saw the 
distorted face of a greedy Gentile above him, and before the bullet 
searched his brain he spat at it once.186 
The purity of such intention finds reward in death for a Williams 
character. 
Ingram misunderstands Caithness's intention totally, and compares 
the priest to Caiphas, a piece of symbolism which is apropos indeed. We 
previously noted that the figures in a story of the Anti-Christ become 
reversed; whoever is Caiphas to the Anti-Christ does the world and the spirit 
good service, which is precisely what Caithness has rendered, even though 
he is justly and understandably horrified when the true meaning of 
Mottreaux's plot becomes manifest. To all those critics who claim the 
book a jumble, one paragraph above all explicitly states the unifying 
theme that holds all the tangled aspects of this novel together: 
'God help me! Caithness said. 'I didn't know.' He hadn't known; 
he hadn't, if it were blameworthy, been to blame; if he were res-
ponsible for Considine's death, it was a noble responsibility, 
and he would bear it. Out of evil, God brought forth good. He 
added, 'Then there's the less reason to say. •187 (Italics mine.) 
From all the actions of men nefarious and relatively good, the Good of 
God will be brought to light. This theme constitutes the underlying 
structure of this book, of the complete Williams corpus, and of concep-
tualist writing of any kind. And with the adepts fighting amongst them-
selves over the prostrate bodies of Considine and Inkamasi, it is Caithness 
186Ibid. , p. 213. 
187Ibid., p. 215. 
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who has the fortitude to return to the house for his coat and Ingram's 
188 before the two of them drive away. 
While attending various refugees, Sir Bernard greets the Ingrams 
189 the next day noon at his home. Roger is able immediately to see the 
purity of the change in Isabel, whose mysticism had previously been hidden 
from him. "He realized at the moment the vast experience of love which 
she had tmdergone, and accepted it."i90 They are clearly set upon a way 
that will lead them together to the experiencing of the Good. Yet he is 
left wondering whether Considine can possibly resurrect· himself, and what 
would happen if he could return. 191 Roger has clearly become a man 
trying to pursue goodness; but as scripture predicted, the Anti~Christ 
can possibly deceive the elect. The profundity of Considine's deception 
still lives on; also, there will be successors. 
For the moment, the movement is checked because it depended (as 
such movements often do) on the leadership of one man. Left to its own 
devices, the African army is totally overwhelmed. 
Considine's body, like Christ's, is missing. Mottreaux's stabbed 
body had been discovered along with the king's. Suydler and Sir Bernard 
have not changed in the slightest. But the converted Philip Travers, 
recognizing where the real determination came from, is setting to right 
188Ibid. , p. 216. 
189Ibid., p. 217.. 
190Ibid., p. 218. 
191Ibid. , pp. 223-224. 
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the tangle of events. At breakfast, Sir Bernard asks whether Suydler ar 
Considine deserves the votes of the peoples "Philip read it ithe news-
paper articli7 and far almost the first time in his life startled his 
father into real admiration by saying that he should vote for Ian Caith-
ness."192 Philip's vote of confidence for Caithness is the same one 
Williams expects to evoke in the reader; this perception can only work if 
that reader, like the book's conceptualist author, views goodness as the 
most important of the verities. Ian Caithness, far from being "intellect-
ualized beyond all belief," becomes the vehicle for a novel which for 
all its complications of farm contains an extremely simple point: the 
Good is good because God made it, and that statement is also a central 
doctrine of John Duns Scotus. 
192Ibid., p. 221. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCEPTUALISM IN THE REMAINING NOVELS 
To exhibit the conceptualism of the remaining novels of Charles 
Williams, it is necessary only to point out how the system is regulative 
in each book. Charles Moorman has observed that "Almost a..rJ.y sentence in 
Emerson or St. Paul, almost any line in Coleridge,co~tains the germ of 
all of Emerson or St. Paul or Coleridge or Charles Williams. 1 Thus, if 
one were to seize on a single essential element of plot, character,or ar-
gument in such writers, one would possess the key to the whole. Conse-
quently, if a critic treats one of the many controlling points of an ar-
tifact and thereby shows that conceptualism is operative, then conceptual-
ism can be assumed to inform the full work. 
-;:'ake, for instance, the handling of the three protagonists in War 
in Heaven. Robert W. Peckham has shown that the symbolical functioning 
of these characters partakes of Arthurian parallel~ the Archdeacon of 
Fardles takes the role of Galahad, the Duke of the North Ridings repre-
sents Percival, and Kenneth Mornington images Bors. Further, these charac-
ters also stand for the respective functions o£ the Church, the State and 
1Char les Moorman, _Th+.e_.;;.Pr.:;....:e-'c--:i-::n'-:c'-t-'s'--o-:'f':--:F--:e_l_i_c_i--:t-"y'-: __ T--:h::o:e:--'A_u:-'g~u_s-:t=-l-· n_ia:::.r_" 
City of the Oxford Christians (Cainsville: University of Florida Press, 
1966), p. JO. 
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the laity. 2 In addition, they may be seen as representative of "superior 
wisdom," the protector of tradition, and "the excusable anger of the 
faithful. ,.J The equivalency of this symbolism to the will-intellect-body 
conceptualism and to the manifold me~~ings of Dantean interpretation is 
readily apparent. The last of Peckham's trichotomies (which appears to 
be anagogical) requires additional commentary. 
The Archdeacon, The Duke,and Mornington (according to this read-
ing) represent alternative ways men of good will can war for what is right 
(the transcendental Good). Mornington is consistently impulsive in his 
actions, desirous only of destroyL~g the enemy. Contrary to the over-
whelming majority of twentieth-century moralists, Williams views his charac-
ter's attitude as proper; the chapter in which he is killed defending the 
Graal is entitled "To-night thou shalt be with Me in Paradise."4 TheCa-
tholic Duke desires that the Truth be preserved at all costs; his conduct 
is always explained in terms of his intellectual sustenance on Roman doc-
trine. In contadistinction, the Archdeacon's practical reason "and con-
templative habits lead him to open himself up toward becoming God's instru-
ment .. . "5 In light of the earlier discussion of conceptualist aesthetics, 
2Robert W. Peckham, "The Novels of Charles Williams," Disser-
tation, University of Notre Dame, 1965, pp. 27-52. 
p. 28. 
4 Charles Williams, War in Heaven (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1966), pp. 237-248. 
5Peckham, Novels, p. 28. 
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the Way of the Body is characterized by Marnington; the Duke is a man of 
intellect; and the Archdeacon is a prototype of the mystical hero, the 
man of will. 
Many Dimensions is, in a number of ways, a companion-piece to ~ 
in Heaven; both concern themselves with the relationship of nature to 
supernature, and both "turn about the unity of creation with its ulti-
6 
mate oneness with the transcendent." In Many Dimensions, as with the 
Graai of the earlier book, the characters fight over a talisman of power, 
this time the Stone of Suleiman {Solomon) which is capable of transporting 
its bearer in time and space. This ability to enter and manipulate time 
and space and to enter it where one chooses has already been shown to be 
peculiar to conceptualism (if, as in Kant, that doctrine is taken serious-
ly), rather than as merely an element of fancy. But it has further been 
shown that Williams does not introduce elements of fancy for their own 
sake. Therefore, the operations of the Stone in the plot are part of a 
conceptualist understanding of potentiality. Also, the embodiment of 
spiritual truth in matter (coupled with the free choices of each figure 
f 
in the book) can only be rationalistic or conceptualistic. The discussion 
of Lord Arglay, who is certainly, along with his secretary, one of the 
two principal characters, takes a decided turn toward Aristotelian 
universality: 
There is no case byond law, the Chief Justice answered. We may 
mistake in the ruling, we may be deceived by outward things and 
cunning talk, but there is no dispute between men which cannot be 
solved in equity. And in its nature equity is from those between 
whom it exists~ it is passion acting in lucidity.? 
6Tb•d 27 
.=....1:_· ' p. . 
7Williams, Many Dimensions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
p. 156. 
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The contention here is that no rationalist could have (or would care to 
have) parlayed the creation of Lard Arglay as an essential perpetrator 
of action in a novel with a theme entailing the principles of spirit in-
carnate in matter. Also, more than likely, the rationalist would react 
adversely to the idea of the Stone; to him it would be purely evil. Only 
a conceptualist would try to keep all these processes in balance. 
On the surface, the plot of The Place of the Lion appears to be 
rationalistic. The novel speculates on what might happen if the Platonic 
Archetypes, the Transcendentals themselve~ were accidentally unleashed 
upon the world. It should be borne in mind that a realist could also 
write about such transcendentals, as could the conceptualist. If, how-
ever, will and intellect are separated, and the will is shown superior to 
the intellect, conceptualism is operative. One of the important charac-
ters, Damaris Tighe, has been writing her di~sertation on Peter Abelard. 
Through the years she has become an intellectual snob; when the arche-
types are abroad, she has a nightmarish vision of Abelard himself, which 
affects her in much the same manner that the ghosts in A Christmas Carol 
affect Scrooge. She recognizes not so much her abuse of other people as 
in the Dickens story, but rather her abuse of the intellect. As another 
character later informs her: 
You saw what you know ... and because it's the only thing you know you 
saw like that. You've been told about it often enough; you've been 
warned and warned again. You've had it whispered to you and shouted 
at you--but you wouldn't stop or think or believe. And what you 
wouldn't hear about you've seen, and if you're still capable of 
thanking God you'd better do it now. You, with your chatter about 
this and the other, your plottings and plannings, and your little 
diagrams, and your neat tables--what did you think you would make 
of the agonies and joys of the masters? 0 I know such things must 
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be: we must shape the patterns in what they said--man must use his 
mind. But you've done more than use it; you've loved it for your own. 
You've loved it and you've lost it. And pray God you've lost it 
before it was too late, before it decayed in you and sent up that 
stink liP Damaris Is vision' Abelard stank mightil)7 which you smes t' 
or bef~re the knowledge of life turned to the know.Ledge of death. 
(This is reminiscent of the stench of Father Zossima, the apocryphal St. 
Thomas Aquinas figure in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karama~ov.) Almost 
immediately Damaris recognizes that she should not wallow in self-pity, 
but "ought" (the Kantian word Williams lingers over in the text, using it 
thrice in three lines) to aid one of the other characters who is in trouble.9 
This last incident, of course, is an example of will b actior atcd is de-
picted directly after the intellect is shown to be insufficient lli~to it-
self. Later Damaris is to reflect to herself that "interpretations nearly 
10 
always are wrong." (not knowing the thing in itself.) Whatever may be-
come of her, "Love Dili] or wisdom, her act awaited her."11 Once again, 
this is conceptualism. 
The Greater Trumps ls easily the most symbolical of all Williams 1 s 
novels. Each of the twenty-two trump cards of the Tarot pack play in a 
wealth of imagery, dense even for this author. Also, it is the hardest 
of the novels from which to isolate one or two factors for discussion. 
Suffice it to say that L~ the background of the history of the 
8
williams, The Place of the Lion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1966), pp. 135-136. 
9Ibid., p. 137. 
10Ibid., p. 170. 
11Ibid. , p. 171. 
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Tarot that Williams invents for the story, among the seventy-eight dane-
ing figurines that correspond to the controlling deck, stands the Fool in 
the middle as the other figures wheel and gyrate to the Great Dance. 
(T. S. Eliot alluded to this motionless character as a source for "the 
still point of the turning world" in The Four Quartets, with the identical 
meaning.)12 Sybil Coningsby--the name symbolism from Lord Beaconsfield's 
novels is intentior.al--the mystical heroine, is the only person who can 
see the Fool move. "Surely that's it, dancing with the rest; it seems as 
if it were always arranging itself in some place which was empty for it."13 
Peckham has analyzed this passage at length: 
To the person on the road to sanctity, then, the Fool is everywhere 
at once, ir.dulging in a perpetual exchange with all the figures, so 
that in naturalistic terms, it is perpetually arriving at the quiet 
center every fraction of a second, and therefore, always appears to 
be there; only the sharp eyes of Holy Wisdom can see it dancing 
everywhere, sustaining all things.14 
This is the Bonaventuran view of God,whose center is everywhere and whose 
circumference is nowhere. Thus the central image of the novel contains a 
mystical heroine who envisions a conceptualistic understanding of the 
Deity. At the ve~y climax of the book, a golden cloud clears away to re-
veal this mystic in ar. act of charity. 15 Williams telegraphs his symbolism 
as he gathers together all the characters i~ the denouement. 
12 Grover Smith, T. S. Eliot's Poetr 
Sources and Meanir.g (Chicago: 
321-322. 
in 
pp. 
13Williams, The Greater Trumps (New York: Farrar Strauss and 
Giroux, 1969), pp. 80-81. 
14 Peckham, Novels, p. 111. 
15Williams, The Greater Trumps, p. 220. 
159 
The three great orders of grace and L~tellect and corporeal strength, 
L~ those immature servants of their senarat~ degrees, gathered round 
the place where Sybil knelt by Jpanna, and the search within and 
the search without were joined.1° (Italics of the three conceptualis-
tic elements mine.) 
That final phrase also indicates the indissoluble continuum that exists 
between nature and supernature. To a conceptualist, the distinction is 
formal, and their integration is indicative of the fully mature person. 
These paragraphs make no sense except as written by a conceptualist. 
Descent Into Hell is the only one of Williams's fictions that does 
not treat the theme of power. Of all his imaginative works, it is the one 
most redolent of ideas he presents in detail in the non-fiction, espe-
cially the themes of exchange, substitution and co-Lnherence. Pauline 
Anstruther's aeveternal acceptance of her martyred ancestor's fears, and 
. 
Peter Stanhope's depiction as an obvious surrogate for Charles Williams 
himself as the direct mouthpiece for the doctrine explored in He Came 
Down From Heaven,are but a few of many examples of its relationship to 
other works in the Williams canon. Probably the most memorable character 
in the book,- and perhaps in all the novels, is Laurence Wentworth. Through-
out the course of the book, Wentworth, a highly respected historian, 
steadily loses grip with the outside world--not because he is afflicted 
with the popular conception of mental disease, but because he chooses Hell. 
Since a conceptualist cannot judge his character from the outside, Williams 
permits the reader to observe Wentworth's thoughts and decisions from the 
author-omniscient point of view. 
16Ibid. 
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Early in the work, the doomed historian merely decides that tell-
ing a lie would be expedient--in this case misirSorming the participants 
in a pageant that their uniform epaulettes are historically accurate 
when they are not, Step by step the man withdraws more and more from so-
ciety as the work progresses. The author further shows us the workings 
of Wentworth's mind: 
A remnant of intelligence cried to him that this was the road to 
mania, and self-indulgence leading to mania. Self-pr'eservation it-
self urged him to remain; lucidity urged bim, if not love. He stood 
and looked and listened ... He went out of the room, down the soft 
swift stairs of his mind into the street of his mind, to find the 
phantoms of his mind. He desired hell. 17 
These last three words are not a judgment, but a logical conclusion re-
sulting from the evidence of the character's own mind. For the four monist 
positions, all truth is totally given in experience. As a result, the 
disparity ~onstantly stressed in the book between the inner Wentworth and 
the outer would have no real meaning. Of the dualists, the realist and 
the rationalist judge people by actions, i.e., the content of one's con-
duct is viewed as close enough to one's intention that any distinction 
drawn is superficial. For the conceptualist, wrong action may often spring 
merely from misinformation or misdirection. Evil (which it will be re-
called is a palpable state for the conceptualist) is identical with a per-
nicious free choice against the nature of things, the Co-inherence that 
Williams outlines so clearly. In the passage quoted, Wentworth has cho-
sen complete separation (the "In-coherence") from others and receives the 
fruits of his desire. He then rejects his betrothed for a succubus; 
17Williams, Descent Into Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
p. 50. 
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symbolically he has taken his fantasies and other chimeras 
for the desired object of the will. The more he· withdraws, the more he 
is unable to communicate; he becomes what the modern psychologist would 
call disassociated. By the novel's end, no one is able to offer him any 
comfort as he becomes locked in the prison of his mind. Presently, he 
confronts his main rival as an historian, Sir Aston Moffat: 
If he had ever hated Sir Aston·because of a passion for austere truth, 
he might even then have laid hold on the thing that was abroad in 
the world and bee~ saved. If he had been hopelessly wrong in his 
facts and yet believed them so, and believed they were important 
in themselves, he might have felt a touch of the fire ... and still 
have been saved. In the world of the suicides, physical or spiritual, 
he might have heard another voice than his and seen another face. 
He looked at Sir Aston and thought, not "he was wrong in his facts," 
but "I've been cheated." It was his last consecutive thought.18 
The insistence by the author on the absolute nature of his character's 
fre~ choice which is not directly-perceivable by the outside world is a 
hallmark of conceptualist thought. Unlike the realist, he is able to 
will that which is not his own good. To experience the collapse of Went-
worth can be harrowing for a reader: "Guns, fast cars and fists are ra-
ther tame for anyone who has watched the soul of a Williams character 
disintegrate."19 
In his last novel, All Hallows' Eve, Williams makes his most ra-
dical use of distorting space and time, both of which are constantly put 
forth as matters of perception. An obvious instance occurs when the dead 
Lester Furnival first sees her husband dimly on Westminster Bridge; he 
18Ibid. , p. 219. 
19Review of Descent Into Hell, The Episcopalian, V (Aug. 1965), 
p. 8. 
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appears vague and shadowy to her. She is not particularly aware of any 
time having elaps~ since they were supposed to meet. The husband,- Richard, 
simply experiences an apparition of his dead wife a month after she was 
20 killed in a bombing raid. 
j 
Lester and the other dead girl, Evelyn, pass easily from one time 
and place to another because they occupy a temporality different from that 
experienced by the living on earth. Lester's condition, as events prove, 
is purgatorial; the best that can be said for poor Evelyn is that she may 
be in a state like the souls in the antechamber of Hell in Dante's Commedia; 
forever unable to make up her mind, she is a whiner soon to become a 
·whine. They are both moving rapidly to that eternal state "where all times 
21 
and places coexist simultaneously. " 
One of the living characters, one of whom has mastered time~ 
·~' . -
space difficulties for evil purposes, can extend himself, although to 
do so in this life requires a rejection of the Co-inherence. Simon the 
Clerk for a terrible price ha~ learned how to project several duplicates 
of himself to important centers of the world, much as the stone of 
Suleiman could be divided physically in Many Dimensions. Such division 
is the means of Simon's undoing. 
Also, more elaborately treated in this last novel than in any of 
the others is Williams's idea of the City. The concept of the City in a 
20Williams, All Hallow's Eve (Boston: Noonday Press, 1971), 
pp.4-6. 
21Alice Elizabeth Davidson, "The Fictional Technique of 
Charles Williams," Indiana University Dissertation, p. 88. 
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Christian writer immediately conjures up an image of the great Bishop of 
Hippo. But as Charles Moorman has noted: 
Williams makes almost no use of St. Augustine's theory of knowledge, 
seemingly ready-made for his purposes, and although it is certain 
that they are largely in agreement as to the certainty of the presence 
of God's hand in history, one is tempted by Williams's discussion 
to conclude that in spite of his enormous respect for the African 
doctor, Williams finds Augustine a rather inhuman and unsympathetic 
subject.22 
Precisely what a conceptualist would fL~d inhuman in the saint is his 
rationalistic framework, in this context, the absolute separateness of the 
City of God from the City of Man. Here is how Moorman sees the City as 
Williams understands it in All Hallow's Eve: 
... the transition area between life a~d judgment, but, more impor-
tantly, as "the precincts of felicity," the actual Co-inherence of 
all time and space and matter; the City is the redeemed creation 
restored to the beauty and holiness of the lost Eden.23 
Unique to the conceptualist position is that, unlike the Augustinian syn-
thesis, this philosophy makes no cleavage between nature and supernature, 
as has been established earlier. When Betty's soul enters the purgatorial 
world from our own, only her mortality prevents her from sharing the same 
mode of knowing and experiencing as the dead girls: 
She had moved on into the thing happening, for here all things were 
happening at once. These were the precincts of felicity. The feli-
city of the City knew its own precincts, but as yet, while she was 
but a vagrant here, she could not know them as such.24 
The exhibition of conceptualist philosophy and theology are regu-
lative in all seven of Charles Williams's novels is complete. 
2~oorman, Precincts of Felicitv~ p. 38. 
23Williams, All Hallow's Eve, p. 51. 
24Ibid., p. 83. 
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If it is true that every writer holds a latent system of thought 
in his work, and if it is also true that by discovering what that system 
is and then by showing how it is operative in his work the full pattern 
of his artifact is thereby revealed, then the approach that has been 
applied in this study has further implications for literary criticism. 
That has been the hope of its author. As the fragmentary hints that have 
come from the novels treated in this chapter seem to indicate, the system-
construction method of literary criticism can prove fruitful for discuss-
ing isolated themes, plots, images and characters from a work, as well as 
for treating a complete literary production. It is further hoped that 
other critics who are sufficiently tutored in philosophy and theology as 
well as in literature will be able to apply this method to other works and 
authors. A study of, say, William Butler Yeats as rationalist or of Dylan 
Thomas as idealist would explain much about both the similarities and the 
dissimilarities in the accomplishments of those two poets. To continue to 
refuse evidence other than from the received methods smacks of the myopia 
which from time immemorial has been the bane of scholarship. Alexander 
Pope's famous dictum for literary critics may well serve as the best motto 
for the preceding pages; 
A perfect judge will read each work of wit 
With the same spirit that its author writ.25 
Z5Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 11. 233-234. 
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APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
CHART (F POOSIBLE REAL PHILOSOPHIES 
category (e) the (i) of (o) System Example 
Will intuits meaning existence 1. Mysticism Chesterton 
Mind perceives categories essence 2. Idealism Keats 
Body senses elements matter J. Naturalism D.H. Lawrence 
Agent alters utility relations 4. Pragmatism Rand 
Will intuits meaning existence 5. Realism Pope 
Mind perceives categories essence 
Mind perceives categories essence 6. Rationalism Wolfe 
Body senses elements matter 
Will intuits meaning existence ?. Materialism -:reiser 
Body senses elements matter 
Will intuits meaning existence 8. Conceptualism Hopkins 
Mind perceives categories essence 
Body senses elements matter 
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APPENDIX II 
APPENDIX II 
CHART OF IDEALIST PERPENDICULARITY 
Plato's 
Ideas 
Einstein's 
Materialistic 
Universe 
Bergson's 
God 
Aristotle's 
Prime Matter 
(N.B. This is the Whiteheadian version OI 
idealistic categories.) 
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